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Abstract 
The learning processes that take place within small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) have attracted 
increasing attention among academics and managers. Growth-oriented SMEs in particular have been a 
focus of academic attention given their importance to processes of economic growth, although 
understanding of the learning processes within these enterprises remains limited, especially with regard to 
their interplay with intermediate and peripheral economic contexts.  
This qualitative study, based on nine case studies of growth-oriented SMEs, provides important insights 
into the learning process which underlies their entrepreneurial capability and ‘openness’ to innovation 
across different sectors operating within the  intermediate economic context of Portugal. The study 
analyses two different groups of SMEs, five from high tech industries and four from traditional 
manufacturing industries, to enable comparative analysis of how sectoral context can trigger different 
responses, learning processes and organisational outcomes. Primary data collection within the selected 
case study firms was undertaken through combining documentary sources with semi-structured 
interviews with owner-managers and other key actors. Qualitative analysis centred on gaining insights 
into processes of entrepreneurial learning and comprised both within-case and cross-case analysis.   
The findings of this research contribute to knowledge on the learning processes within growth-orientated 
SMEs in intermediate economic contexts in three main ways. First, due to the constraints of the domestic 
economy, all companies internationalized whilst relying heavily on their in-house capabilities. In this 
internationalisation process, high-tech companies were characterised by more formal, decentralised and 
cooperative learning arrangements than traditional companies, which tended to be more ‘closed’ and 
showed simpler and more informal learning. Second, high-tech companies demonstrated a larger and 
more varying combination of learning processes compared to their traditional counterparts. In the high 
tech companies, learning was not only more systematic and more frequent, but also operated at a wider 
inter-organisational scope, with more radical change and a greater openness in terms of innovation. Third, 
the owner-managers were the principal knowledge gatekeepers of the learning processes through 
absorbing and disseminating external complementary knowledge and via varied learning modes. Owner-
managers were therefore critical for integrating their entrepreneurial capabilities within the organisation 
and in moderating the firm’s propensity to engage in ‘open innovation’. This moderating role was 
accomplished by external interactive learning, internal planning and experiential learning. This 
augmented the firms’ absorptive capacity – their ability to access and apply external sources of 
knowledge within their innovation processes – and entrepreneurial capability – their ability to identify, 
select, shape, and coordinate internal and external conditions and resources to explore opportunities. 
These findings are of significance to owner-managers with regard to better addressing SME needs in 
terms of expanding their international business knowledge and stimulating greater regional cooperation. 
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Learning Processes in Growth-oriented SMEs: the 
Portuguese Case 
1. Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1. The learning process 
It is largely accepted that small and medium size enterprises
1
 (SMEs) contribute 
significantly to the general economy, and there is a substantial body of research 
addressing issues of SMEs’ growth. One reason for research interest in SMEs relates to 
their limited resource (and knowledge) base and lower capability to shape their external 
environment (Smallbone et al., 2003; Huggins and Johnston, 2009). Their growth 
within turbulent and highly competitive contexts is often dependent on their being able 
to access external resources and support (Wyer et al., 2000). These characteristics are 
intrinsic to the particular character of entrepreneurial and organisational learning in 
SMEs and their ability to respond to opportunities and to grow (Penrose, 1959).  
Growth involves the effective application of knowledge resources (Greiner, 1972, 1998; 
Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Scott and Bruce, 1987). Therefore, SMEs growth and 
learning are intrinsically linked at individual, team and organisational levels and, as 
stated by Deakins and Freel (1998, p.153) “the ability of the entrepreneur and 
entrepreneurial team to learn is crucial to the growth process”. The learning activity of 
SMEs is often unplanned and unsystematic, processed by personnel or departments that 
predominantly organize other activities (Huggins and Johnston, 2009). While SMEs’ 
knowledge contributes to their learning performance, entrepreneurs have the experience 
that allows them to identify opportunities (Wang et al., 2010; Penrose, 1959). Success 
in growing a business is thus dependent on how the entrepreneur learns from experience 
and also the existence of a supportive group of organisational collaborators. Learning in 
organisations is both an individual and collective process (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000) 
and can involve a tension between exploitation of efficiency-related routines (e.g. 
                                                          
1
According to the EU Commission definition, an SME is a firm with fewer than 250 employees, while 
small firms have up to 50 employees (Curran and Blackburn, 2001). SMEs have been growing in number 
in Europe and have shifted their advantage from traditional manufacturing industry toward knowledge-
based economic activity (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). According to Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 
(2007), in Portugal, SMEs account for 99.5 % of the total number of firms and 74.7% of total 
employment, contributing to 59.8% of gross value added. 
 2 
production efficiency) and more radical innovation involving the research and 
development of completely new products and procedures (March, 1991), and there may 
be a need to resolve tensions and crises that are ongoing and overlapping (e.g. involving 
debate and conflict around the focus of learning). 
The literature on entrepreneurial learning focuses on the nature of individual learning, 
whereas perspectives on organisational learning emphasise that entrepreneurs are one 
amongst potentially numerous other actors involved in generating and distributing 
knowledge throughout the firm (Harrison and Leitch, 2005). Organisational learning 
occurs when the firm improves its performance through learning something new 
through collective mechanisms associated with the generation, distribution and 
institutionalization of knowledge (Jones and Macpherson, 2006). The concept of 
organisational learning is highly relevant to SMEs (i.e. with up to 250 employees) but it 
has been argued that owner-managers/CEOs are central to the learning processes of 
many smaller enterprises (e.g. Wyer et al., 2000). The concept of entrepreneurial 
capability (EC) combines those collective and individual dimensions of learning and has 
been defined as the firm’s capacity to sense (the scale of the entrepreneurial individual), 
select, and shape opportunities, and synchronise strategic moves and resources (at the 
level of the firm) in pursuit of these opportunities (Abdelgawad et al., 2013).  
The present study addresses the entrepreneurial and organisational learning processes 
behind the growth of selected SMEs. To better understand such processes the study 
examines the nature of various ways or modes of learning (e.g. ‘by doing’, trial and 
error), their scope (individual, group, organisational, inter-organisational) and the role 
of key contextual factors and events facing the selected SMEs. Absorptive capacity, a 
key concept related to the organisational learning theory, is here defined as the firm’s 
ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Although some studies found that, SME owners' experiences are 
contributing factors to their companies' knowledge absorptive capacity (Wang et al., 
2010), little is known regarding the role of the entrepreneur in the process.  
Among SMEs, growth-oriented firms (GOFs in further text) have recently attracted 
attention because of their positive relationship with growth and learning (Stam et al., 
 3 
2006). These are firms that intend to get bigger
2
 and demonstrate greater capacity to 
create sustainable economic growth than other SMEs with limited growth prospects 
(Liao et al., 2003). These firms present significant economic characteristics a number of 
which they share with high growth firms: firms that grow at a high rate compared with 
most other firms, achieving annual growth rates in turnover and/or employment of over 
20% for three consecutive years, which implies that they are largely responsible for 
national economic growth (BERR, 2008). As well as growing quickly, they are also 
intensive and rapid learners (Hitt et al., 2001; Sadler-Smith et al., 2001), showing 
greater innovative and absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). This study 
examines a selected sample of growth-oriented SMEs in Portugal, an intermediate, more 
peripheral economic context with a relatively poor environment in terms of innovation 
strategy.   
1.2. The impact of context 
The role of growth-oriented SMEs as learning actors cannot be appreciated outside of 
the contextual characteristics of their operational environments, including their markets 
and other institutional/regulatory factors. Faced with different environmental 
constraints, SMEs tend to demonstrate distinct entrepreneurial capabilities (EC) while 
exhibiting varying depth of change in their final outcomes. These companies likely 
present a relative degree of ‘openness’ towards their environment (Dahlander and Gann, 
2010).  A basis for the idea of openness is that an organization cannot innovate out of 
context. It has to interact with different external actors to acquire tangible and intangible 
assets from the external environment in order to keep up with competition (Chesbrough, 
2003). 
Portugal, although a member of the European Union (EU), is facing at the moment of 
writing a serious economic crisis that has prompted the need for support under an 
international financial assistance program. This program was negotiated between the 
Portuguese authorities and officials from the European Commission, European Central 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. Portugal presents an industry profile that is 
mostly composed of SMEs. Their recent experience of the crisis has included a 
worsening of an already difficult access to finance situation (particularly long term 
                                                          
2
 dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary 
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R&D investment) and in obtaining a qualified workforce, especially managers (Cabral, 
2007).  
The Portuguese indicators for business R&D fall short of the OECD median (Eurostat, 
2012b) with a likely contributory factor here being the weak interaction between 
regional innovation actors (e.g. firms and universities) and a lack of a cooperative 
culture needed to underpin an effective regionally based innovation system (Santos, 
2000). It seems likely, therefore, that successful growth SMEs have had to develop 
specific strategies and approaches in order to overcome the limitations of the 
Portuguese economic context and lack of an effective system for supporting innovation 
at national and regional levels. 
The study of firms’ learning processes and issues therefore has limited explanatory 
value unless we understand how such factors interplay with their specific operational 
contexts, identified by Edwards et al. (2005) as an under researched topic  (Edwards et 
al., 2005). The entrepreneur, his or her firm, and the context can only be understood if 
considered jointly, as learning is localised. Consequently, exploration and exploitation 
of the different opportunities require different EC configurations. Close interactions and 
knowledge exchange between regional agents have been identified as crucial in dealing 
with the uncertainties attached to situated learning processes involving SMEs (e.g. 
Huggins and Johnston, 2009).  
This study is particularly concerned to develop a more integrated understanding of the 
different levels at which learning occurs - entrepreneurial, organisational and inter-
organisational. The earlier literature on growth in SMEs was principally focused on 
growth, strategic change, and entrepreneurial learning at the level of the individual 
enterprise (e.g. Hitt et al., 2001), but with increasing recognition of the importance of 
the firm’s operational context, including relationships with other firms, including 
partners, suppliers and  consultants (BERR, 2008; Etienne et al., 2008). Studies of 
Portuguese SMEs, on the other hand, have highlighted their tendency to be rather 
inward-looking, with little ‘openness’ in terms of innovation (e.g. exchange of ideas and 
resources with external actors), self-reliant and conservatively-managed (e.g. Santos, 
2000).  This raises the question of the role of the Portuguese context in relation to such 
tendencies – i.e. the extent to which it may hold some responsibility for perpetuating 
such orientations or, on the other hand, whether the more recent efforts of key 
 5 
innovation/business support actors might be helping to challenge and transform such 
tendencies.  
The learning process of growth-oriented SMEs is relational, and research into it requires 
a complementary perspective (Curran and Blackburn, 2001) to regard it as an emergent 
process that can be investigated by examining the context of each SME. Indeed, 
competition unfolds within a business ecosystem (e.g. sector) involving multiple players 
that differ in their strategies and capabilities but with a tendency to imitate successful 
cases.   
It is necessary to gain a better understanding of the situated nature of knowledge 
acquisition and learning activity in SMEs. EC theory emphasises a need for a multilevel 
perspective on the competitive arenas, their context, and the agenda of different players 
(e.g. customers and suppliers) (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). Similarly, ‘open innovation’ 
theory focuses on relational interactive processes between firms or in collaboration with 
knowledge creating institutions, such as universities, both at domestic and international 
levels (Wynarczyk et al., 2013).    
Nevertheless, existing research focuses mainly on large high tech companies with 
relatively few studies on ‘open innovation’ in SMEs (Wynarczyk et al., 2013). Also, the 
Portuguese SMEs, through their inward-looking stance, tend to operate within a rather 
closed innovation system, hardly share R&D knowledge with other regional actors 
(Lopes and Teixeira, 2009), which poses the question of what might be the sources of 
innovation to these companies.  
The literature that examines less favoured or intermediate contexts is limited. Peripheral 
regions and less successful places have social contexts that differ from regions where 
such knowledge-based economic development theories have been mainly developed – 
in contexts that are well endowed with innovative actors and related institutional 
support. Peripheral regions have been an object of research, with the general argument 
being that they tend to be less competitive due to a lack of strength and depth in the 
precise factors that give leading regions their competitive edge, especially a high 
density of knowledge-based firms and a strongly networked business culture (Huggins 
and Johnston, 2009).  
 6 
Some of the key challenges identified as restricting the learning process and growth 
capabilities of SMEs in peripheral regions include their limited internal resources and 
knowledge base; their heavy reliance of knowledge tacitly held within the firm, and an 
inward-looking fortress enterprise mentality resulting from a limited capability to shape 
and influence their external environment (Smallbone et al., 2003). While peripheral 
regions may not be innovation deserts, the evidence suggests that these regions do have 
specific problems. For example, apart from a lack of knowledge-based infrastructure, 
there can also be a lack of interactive learning among SMEs and between SMEs and 
other actors (Boekema and Rutten, 2007). Extant studies are often restricted to 
highlighting the existence of these external and internal actors rather than the 
connections between them.  
Furthermore, SMEs from peripheral regions such as Portugal, with their rather closed 
innovation systems and related poor performance, tend to be short of international 
networking competencies (Teixeira et al., 2013) which, for instance, raises the question 
of what regional markets are targeted by these companies and why? It would appear 
crucial to examine such relationships across regional boundaries. This thesis therefore 
attempts to gain greater contextualised understanding by examining the learning 
processes that are behind the growth of selected Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs.  
Although Portugal enjoys a fairly good physical infrastructure (road, rail, 
telecommunications), unemployment stood at 15.2% in the 2
nd
 quarter of 2014; with 
low income per capita (39
th
 position in the world
3
). The country also exhibits little 
intensity in terms of knowledge transfer between public institutions and firms (Capaldo 
and Fontes, 2001), which requires absorptive capacity in both provider and recipient 
(Boekema and Rutten, 2007). Although existing theory has highlighted the importance 
of such knowledge transfer, there is insufficient attention in the literature to the 
importance of addressing an intermediate developing context in ways that enhance 
learning and subsequent growth in SMEs’. The current research aims to bring 
additional understanding into how a particular geographic, industry and innovation 
context influences the learning processes and subsequent growth of SME.  
The study explores this two-pronged perspective on the learning process and growth of 
SMEs to understand how they are influenced by contextual factors (e.g. lack of 
                                                          
3
 International Monetary Fund, 2012. 
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cooperation between firms, difficulty in accessing knowledge and financing, lack of 
qualified workforce) within a peripheral/intermediate context that may be lacking in the 
systemic elements needed to promote effective knowledge transfer. Organisational and 
entrepreneurial learning and context may be understood as complementary perspectives, 
(combined within the firms’ EC), to explain the importance of learning processes of 
growth-oriented SMEs. Different problems and opportunities might demand distinct 
solutions, according to the regional context (Claire and Wintjes, 2002). Likewise, how 
firms’ ECs are configured is likely to vary in response to the nature of the contextual 
opportunities and constraints faced (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). For instance, the lack of 
cooperation between Portuguese SMEs might be overcome through new capabilities in 
achieving partnerships (e.g. alliances) whilst the lack of qualified workforce (e.g. 
managers) could be addressed by gaining new competences by ‘on the job’ training.  
1.3. Research framework 
This research investigates the learning processes of GOFs by utilising an approach that 
combines organisational learning theory with entrepreneurial learning theory while 
emphasising the role of the innovation context. It is proposed to view the learning 
process in terms of the constraints and opportunities experienced. The outcomes of 
learning experiences are likely to reflect the firm’s accumulated knowledge and ability 
to deal with uncertainty and novelty and its relations to customers and other actors. The 
study aims to ascertain the drivers of firms’ learning behaviour and consequent growth. 
In the light of these concerns a main question emerged: 
1. What is the nature of the learning process in Portuguese growth-oriented 
SMEs? 
In this study, learning processes are considered in terms of the critical events and 
challenges faced by SMEs, as identified in the literature (Claire and Wintjes, 2002): 
accessing finance/risk sharing; technology/technical know-how (e.g. access to 
technology centres); qualifications/personnel (e.g. the ability to attract highly skilled 
workers and exchange of knowledge); market access/information (e.g. collaborative 
orientation and networking); and organisation/strategic capabilities (e.g. management 
and staff training). Learning events are localized and situational according to different 
innovation contexts, for instance in terms of institutions and sources of support (e.g. 
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investment in science, technology and innovation) (Reuber & Fischer, 1999). Moreover, 
firm’s absorptive capacity - its ability to accumulate and apply knowledge – is likely to 
be a key influence with respect to how firms cope with those learning events (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990).  Effective learning in SMEs, contributing to the development of 
new capabilities, as well as outcomes in the form of successful innovations, therefore 
depends on being open to sources of new external knowledge and having the capacity to 
integrate it with internal knowledge on a continuing basis. In this way, innovation 
context and the organisational learning concept of firm’s absorptive capacity seem to be 
also interrelated, giving rise to a further research question: 
1.1. What is the influence of context on learning processes?  
Previous research has shown that the learning and growth processes of SMEs are 
characterised by significant and critical learning events relating, for instance, to change 
in terms of competition or regulation. Additionally, the ability of entrepreneurs to apply 
relevant knowledge as a result of experiencing these learning events will partly 
determine success (Deakins & Freel, 1998). Although critical learning events, such as 
the collapse of a firm’s market, have been shown to trigger learning with ensuing 
structural change in terms of organisation, strategy and innovation (Cope, 2003), there 
remains a lack of understanding of the specific learning processes associated with such 
exceptional experiences and how they sustain effective entrepreneurial capabilities 
(Zahra et al., 2006; Abdelgawad et al., 2013). This, in turn, gives rise to another 
question: 
1.2. What is the role of (and relationship between) entrepreneurial and 
organisational learning in responding to critical contextual events and 
challenges in Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs? 
First, SME’s ability to learn is influenced by its innovation environment, which presents 
different critical events and types of support (e.g. Hassink, 2005). Secondly, the 
concepts of absorptive capacity and different learning modes and scope, allows a better 
understanding of the process of acquiring and transforming knowledge that is behind 
firms’ growth (e.g. Zhang et al., 2006).  Finally, the entrepreneurial learning approach 
underscores the role of the entrepreneur and other key actors in dealing with the firm’s 
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external and internal events (Cope, 2003; Abdelgawad et al., 2013). Hence, another 
central question emerges: 
1.3 How do we best conceptualize the learning processes in growth-oriented 
SMEs?  
To summarise, the goal of this thesis is to understand the learning processes of growth-
oriented SMEs, within the peripheral, geographic and industry innovation context of 
Portugal. Furthermore, we seek to understand how key actors within GOFs and types of 
knowledge influence such learning.  
1.4. Summary of methods 
Large organisations have tended to receive more attention from researchers than have 
small businesses. Consequently, the study of small businesses is an area that requires 
more directed and theoretically grounded research (Curran and Blackburn, 2001). 
Moreover, quantitative studies have been ineffective in explaining causal relationships – 
the ‘how’ question – relating to SMEs’ learning processes and context (e.g. Sadler-
Smith et al., 2001; Liao et al., 2003).  Given that quantitative research does not fully 
capture the causality of the process-oriented learning phenomena in GOFs, this study is 
based on a qualitative approach given the importance of subjective meanings and 
actions to the phenomena under investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
A multiple case study design was adopted (Yin, 2003) to explore, describe, and explain 
the phenomena under examination. The case study approach allows a holistic 
understanding of relational and structural processes of organisations embedded in their 
contexts (Yin, 2003), thus allowing us to directly experience, enquire of and examine 
the phenomena in question (Wolcott, 2009). The longitudinal approach of the research 
allowed organisational change to be examined over time, and to capture the business 
processes that underpin learning within SMEs (Zhang et al., 2006).  
Nine case studies of growth-oriented SMEs from different industries were selected for 
in depth study; five are high tech firms and four are from traditional sectors - one from 
the cork industry, one from the wine industry, one from the footwear industry and 
another from the mould industry. The sources of information were semi-structured 
interviews plus documentation. These data were collected between 2007 and 2013, with 
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the interviews being conducted between 2009 and 2013. The analysis was guided by 
previous relevant literature. Case studies were analysed using both within-case and 
cross-case methods (Miles and Huberman, 1994) and matrices were used to present the 
corresponding analysis of the learning processes of the firms.  
1.5. Organisation and structure 
Organisational learning theories identify knowledge and learning as valuable assets that 
play a key role in enterprise growth. This dissertation is structured as follows (Figure 
1.1): 
Figure 1.1 Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter I, Introduction  
 
 
Theory  
 
Chapter II, Firm growth and the learning process     Chapter III, Context and firm learning  
  
       
 
 
 
 
        Chapter IV 
        Research Methods  
 
Empirical Evidence  
 
Chapter V, Learning in growth-oriented       Chapter VI, Understanding learning in growth- 
Portuguese SMES: within case analysis                         oriented firms: cross case analysis  
    
      
 
Chapter VII, Conclusions  
 
Chapter One introduces the background to study, the theory, the research objectives, 
research questions, research approach, and structure of the study. 
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Chapter Two reviews the literature on business growth, growth-oriented SMEs and 
organisational learning. Growth-oriented ventures are examined in terms of their 
economic profile and what is known about factors relating to owner-manager 
characteristics, size, age, way of growing, and industries where they operate. Their 
above average propensity to learn and related innovation activity were described as well 
as their close dependence to the external environment (e.g. Stam et al., 2006). 
Organisational learning theory is drawn on to explain the varied processes by which 
SMEs learn (and grow), with particular reference to the concept of absorptive capacity – 
how firms identify, prioritise and apply relevant external knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), combined with insights from entrepreneurial learning theory, which 
emphasises the role of individual learning and the firm’s entrepreneurial capability (e.g. 
Cope, 2003; Abdelgawad et al., 2013). Contextual-institutional factors are also 
identified as having an important impact on SME learning. The study aims to develop 
an integrated understanding by synthesising the above perspectives. There is also value 
in distinguishing between aspects of the learning process that relate to the types of 
knowledge involved (e.g. whether business/marketing or R&D related), modes (e.g. 
ways of acquiring knowledge, such as by networking, searching, etc.) and scope (e.g. at 
team, organisational and inter-organisational level) (Zhang et al., 2006).  
Chapter Three examines the importance of context to firms’ learning, drawing upon 
recent theories of interactive learning and the concept of ‘open innovation’. Integrating 
the notion of context with concepts of entrepreneurial and organisational learning 
previously discussed, a conceptual framework to inform the study is set out. The rest of 
the chapter then considers the elements of the Portuguese national and sectoral context 
which are relevant to understanding the learning processes of the growth-oriented case 
study SMEs analysed in chapters five and six. 
Chapter Four presents the research approach and methodology adopted. The rationale 
for the chosen paradigm, the selection of the case study method, and the sampling of 
growth-oriented SMEs is discussed, including a short profile of the case study SMEs. 
Methods of data collection, validity and ethical issues are discussed in detail.  
Chapter Five present the case studies, focusing on their origins and knowledge base, 
growth and related learning processes and outcomes using the single case analysis. 
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Chapter Six present a cross case analysis of the case study firms. Through in-depth 
examination of the characteristics, learning behaviours, adaptations and outcomes of a 
sample of GOFs within Portugal, a model of the learning process in growth-oriented 
SMEs in peripheral/intermediate contexts is presented and discussed. 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis and summarises and discusses its findings. It also 
adds insights to the business and management literature and discusses the limitations of 
the study.   
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2. Chapter Two: Firm growth and the learning process 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on growth, growth-oriented firms and organisational 
learning. It was important to review these streams of literature for the purposes of the 
study as, according to Leitch et al., (2010), previous literature has insufficiently 
addressed the qualitative aspects of how different SMEs grow. Learning and growth are 
complex phenomena, therefore the study of growth-oriented SMEs necessitates a multi-
faceted approach in order to gain a better understanding of the processes involved.  
The chapter begins by reviewing the literature on the stages of business growth and 
their determinants. The issue of growth has initially been addressed through the concept 
of ‘life cycles’ (e.g. Greiner, 1972), although this approach has been criticised. Later 
developments have reformulated these initial models and contextualized them in order 
to make them more compatible with the insights from organisational learning and 
growth theories, particularly with respect to how organisations respond to crises and 
events.  
Second, the chapter examines what is known about growth-oriented SMEs, with 
particular reference to learning and growth theory and the importance of context, i.e. in 
terms of business networking and milieu (Etienne et al., 2008) and issues relating to 
infrastructure and support policies (e.g. Littunen and Tohmo, 2003). Third, drawing on 
the organisational and entrepreneurial learning literature, the chapter examines the 
importance of learning to firms in general, the concept of absorptive capacity - firms’ 
ability to identify, absorb and apply new knowledge – and the concept of 
entrepreneurial capability. In other words, the firm’s overall capacity to sense, select, 
shape, and synchronise internal and external conditions and resources for the 
exploration (recognition, discovery, and creation) and exploitation of opportunities.  
2.2. Conceptualising business growth 
A growing body of literature has addressed the importance of learning to business 
growth and how firms apply new knowledge in order to achieve strategic goals (Sadler-
Smith et al., 2001). The organisational learning literature, as for instance Zhang et al., 
(2006) in attempting to conceptualize the learning process in SMEs, has increasingly 
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focused on interactions between the firm and external sources of knowledge and support 
factors on the firms’ learning processes. However, McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) claim 
that most studies consider the firms’ growth process as a ‘black box’, neglecting the 
specific learning processes which have enabled growth over time. 
The notion that firms have sequential life cycles was introduced by Greiner (1972, 
1998) who focused on the changes in intra firm variables such as age, size, and rate of 
growth. His life cycle model presented a three stage theory involving inception, growth 
and maturity and was based on the assumption that growth occurs in a linear fashion 
and can be divided into discrete stages. According to Greiner (1972), each phase 
contains a relatively calm period of growth that ends with a management crisis 
(creativity, direction, delegation, collaboration and coordination phases). Since each 
phase is strongly influenced by the previous one, management with a sense of its own 
organisation's history can anticipate and prepare for the next developmental crisis. 
Later, the author added a possible sixth phase, in which growth depends on the design 
of extra-organisational solutions other than organic growth, such as creating a holding 
company or a network organisation (Greiner, 1998).  
Churchill and Lewis (1983) similarly presented a model based on five phases: start-up, 
in which the main problem is to gain customers and deliver the product; survival, where 
efforts are directed to the achievement of the ‘breakeven point’ between revenues and 
expenses; and the success phase, where the focus is on exploitation and expansion. If 
successful, the phase of launching, is dominated by concerns on how to grow rapidly 
and how to finance that grow; and finally the resource maturity phase, involves the 
consolidation of the enterprises financial gains and further responding to changing 
markets with flexibility and rapidity (Churchill and Lewis, 1983).  
Others, Scott and Bruce (1987), building upon the Churchill and Lewis’ five phases 
model, argue that all firms have the same growth behaviour, deal with standardized 
events as they become more complex, and need to overcome similar changes in order to 
advance to the next stage. First, they posit a start-up phase in obtaining clients; next a 
survival phase of critical revenues and expenses; a phase of growth, in which the critical 
issues are managed to grow and ensure resources. Then, a phase of expansion, centred 
in financing growth; and finally a phase of maturity, of productivity and expenses 
control.  Scott and Bruce thus propose a more prescriptive model of small business 
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growth to enable small business managers to plan for future growth whilst emphasizing 
problem resolution and the need for an entrepreneurial approach.  
A number of authors (e.g. Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990; Rutherford et al., 2003) have 
subsequently argued that such models oversimplify the complex combination of internal 
and contextual factors that affect small business growth and, although linear patterns 
and organisational growth paths can be discerned in terms of distinct stages and 
problem configurations, actual realistic progressions from one stage to another require 
complex bundles of organisational capabilities. Specifically, Kazanjian and Drazin 
(1990) argued that the structural characteristics of firms are likely to play a key role in 
their ability to respond to the various problems presented at different stages of growth.  
The correspondence between the stage and its typical problems in these models is 
challenged by evidence from other studies. For instance, Rutherford, et al., (2003) in a 
study about the role of human resource management over firm’s life cycles, concluded 
that the firms’ age was not a significant indicator of stage. Furthermore, Miller and 
Friesen (1984), in a longitudinal study on the firm’s life cycle, identified five key stages 
of the firm life cycle: birth phase through product innovation; the growth phase as 
evolving toward a more formalized structure; maturity in its efficiency behaviour; a 
revival phase of product market diversification; and a decline phase as markets dry up. 
They claimed that, although inter-stage differences resembling those identified in 
previous literature could be discerned, the patterns they identified could not be neatly 
matched to existing linear models involving discrete and well-defined stages (e.g. the 
maturity phase may be followed by decline). That is to say, crises and issues were found 
to occur randomly throughout the firm’s life and not necessarily involving a progressive 
path of resolution and subsequent growth; indeed, there was also evidence of firms 
regressing to earlier stages of the suggested models. 
A better understanding of how business growth is influenced by contextual events and 
of the entrepreneurial and organisational strategies and processes that underpin or 
constrain growth is thus paramount. Penrose (1959) originally identified internal 
conditions such as managerial ability, and external factors such as markets that are both 
influential in how enterprises change and grow in response to critical events (Penrose, 
1959). Also Nicholls-Nixon (2005), in a study on management practices to better deal 
with rapid growth, posited that firms’ growth and success depends on the way events 
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and crises are dealt with, emphasising that the focus must be on the nature of growth 
and learning events, rather than on abstract evolution stages of life cycle. Likewise, the 
nature of learning seems to be more related to diverse issues than with life cycle 
categories. It is notable that the literature on GOFs emphasises issues such as the need 
for resources and demand for organisational change (Liao et al., 2003). In addition, 
there is a need for more attention to how the issues are faced and subsequent learning 
processes need to be understood in terms of contextual factors as well as firms’ internal 
characteristics (Macpherson and Holt, 2007).  
To summarize, sequential growth models fail to capture the complex and multilevel 
reality of firms’ growth and learning and the interplay of these in different types of 
firms and contexts.  The heterogeneity of enterprises, including in terms of their diverse 
contexts and experiences, also makes it difficult to draw clear process implications. Life 
cycle models suppose that growth involves a sequential progression through distinct 
stylised stages, saying little about the non-linear learning processes that support firms’ 
growth and evolution over time. They do not provide a complete perspective of growth 
as they neglect relevant contextual learning triggers, as if the inherent quality of 
organisations was enough to progress through pre-determinate stages irrespective of 
context. Finally, life cycle models focus on the organic growth of the firm and neglects 
other possible outcomes, such as spin outs, acquisitions, strategic alliances, licensing 
and franchising. GOFs have attracted particular attention not only because of their 
contribution to growth but also due to interest in their way of dealing with 
environmental issues in circumstances that are likely to be more turbulent than those 
experienced by most other enterprises (Liao et al., 2003). The following two sections 
further examine the distinctiveness of GOFs and what is known about learning 
processes in SMEs.   
2.3. Growth-oriented firms 
2.3.1. Conceptualization 
Put simply, GOFs are enterprises which demonstrate greater desire to grow at a higher 
rate than the majority of firms. However, according to Leitch et al., (2010), firms’ 
growth is difficult to predict, and a better theory of business growth needs to be 
developed shifting the emphasis from ‘what growth’ towards the ‘how’ of growth, 
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focusing on the learning processes behind diverse growth experiences. Given the 
understanding of the heterogeneity of SMEs, there is a need to attend to firms 
distinctive characteristics in diverse contexts (Smallbone et al., 2003). Also, Delmar et 
al., (2003) posit that growth can take forms as recorded by differences in various 
indicators such as profit, sales, employment, market share, physical output, and assets, 
making it difficult to standardize one criterion. For example, in the substantial literature 
on high growth firms, there is no agreement as to the definition of what constitutes 
high-growth. Smallbone et al.’s (1995), for instance, refer to firms which more than 
double the sales turnover in real terms to a minimum of £10.5 million over an 11-year 
period (1979-1990); Storey (2001) includes £5-10 million sales growing over 25% 
yearly for smaller firms or £10-100 sales growing over 15% for larger firms, for at least 
four consecutive years; and Birch et al., (1994) support the 25% criteria.  
The OECD (2007) proposes the following definition for high growth: ‘All enterprises 
with average annualized growth in employees or gross sales greater than 20% per 
annum, over a three year period’. For the purposes of this study, we follow the OECD 
in utilising gross sales as a key dimension in identifying enterprise growth because it is 
the most widely used indicator and is relatively accessible. Moreover, sales tend to be 
favoured by the entrepreneurs themselves, rather than growth in other indicators 
(Delmar et al., 2003). 
Additionally, BERR (2008) defines firms with high growth in terms of two basic 
characteristics: 1) they are found to contribute significantly to employment growth; 2) 
and they display higher levels of productivity than average. The combination of these 
two attributes provides tremendous economic significance to GOFs due to their 
potential relative contribution to economic growth. Moreover, they attract much interest 
because they tend to produce indirect and spill-over effects as in the case of growth-
oriented technology firms (Schreyer, 2000). Specifically, due to their potential for faster 
growth, they tend to grow by spinning out or acquiring other firms too, which often 
evolve towards localized industry agglomerations. At the same time there is a need to 
acknowledge that the criterion of sales growth, together with these main characteristics, 
are insufficient to describe GOFs, which hold many other features of interest to 
enhance. The next section examines the literature on GOFs in greater depth.  
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2.3.2. Towards a theory 
The combination of high sales and employment growth implies that GOFs are 
responsible for a substantial proportion of economic growth. However, despite their 
economic importance, according to Henrekson and Johansson (2010), little empirical 
evidence has been recorded regarding these firms. The OECD (2007) identify a total of 
20 studies about ‘Gazelles’, a subset of growth-oriented enterprises up to five years old,  
published after 1990. The contexts of research were divided all over the USA (5 
studies); Canada (3 studies); Finland (3 studies); Germany (3 studies); UK (1 study); 
France (1); Italy (1); Netherlands (1); Spain (1); and Sweden (1). Most of these were 
conducted in developed national contexts that are relatively well favoured in terms of 
supportive programs and infrastructure, including, for instance, in terms of access to 
seed capital and knowledge transfer mechanisms. There is therefore a shortfall of 
studies on growth-oriented ventures in peripheral regions. Nonetheless, some general 
findings emerge on the nature of GOFs that are summarised in the Table 2.1:  
Table 2.1 Main features of growth-oriented firms 
The majority of studies report GOFs to be crucial for net job growth. They generate a large share 
of all new net jobs; 
SMEs are overrepresented amongst growth-oriented firms. Because of their small/medium size - 
and resources - SMEs tend to be relatively entrepreneurial, fast learners, and even more if 
considering their low R&D expenditures. Nevertheless, GOFs are of all sizes; 
Owners are on average more educated and entrepreneurially experienced; 
GOFs are younger on average; 
GOFs generally evolve in well supportive contexts; 
GOFs are more innovative and more active in learning;  
GOFs are present in all industries and overrepresented in young and growing industries; 
GOFs learn more by interacting and are strongly integrated in networks, either formal or informal 
ones; 
Young and small GOFs grow organically – recruiting instead of acquiring - to a greater extent than 
large and old GOFs, and therefore make a larger contribution to net employment growth.  
Source: adapted from OECD (2002) and Liao et al. (2008) 
According to Moreno and Casillas (2007), these main features tend to give the 
appearance of a standardized, ideal enterprise which does not, in fact, exist, or if it does, 
it is the exception rather than the rule. From our previous discussion, GOFs are likely to 
display other characteristics that do not resemble a “model” firm, such as idiosyncratic 
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company histories and industry characteristics that shape their learning process and 
ensuing heterogeneity.  
Firstly, the available evidence suggests that SMEs which display strong growth struggle 
to maintain a high growth rate in the long term. It shows for instance that significant 
gross job gains can co-exist with large gross job losses in firms which, although initially 
displaying high growth, may subsequently exhibit rapid decline (Schreyer, 2000). 
Secondly, GOFs are not always young; for instance Acs et al., (2008) found the 
‘gazelles’ in their study were on average 25 years old. Thirdly, while some studies 
suggest that GOFs are unlikely to be found in areas that are not centres of economic 
activity, other evidence indicates that GOFs can be found in declining industries, 
recession periods and less favoured regions (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010).  
Nevertheless, it is not clearly the case that wealthier innovative regions lend themselves 
to creating larger GOFs – e.g. high tech industries. It is easier to grow in contexts where 
funding comes more easily, which is critical in determining the investment and 
innovation performance (BERR, 2008). However, the evidence also indicates that many 
GOFs exhibit relatively stable paths of development even during economically difficult 
periods, suggesting the critical role played by firms’ internal learning processes in 
adapting to contextual challenges and events. Finally, Schreyer (2000) confirms that 
GOFs show marked variance in their characteristics and how these are shaped by 
different contexts. Firms that require or benefit from proximity with key external actors 
(e.g. clients, suppliers and partners) tend to present a rather distinct profile along with 
their different context (Schreyer, 2000; Etienne et al., 2008).  
The characteristics of growth-oriented SMEs presented above are shaped by diverse 
actors - in which the owner-manager is central - and by the learning processes that 
support growth. Firm growth has been found to be driven by the creation and 
application of knowledge with the contribution of diverse organisational, inter-
organisational actors and regulatory institutions (Henrekson and Johansson, 2008). The 
evidence of their learning through networking suggested the relevance of diverse 
perspectives on learning (e.g. Morgan, 1997) to investigating the processes and 
interactions involved, including with a range of external actors, such as other firms, 
consultants, and sources of support.  
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2.3.3. The learning process 
The BERR (2008) report on firms that exhibited periods of high-growth identifies the 
role of a strong learning process with respect to their operational contexts and related 
institutions. Context is only part of the learning process; and the differences in external 
environments are insufficient to explain growth performance (Smallbone et al., 2003). 
There is also a need to consider firm level learning processes and how these enable 
enterprises to respond to different external constraints and opportunities and hence, 
sustain their growth.  
Etienne et al., (2008), in a study of factors associated with growth, posit that firms that 
demonstrate higher growth are market oriented and, unlike most growing firms, they 
innovate rather than imitate - often on the basis of close client relations, customised 
products - and tend to grow through market penetration, which overall reflects a need to 
stay close to customers. Smallbone et al., (2003) contend that a key distinguishing 
feature of well performing firms is the entrepreneur’s motivation and commitment 
towards growth. Also, Stam et al., (2006) claim that high levels of qualifications and 
management skills are key factors in growth, since individuals with these traits find it 
easier to access finance. Smallbone et al.’s (1995) suggest that managers motivated 
towards growth are very competent in adaptively positioning their firms in relation to 
contextual factors. Indeed, other studies found that owner-managers committed to 
growth are able to develop a structure that enables ‘self-organizing’ learning, for 
instance by creating systems to absorb external knowledge and emphasizing 
relationship building (Nicholls-Nixon’s, 2005).  
Thirdly, the evidence indicates that organisational learning is particularly intense in 
growth-oriented firms. Such enterprises are usually characterized by a relational and 
participatory organisation, with relatively horizontal structures and organisational 
cultures that encourage participation - all these factors seem to be prerequisites for 
achieving and sustaining growth (Stam et al., 2006). In addition, Barringer et al., (2005) 
found that an efficient human resource management and a successful entrepreneurial 
narrative were shown to be related with growth orientation. However, the relative 
importance and relationships between these factors is difficult to demonstrate, and the 
processes of learning remain unclear. Zahra et al., (2006) found that the capability to 
acquire and successfully use external new knowledge is particularly important to a 
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GOF. This study analyses the learning processes behind GOFs’ growth, within a 
particular context.  
Fourthly, although GOFs tend to grow organically, evidence suggests that they can also 
grow through external alliances and partnerships, particularly as a result of learning by 
interaction (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010). Alliances, either formal or informal, may be 
entered into with a wide variety of actors – customers, suppliers, competitors and public 
or private research institutions – and appear to be both more frequent and varied in 
GOFs (Stam et al., 2006).  
Finally, successful innovation in GOFs seems to be an outcome of combined 
entrepreneurial and organisational learning in which owner-managers play a key role. 
The BERR (2008) report states that firms that show high growth tend to respond to their 
customers’ needs through innovative and precise ways, reflecting their intense learning 
process. Therefore, innovation plays a key role in the firms’ growth process, by which 
they combine external and internal knowledge to commercialize new technologies 
(Wynarczyk et al., 2013). Indeed, entrepreneurial capability is more evident in proactive 
companies that show more decentralised decision making, while creating novelty 
through collective efforts (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). 
2.3.4. Environment and local/regional context 
The existing evidence shows that GOFs owe their success to idiosyncratic firm level 
and environmental factors, and thus their growth is difficult to predict, support, and 
transfer to other firms. According to Fisher and Reuber (2003), in their study on how 
growth-oriented firms can be supported, two groups of individuals have particular 
interest: owner-managers as the result of their self-interest as managers; and external 
resource providers such as suppliers, labs, research centres, or universities. Also, 
Bartelsman et al., (2005) claim that domestic institutions, with varying differences in 
regulation, taxation, and financial industry, play a key role in shaping business and 
employment growth. Others have argued that a place can only be competitive through 
the presence of localized, place-specific knowledge, which also requires knowledge 
sharing among regional actors (Boekema and Rutten, 2007).  
Some (e.g. Chesbrough, 2003) claim that the success of a firm depends to a large extent 
on its openness in terms of the external flow of technical information with a number of 
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stakeholders in its vicinity (e.g. science parks, incubators and university). However, 
more recent contributions around ‘open innovation’, following Chesbrough (2003), 
reiterate the case that in order to achieve competitive advantage, enterprises need to be 
open to external knowledge as well as drawing on internal ideas.  Although the notion 
of ‘open innovation’ has gained considerable recent traction with other 
academics/researchers, it builds on the contributions of numerous previous studies 
rather than representing a genuine breakthrough in understanding (Dahlander and Gann, 
2010). For example, Oakey (2013) in his study of ‘open innovation’ in high tech 
companies found that this openness of innovation transfer is less open than suggested 
initially. In fact, many firms demonstrated a prudent degree of openness, absorbing 
external complementary knowledge, while also relying heavily on processes that could 
be characterised as involving a ‘closed’ approach to innovation, particularly given the 
need to conceal and protect their knowledge on product development since it constitutes 
a key asset.  
In this vein, growth-oriented ventures could be better supported by targeting their 
different innovation-related needs, for instance in terms of managerial competences, 
support for internationalization, funding, intellectual property protection (IPP) and 
technically talented people (Stam et al., 2006). It is argued that supporting directly 
GOFs is better for job creation rather than the providing of general business support 
(Stam et al., 2006; Hart et al., 2009). Reuber and Fisher (2003), on the other hand, 
suggest that it would be unwise to focus entirely on GOFs as economic growth is owed 
to all SMEs in general and also, their owner-managers tend to avoid information from 
institutions or consultants, who they do not trust entirely. The evidence and related 
argument suggest that the multidimensional phenomenon of GOFs means that it is 
difficult to ‘pick winners’ and predict which firms will be successful and sustainable in 
the long term. 
The BERR (2008) report shows that most growth-oriented enterprises that intended to 
grow above the average fail because of constraints such as lack of access to appropriate 
financing, lack of skills, weak investment in innovation, lack of demand and poor 
understanding of market needs. In this way, access to resources can moderate the 
intentions and realizations of growth. A better understanding in how growth is 
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influenced by the access to resources is therefore paramount in order to encourage 
potential entrepreneurial initiatives (Stam et al., 2006).  
In short, how to promote economic and employment growth has lately been a key 
concern. The capacity of firms and other regional actors to learn from each other in 
order to overcome barriers and respond to opportunities has been emphasized. However, 
since growth is a multilevel concept, it is crucial to not only focus on how much a firm 
grows as reflected in quantitative indicators such as sales, size, or profit, but also in how 
it grows, in order to understand the heterogeneous nature of growth and ‘what happens 
while a firm grows?’ (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010).  
Specifically, the process of growth is distinct for diverse firms and, therefore, the 
learning processes that support growth are likely to vary considerably as well. For 
instance, if a firm internationalizes through partnership its learning processes would rely 
principally on interactive learning (e.g. by networking). Conversely, if it 
internationalizes incrementally it would rather favour tentative learning (e.g. by trial and 
error). Growth could be characterised as being bound up with processes of interactive 
learning and absorption of new knowledge, particularly  from external agents – e.g. 
clients in responding to requirements, distributors, suppliers, and parent groups (Reuber 
and Fisher, 2003).  Hart et al., (2009) for instance, in a study about the economic impact 
of growth-oriented firms, claim that there is a need to investigate these firms more 
thoroughly with respect to their learning processes and local context.  
Furthermore, a number of studies have shown how the local texture of 
interdependencies between SMEs and the local community can originate a particular 
regional economy. For instance, Boekema and Rutten (2007) posit that firms are rooted 
in their territory, relying on its historical development  and, thus, the idea of 
‘embeddedness’ is a key analytical concept in understanding the functioning of 
economic regions. In this way, learned skills become partially embedded in habits, 
which grow into routines or customs – or conventions – and become a common part of a 
social culture (Storper, 1995). The tacit nature of new or innovative knowledge and the 
localness of much tacit knowledge make, therefore, the knowledge difficult to tap into 
from a distance or to transfer to other places. Additionally, trust and mutual 
understanding reinforces local inter firm cooperation, making it even more difficult for 
outsiders to imitate (Boekema and Rutten, 2007). 
 24 
Such regional idiosyncrasy, however, cannot be built solely on local knowledge and 
competences. Typically, studies of successful regions show how crucial it is to have 
links with the non-local, outside world, as well. R&D activities, for example, can be a 
linking pin between the local and the non-local, demanding high receptive and 
absorptive capacity through significant gatekeepers (Vickers and CordeyHayes, 1999). 
External connections rely on intermediaries (e.g. wholesalers), who buy and sell local 
products outside the region, bringing new information and competing products back to 
the region, acting as bridges that cross industry lines (Boekema and Rutten, 2007). 
GOFs present therefore, a complex interplay of learning and growth, with their wider 
context that require further research (Henrekson and Johansson, 2008). Liao et al., 
(2003), for example, were able to ascertain general features of GOFs but, due to the 
extensive nature of their approach, did not provide causal inferences, or 
interdependencies between factors. Such interrelations can only be revealed through a 
qualitative study. This research intends therefore, to explore the learning process behind 
GOFs growth and success in a different context, that of Portugal. This contextual 
dimension is discussed in detail in chapter three.  
2.4. The learning process in SMEs 
What exactly is learning? According to Collins COBUILD Dictionary
4
, “learning” is 
defined as “The process of gaining knowledge through studying”. Notwithstanding, this 
learning cannot be considered as merely the acquisition of a set curriculum. If one 
examines job advertisements, it becomes obvious that general skills are also considered 
as being at least as influential as academic qualifications. Furthermore, in business, the 
concept of capability has been preferred to learning (Illeris, 2003).  
According to Wenger (1998), learning should be broadly understood as resulting from 
the acquisition of relevant knowledge and skills plus a range of personal qualities and 
the ability to implement all this in either well known, or unknown situations. That is, 
learning can be conceived as knowing how to act in a domain of action. Such a concept 
covers all processes that lead to changes in what one knows and is able to do; whether 
they are of cognitive, emotional, or social nature, and are not due to genetic or 
biological maturation (Illeris, 2003). 
                                                          
4
 www.collinslanguage.com/.../english-co build.aspx 
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Such broad definition of learning encompasses matters such as personal development, 
the acquisition of qualifications and socialization, as well as ways of learning when 
approached through different lenses. Learning can take place through various interactive 
processes, namely external between learner and environment, and internal between 
individual knowledge acquisition and knowledge connection to prior learning. Illeris 
(2003) claim that learning encompasses the cognitive dimension of knowledge and 
skills, the emotional element of motivation, and the social aspect of communication, all 
embedded in a social-situated context. The most effective way for individuals to 
develop a strong sense of competence is, therefore, by mastering experience, 
observational learning, and social experience (Erikson, 2003), although many learning 
theories are confined to one of these views. This is the case of traditional cognitive and 
behaviourist learning theories that focus strictly on the internal psychological process, 
and is also the case with social learning theories, focused strictly on the external process 
of interaction and with the ‘socially constructed’ nature of situated learning (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991).  
The view taken in this study is that learning must comprise cognitive, emotional and 
social processes. The cognitive dimension covers the learning content in terms of 
knowledge and skills and helps to cope functionally with change in practical life. The 
emotional dimension embraces mental balance and sensibility and is influenced by 
understandings - while learning cognitively is driven by emotional motivation. The 
social dimension of learning involves the social integration of the learner. Learning 
events are stretched out between those three processes and force the subject to go 
beyond his/her current state (Illeris, 2003). Moreover, learning always occurs within 
specific contexts that offer diverse learning possibilities in terms of stimuli and barriers.  
Learning possibilities and challenges are idiosyncratic, and in this way learning always 
takes place in socially shaped contexts. According to Harrison and Leitch (2005), the 
ontology of learning is therefore different in diverse cultural contexts. This point of 
view is corroborated by Cope (2003), who argues that different critical events and 
affective/social characteristics form distinct outcomes. Similarly, Wenger (1998) posits 
that there is no universal explanation that adequately represents the dynamic interaction 
between the external and internal aspects of learning in communities of practice, 
defined by “groups of people who share a passion for something that they know how to 
do, and who interact regularly in order to learn how to do it better” (Wenger, 2004, p. 
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2). Besides the constructed meanings, this practice perspective also acknowledges the 
activities and practices that underpin the learning processes. There is thus a need of 
research to address processes rather than just the personal or situational attributes of 
cognitive, emotional and social dimensions.  
Different levels of learning were identified by Illeris (2003) in the process of acquiring 
knowledge from particular contexts which may range from cumulative learning applied 
to situations similar in the learning context (e.g. pin code number); assimilative learning 
when a new element is linked to the previous mental scheme; and accommodative 
learning that happens in the absence of relation with previous schemes, leading to the 
shaping of existing schemes in order to fit new events. Finally, transformative learning 
occurs when personality changes and learning is reconstructed in order to face an urgent 
crisis. These levels of learning can therefore be activated in different situations, 
resembling other authors’ classification (e.g. Argys and Schon, 1978).   
When then can learning be conceived as organisational? The above definition of 
learning reserves a significant role for the agency of individuals who are able to be seen 
as being capable of make a difference while taking into account individual, group and 
organisational understandings (e.g. Vickers and Cordey-Hayes, 1999), in which 
individuals draw upon in the process of making judgements. In this sense, Tsoukas 
(2005) posit that learning is organisational when generated, developed, and transmitted 
by individuals within organisations. Individuals draw and act upon a corpus of 
generalization in the form of generic rules that emanated from the organisation. Also, 
Huber (1991) claims that an organisation learns when any of its units identifies, 
acquires and applies useful knowledge. The learning process begins therefore at the 
individual level, in the assimilating of new knowledge and progresses throughout the 
organisation via sharing and communication (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) define this capacity for successfully absorbing external knowledge, 
assimilating it and applying it for commercial ends as absorptive capacity. With regard 
to entrepreneurial capability, Abdelgawad et al., (2013) also emphasize the need for 
organisational embeddedness and that in order to effectively use their firms' capacity for 
strategic change, owner-managers should coherently integrate their diverse views within 
the organisation. Learning, therefore, needs to be understood in terms of the changing 
nature of the organisation and constitutes an integrative concept that can unify at once 
individual, group, and organisation levels (Dodgson, 1993).  
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The concept of a firm as a knowledge system, on the other hand, focuses on the services 
rendered by the firm’s resources (Penrose, 1959). Hammel and Prahalad (1990), for 
example posit that there is likely to be considerable variation and discretion in how 
different firms could use their resources (e.g. R&D). It is argued that successful firms, 
relying on different capabilities, are able to configure their knowledge assets in ways 
that constitute a competitive advantage.  
A number of authors (Chaston et al., 1999; Zahra et al., 2006) maintain that knowledge 
is what the firms know whilst “capability” is what the firms can do. The firm’s ability to 
learn depends therefore on its capabilities in integrating organisational resources 
(Penrose, 1959; Fiol and Lyles, 1985). Penrose (1959) alleged that along this process, 
the perceptions and coordination of managers are paramount in achieving 
complementary effects as in improving the services rendered by resources.  
Nelson &Winter (1982) identified that as the firm grows, the resources that underpin 
learning and also their various permutations also expand its potential combinations. 
However, existing routines can limit the set of combinations to implement and restrain 
as well the ability to recombine existing resources. These limitations can hinder learning 
beyond the span of the firm’s previous knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and also 
tend to restrict learning to familiar areas (Cyert & March, 1963). Learning processes are 
therefore responsible for the evolution over time of two sets of organizational activities: 
the operational functioning of the firm and its existing routines; and the modification of 
those existing routines, through dynamic capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
According to Zollo and Winter (2002), a dynamic capability is a learned and stable 
pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically generates 
and modifies its existing routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness.  
Indeed, the resource based theory, being much focused on internal factors, claims that 
organisations possess a unique configuration of resources and capabilities that, as 
suggested by Hitt et al., (2001), can constitute a framework for strategy, leading to 
sustained competitive advantage, particularly if costly for other firms to imitate. Grant 
(1996), on the other hand, presenting a knowledge-based view theory, argues that an 
organisation’s most valuable resource is the knowledge embedded within it, which is 
critical to obtain a competitive advantage. In this vein, Nonaka et al., (2000) add that 
knowledge is paramount to success because it is a potential “intangible resource”, hard 
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to imitate and transfer, that is created through interactions between different agencies 
(individuals, groups and their contexts/environment) resulting in knowledge that can be 
both tacit and explicit (codified).  
Given that growth depends on the application of knowledge configured as resources 
(Penrose, 1959), the ability to access relevant knowledge is therefore a key competence 
of growth-oriented SMEs (Deakins and Freel, 1998). The channels by which external 
knowledge reaches the firm, which include the entrepreneur, firm, and social and 
business networks, are here identified by Macpherson and Holt (2007) as crucial. 
Moreover, any concern with how knowledge resources are developed to identify and 
respond to opportunities requires a longitudinal study to appreciate how firms and 
entrepreneurs interact within specific and of varying support contexts (Theyel, 2012). 
All of these factors are analysed in this study within a peripheral context.  
SMEs, as knowledge systems,  are constantly in tension since, as maintained by Cyert 
and March (1963) and March (1991), learning is a dynamic process involving ongoing 
judgments and trade-offs between improved efficiency in the short-term and more 
strategic considerations, of how to improve competitiveness, over the long term.  On the 
other hand, learning, as suggested by Sadler-Smith et al., (2001), as introduces 
discontinuity in the knowledge process, increases as well the organisation’s knowledge 
about possible alternatives, thus increasing the potential strategies, technological 
options and innovation.  
Such tensions around learning pose significant challenges for SMEs and, according to 
Liao et al., (2003), the more competitive SMEs are those that are most able to 
effectively absorb relevant external knowledge and disseminate it at internal level. 
Additionally, GOFs which are likely to demonstrate high openness in terms of their 
internal and external knowledge resources, may need an effective knowledge structure, 
in order to deal with their high intensity of innovation and learning. These companies, 
as suggested by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Barringer et al., (2005) also seem to 
rely on previously acquired entrepreneurial knowledge. Indeed, although the owner-
manager is revealed to be a key knowledge gatekeeper when it comes to sensing 
potential opportunities, the whole organisation is paramount in selecting and shaping 
opportunities, and synchronising strategic moves and resources in pursuit of those 
opportunities (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). It is important, therefore, not only to examine 
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the learning modes underlying individual entrepreneurial capability, but to see how 
entrepreneurial knowledge is integrated within the firm and, with regard to final 
outcomes, and to what extent. 
In short, this section has reviewed the literature on how individuals and organisations 
learn, and the role of knowledge and learning in the SMEs’ success and growth. These 
SMEs comprise individuals, groups, and corresponding organisation, which together 
support knowledge flow - and subsequent decisions and implementation. Organisational 
learning, as suggested by Huber (1991), occurs through transferring knowledge from the 
individual to the collective level. This study aims at bring additional insights on these 
SMEs’ situated learning (Harrison and Leitch, 2005), likely dependent on contextual 
critical events (Cope, 2003). Specifically, the study analyses their organisational 
learning, with particular focus on entrepreneurial learning, in facing contextual events 
(Cope, 2003) and the ensuing capacity in absorbing knowledge throughout the 
organisation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). It is also examined the outcome of such 
learning processes in terms of combination of knowledge resources and capabilities that 
can constitute competitive advantages (Hitt et al., 2001). The next section deals with the 
knowledge acquisition. 
2.5. Learning modes  
The evidence and theory suggests that effective knowledge acquisition in GOFs 
involves individuals (managers and other related key actors) and processes that can be 
described in terms of an interplay between different modes of learning. Building on 
Zahra et al., (2006) and Huber (1991), we suggested a classification, which aims to 
define discrete learning modes such as learning ‘by doing’, networking, trial and error, 
improvisation, imitation, ‘grafting’ and searching.  
The different learning modes identified by Huber (1991) are centred on the following 
categories of: individuals’ own experience; others’ experience; organisational memory; 
formal or informal learning; internal routines; externally focused and novel; planned, or 
unintentional learning. GOFs, with their high learning intensities, can share most of 
these learning modes as they have been shown to be highly effective at environmental 
scanning and engaging with external knowledge providers with whom they forge strong 
relationships, through a more interactive learning mode (Zhang et al., 2006). 
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Particularly, by learning through networking, as Taylor and Pandza (2003) propose,  
firms gain rapid access to others’ new knowledge and, without having to repeat the 
experiences of their ‘trusted contacts’, enact relationships with key external actors and 
knowledge sources.  
These firms can also learn through imitating others, following actions already taken by 
the majority of organisations as they are perceived as already legitimized, or their 
success is taken for granted. Imitation as proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is a 
constraining process (institutional isomorphic pressure) that compelled organizations to 
resemble others in facing the same context. It can assume the form of coercive 
isomorphism, resulting from pressures exerted on organisations by other organizations 
on which they are dependent (e.g. regulation); mimetic isomorphism, in which 
organizations may model themselves on other organizations in order to face uncertainty; 
and normative isomorphism that stems primarily from the norms and practices 
associated with particular professions and occupations. Indeed, according to 
Abdelgawad et al., (2013), within a business ecosystem of increasing competition, 
involving multiple players that differ in strategies, capabilities, and resources, a strong 
performance draws the attention and response of other players and company leaders to 
either imitate or otherwise take advantage of radical innovations. 
Although some studies have found imitation to be positively related with growth (e.g. 
Autio et al., 2000), there is evidence to support that GOFs gain their advantage through 
a commitment to more significant innovation and the creation of new markets (Liao et 
al., 2003). Huber (1991) also found that firms can also learn through acquisition, or 
‘grafting’, whereby they acquire another business or new expertise in order to obtain 
‘second hand’ access to its knowledge base, resources, and capabilities. Delmar et al., 
(2003), on the other hand, suggest that the organic growth of the individual enterprise is 
more likely to represent genuine ‘organic’ job creation than is growth by acquisition, 
where existing jobs are simply transferred from one firm to another. According to 
Huber (1991) firms scan the external environment, by learning through searching, 
focusing the research on a segment of internal or external environment. Zahra et al., 
(2006), posit that by trial and error, explorative learning actions take enterprises beyond 
their normal routines and ‘comfort zone’ and thus are particularly important is 
supporting significant future actions and more novel innovations. 
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In the case, growth-oriented SMEs, as Sadler-Smith et al., (2001) suggest, tend to adopt 
an active learning posture while retaining a willingness to review existing routines 
through constant searching. Conversely, ‘learning by doing’ tends to be firm specific, 
time consuming, and relies on the firm’s tacit and idiosyncratic knowledge. According 
to Zahra et al., (2006), this incremental and adaptive learning mode seems to be adopted 
more often by more reactive and less innovative SMEs.  
Improvisation is referred by Moorman and Miner, (1998) and Zahra et al (2006) as a 
common learning mode in SMEs, which can occur whenever real time, unplanned 
experience influences action as it occurs. The literature identify it as a distinct type of 
real-time, short-term learning that principally emerge in fast-moving competitive 
settings and in areas such as new product development, in which experience and related 
change happen all at once (Moorman and Miner, 1998). Specifically, the creation and 
execution of a new product can occur simultaneously in order to face unexpected events 
or surprises in bringing a product to market. Notably, the improvised activities often 
occur outside the organized routines and planning as a form of short-term learning. In 
Moorman and Miner’s words “The focus of the activity is to get the problem solved 
rapidly or take advantage of specific opportunity” (Moorman and Miner, 1998, p.322). 
As a result, the improviser cannot therefore realize the consequences of the improvised 
production while executing it, in contrast to what happens for example in trial-and-error 
or experimental learning. The theoretical inference is that GOFs often are responsive to 
the external environment due to their proactive strategy with ensuing integration of 
knowledge (Liao et al., 2003), suggesting the presence of improvisation.  
Furthermore, while learning by improvisation, the process can be moderated by well 
embedded routines, information and knowledge accumulated (and sometimes lost) by 
an organisation during the course of its existence that Huber (1991) identified as 
organisational memory.  The function of organisational memory is often seen as 
dependent on storage and retrieval systems, but can also be shaped by a social process 
whereby key organisational actors influence how this relevant ‘memory’ is identified, 
stored and embedded in ongoing practices/routines. Organisational memory can also be 
an obstacle to unlearning old and unnecessary capabilities, particularly given that firms 
tend to acquire closely-related knowledge, in pursuit of immediate efficiency-related 
considerations. 
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These different learning modes are described separately only for explanation. Because 
learning depends on the way individuals learn, the different learning modes may as well 
be differently combined over time (Colbert, 2005). For example, Moorman and Miner 
(1998) contend that the rapid improvisation of new products to face surprises (e.g. 
declining market) can coexist with well-established planning. Likewise, high learning 
intensity, recognised as a key characteristic of GOFs, is unlikely to be maintained in the 
long term, given the limited resources and capabilities of SMEs to continuously absorb 
large amounts of new knowledge in the long term (Zhang et al., 2006).   
These learning processes can present variable degree of exploratory level. Indeed, 
Argyris and Schon (1978) have identified three main learning levels: single loop, or 
adaptive learning, occurs within the established learning frame of the organisation, 
focused on exploiting existent products/services, processes and resources for maximum 
short term advantage; double loop learning, or generative learning, occurs when the 
established learning frame of an organisation is subject to more radical change to 
address new challenges; deuteron learning implies “learning how to better learn” at the 
organisational level. High exploratory learning is also unlikely to be maintained over 
time because of the need to continuously implement and institutionalize knowledge in 
SMEs (Zhang et al., 2006). This also indicates the need for a longitudinal approach to 
investigation in situated, unique social and business contexts where decisions on critical 
events faced by entrepreneurs and their teams play a key role. The next section will deal 
with the concept of entrepreneurial learning. 
2.6. Entrepreneurial learning 
The literature on entrepreneurial learning places the owner-manager at the centre of 
GOFs’ learning processes. Their interpretation of environmental events and subsequent 
strategic choices strongly influence organisational structures, learning opportunities 
(Child, 1997), therefore prioritising their individual learning experiences in a social 
context (Harrison and Leitch, 2005). Zhang et al., (2006) similarly posit that learning in 
SMEs can only be understood in terms of the organisational context and the role of the 
owner-manager in embedding entrepreneurial learning within their firm. This 
assumption is paramount to GOFs as they present characteristics of highly 
entrepreneurial businesses, being strongly market oriented and with high levels of 
novelty in terms of their products, services and business models (Birdthistle et al., 
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2009). Therefore, Abdelgawad et al.’s (2013) argue that an integrated entrepreneurial 
capability throughout the organization is positively related to the creation of new 
opportunity realization paths, thereby increasing organizational novelty. 
Research on entrepreneurial learning has focused on individual experiential learning 
processes (e.g. Deakins and Freel, 1998); learning in new venture creation (Erikson, 
2003); learning ‘by doing’ (Gibb, 1997; Boyd and Vozikis, 1994); learning in SME 
growth and centred on critical events (e.g. Cope, 2003); learning by development of 
learning capabilities (Chaston et al., 1999; Rae and Carswell, 2000, 2001; Rae, 2000, 
2003, 2004, 2006); and learning by networking (Taylor and Pandza, 2003; Taylor and 
Thorpe, 2004). Minniti and Bygrave (2001) contend that entrepreneurial learning relies 
on the external industry knowledge that entrepreneurs successfully gathered in order to 
update their subjective stock of knowledge. Indeed, learning theories recognize that 
decisions to change depend on managers’ experience (Penrose, 1959; Fiol and Lyles, 
1985; Child, 1997) and context.  
With few exceptions, current entrepreneurial learning theories resemble the experiential 
learning model of Kolb (1984) in that they tend to be focused on the internal and 
individual learning cycle of the entrepreneur. Kolb’s experiential learning model 
considers learning as a process of relearning. It is a constructivist theory of learning 
whereby social knowledge is created and recreated in the learner, in a cycle of 
experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualisation of the new knowledge, 
and active experimentation (Kolb, 1984). Building on this, knowledge-based 
organisational theory (e.g. Grant, 1996) considers personal and business experiences as 
individual knowledge resources and capabilities with the entrepreneur learner at the 
centre of the model. Entrepreneurial learning primarily involves interaction between the 
individual and his/her context, with little consideration given to the individual, the 
wider organisation, and the social context (Harrison and Leitch, 2005).  
The various theories on entrepreneurial learning present a number of differences in their 
approaches, with some studies being more individual oriented (e.g. Deakins and Freel, 
1998), others that are more context oriented (e.g. Fontes and Combs, 2001) and still 
others that aim to integrate both dimensions (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). Some studies 
also focus on self-reinforcing learning cycles and ‘sense making’ processes (Ravasci 
and Turati, 2005) while others focus on individual self-efficacy (i.e. individual 
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confidence levels and self-belief in responding to challenges) enhanced with learning by 
experience, (Boyd and Vozikis, 1994). Because of resources scarcity, the ambiguity of 
opportunities and incomplete information, entrepreneurs often engage in an exploitation 
cycle also relying heavily on previous information (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001).  
Politis (2005) emphasizes the role of experience in entrepreneurial learning through 
reference to a number of theories of experimental learning, positing that learning is a 
process, and creation of knowledge is its outcome. An important element in Politis’ 
framework is the embracing of a dynamic perspective, which draws attention to the 
intermediate processes through which experiences are transformed into knowledge. The 
entrepreneur’s background is positively related to the development of entrepreneurial 
knowledge, and an entrepreneur’s predominant mode of transforming experience into 
knowledge moderates the relationship between his or her career experience and 
entrepreneurial knowledge. These factors increase the effectiveness in taking advantage 
of opportunities (Politis, 2005).  
A number of other studies give greater emphasis to context, whereby critical events are 
decisive in triggering absorption and assimilation of new knowledge. Cope (2003) 
emphasises the dynamic and interrelated social process stimulated by critical events that 
supports entrepreneurial learning. Cope (2003) argues that context and history shape 
entrepreneurial knowledge and capabilities that evolve through a process of 
experimentation and reflection, considered as an emergent process of becoming, in 
which people develop the ability to act differently, through knowing, doing, and 
understanding. Thus exploratory, discontinuous learning is emphasised, rather than 
more exploitative, single loop learning, i.e. doing ‘better things’ creatively, rather than 
simply ‘doing things better’ by making small scale improvements within existing 
boundaries. Thus Abdelgawad et al.’s (2013) argue that the entrepreneurs redeploy 
accessible resources to create and/or exploit new opportunities to make profits, and that 
redeployment is, by definition, a dynamic capability.  
Similarly, other studies support that entrepreneurial learning can be considered to be an 
interactive ‘sense making’ process involving different contexts, network relationships, 
and internal experience (Rae and Carswell, 2000, 2001; Rae, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006). 
This conceptualization echoes the findings of the study by BERR (2008), reflecting the  
general conclusion that growth-oriented entrepreneurs are generally more skilled and 
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experienced than other entrepreneurs, as well as being more motivated (Birdthistle et 
al., 2009). GOFs also rely significantly on the sort of supportive contexts  that are more 
often found in industries and regions that are more dynamic (Etienne et al., 2008). 
Of particular relevance to this study, Fontes and Combs (1996; 2001) have examined 
experiential learning in Portuguese high tech companies, finding that entrepreneurial 
learning was a process of resource acquisition involving several actors, establishing 
between themselves and the environment a diversity of relationships. Consequently, 
Fontes and Combs (2001) argue that the actors’ location, characteristics and their 
relationships shape the entrepreneurial learning, by limiting the available resources, 
opportunities and the way they are identified and exploited. 
Several studies recognize the role of events in stimulating learning (e.g. Fiol and Lyles, 
1985; Cope, 2003) and driving the firm to higher levels of learning, but, according to 
Harrison and Leitch (2005), do not fully explain how the entrepreneur shares his or her 
knowledge within SMEs and their contexts.  
The understanding of such interaction between learning and the entrepreneurial process 
remains unclear as entrepreneurs either built teams around them or are part of an 
organisation. The literature on processes of organisational learning is further explored in 
the next section. 
2.7. Organisational learning 
Researchers on entrepreneurial learning posit that, because of limited resources, 
learning in smaller firms is remarkably different to that in large organisations (e.g. 
Cope, 2003; Deakins and Freel, 1998). The SME category covers a spectrum of 
businesses ranging from individual entrepreneurs to organisations with as many as 249 
employees and therefore, learning processes in SMEs are likely to be highly varied and 
characterised by both entrepreneurial learning, focused on the owner-manager, and 
organisational learning also, a wider collective process involving other managers and 
staff.  
On average SMEs are small and young and tend to be more flexible and with less 
formalised structures and procedures than older firms, which can make them more 
receptive to new learning (Zahra et al., 2006) and with a greater ability to adapt and 
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innovate (Liao et al., 2003). How and what firms learn and how they change depends 
partly upon the length of their history and their context (Zahra at al. 2006) with the 
search for new knowledge and its application being dependent on the previous 
knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal, 1991).   
It is difficult to generalise about learning processes in SMEs, due to their idiosyncrasies 
and heterogeneity, their varied resources and capabilities. New insights are needed into 
how these interact with their contexts, either at the group, intra-organisational, 
organisational or inter-organisational levels. This is particularly so, given that evidence 
suggests that SMEs, on average and in the European context, are mostly founded and 
managed by entrepreneurial teams rather than isolated individuals (BERR, 2008). 
Moreover, studies indicate that GOFs owner-managers tend to adopt a more open 
management style, encouraging employee participation and prioritising the development 
of effective learning networks with external actors. In other words, GOFs owner-
managers have a greater willingness to share knowledge with their employees, with 
greater focus on both intra organisational learning and external networking (Zhang et 
al., 2006).  
Although the process starts with individual learning, organisational learning demands 
interaction between different actors, rather than the simple scenario of ‘top down’ 
decision goals (Vickers and CordeyHayes, 1999). The organisational learning process is 
therefore a function of learning modes, levels and scope. For example, learning by 
interacting often involves owner-managers (or other key organisational actors), 
combining and exploring, at high level, different knowledge from others, as a result of a 
larger inter-organisational scope. It is therefore more complex than individual learning.  
Relatively little research in organisational learning has been applied to entrepreneurial 
learning in small businesses, and the entrepreneurial context has received little attention 
in the innovation and learning literature (Wynarczyk et al., 2013). The literature on 
organisational learning has taken on two perspectives: one cognitive (e.g. Cyert and 
March, 1963), based on the psychology of individual learning; and a social perspective, 
based on social and relational learning (e.g. Brown and Duguid, 1991).  
The first perspective sees the individual learning process as the foundation for learning 
in organisations (Cyert and March, 1963; Hedberg, 1981). This approach assumes that 
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organisations are able to learn, given that they have capacities that are similar to those 
of individuals. Specifically, like an individual, the organisation learns if it acquires 
knowledge, recognised as potentially useful (Huber, 1991). However, cognitive changes 
alone, like in individuals, may not lead to an observable behavioural outcome and 
organisational effectiveness in terms of new capabilities (Argyris and Schon 1978). As 
with individuals, newly acquired knowledge, although changing understandings, may 
not necessarily lead to new behaviours (Huber, 1991). 
The second perspective understands organisational learning as different from the 
acquisition of discrete pieces of knowledge. Lave and Wenger (1991) attempted to 
categorise it as the development of situated identities based on participation in a 
community of practice. Organisational learning as social development involves 
therefore the development of a common understanding, starting from a specific social 
setting and people’s social relationships and backgrounds.  
The two approaches are not discrete. Organisational learning deals both with cognitive 
and social components and sees knowledge as flowing, from individual to social group, 
from identifying information to integrating it in a specific context. Intuiting and 
interpreting take place within the individual domain; interpreting and institutionalizing 
occur at group, organisation, and inter-organisational levels. Organisational learning 
therefore starts at the individual level, with knowledge acquisition and flows throughout 
the organisation by knowledge diffusion, and integration (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). It thereby involves individuals, groups and organisations through different 
learning modes, levels, and scope (Zhang et al., 2006).  
The conceptualization of such integration has been presented under different forms: 
learning through developed consensus on interpretations around shared knowledge 
(Fiol, 1994); a process of identifying erroneous and correct activities (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978); a process of continual integration and processing of individual 
knowledge at higher units in the organisation by knowledge acquisition, sharing and 
distribution, interpretation and storage in organisational memory (Huber, 1991).  
Crossan et al., (1999) consider four interacting phases within the learning system, which 
constitute of intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing by a feed-forward 
process of explorative behaviour and a feed-back exploitative behaviour. It is about a 
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process of knowledge acquisition and subsequent interpretation and embedding in 
organisational systems. Such a process has been conceptualized differently: perception, 
interpretation, and reaction, associated with unlearning of old learning (Hedberg, 1981); 
detecting and correcting knowledge related errors by carrying out existing policies 
(“single loop learning”) or questioning underlying policies (“double loop learning”), or 
questioning the establishment (“deutero-learning”) (Argyris and Schön, 1978); or 
knowledge acquisition, distribution, interpretation, and memorization (Huber, 1991).  
Finally, some other theories seek to integrate organisational constructs and 
entrepreneurial learning and are mostly centred on entrepreneurial opportunity 
enactment (e.g. social construction of opportunity). Dutta and Crossan (2005) propose 
the adoption of an organisational learning model that distinguishes the processes of 
Intuiting, Interpreting, Integrating, and Institutionalizing (4Is) to recognize the nature of 
opportunities unfolding as entrepreneurs engage with them.  
Lumpkin and Lichtenstein (2005) identify three approaches to organisational learning: 
behavioural in goals oriented firms; cognitive, in which individual cognitive maps are 
translated into organisational cognitive schemes; and action learning in aligning theory 
and theory in use; the more entrepreneurially firms engage in cognitive, behavioural and 
action learning processes, the more effective they will be (Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 
2005).  
To Corbett (2005), learning is a social process created by transforming the experience. 
It relies on Kolb’s (1984) entrepreneurial learning theory. Part of the variance in the 
opportunity recognition behaviour is because of the  opportunity identification and 
exploitation are based on learning asymmetries, by which individuals acquire and 
transform experiences in ways that can be more or less explorative or exploitative 
(Corbett, 2005) – a key tension to be further examined in this study. 
Entrepreneurial capability 
Abdelgawad et al., (2013) contend that Entrepreneurial Capability (EC) refers to a 
firm’s overall capacity: to sense or envision business opportunities, within as well as 
beyond the confines of an industry; to select by comprehending and choosing which 
ideas and insights to focus on and pursue given a firm’s strategic priorities and 
resources; to shape by transforming and connecting internal and external elements for 
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opportunity probing and realization; and to synchronise by orchestrating the temporal 
and spatial correspondence of internal and external resources, capabilities, and activities 
to reach markets for the exploration (recognition, discovery, and creation) and 
exploitation of opportunities. EC is, therefore, characterized by the interplay of 
corporate entrepreneurs’ (managers’ and employees’) abilities to envision new courses 
of action, and by their success in assembling resources in pursuit of them. It involves 
judgments and actions from an array of entrepreneurs with different roles and 
contributions throughout the process of reshaping and using a firm’s capability portfolio 
in accordance with their mental models. Hence, it places the emphasis on the owner-
managers’ role in the identification, evaluation, realization, and creation of 
opportunities.  
Absorptive capacity 
Closely related to the concept of organisational learning is the notion of absorptive 
capacity that is the ability of an organisation to gather information from the 
environment and apply it. Cohen and Levinthal (1991) refer to a firm’s absorptive 
capacity as a learning process in which the firm’s R&D both induces new knowledge 
and augments the capacity of exploiting and absorbing knowledge. This capacity 
depends on the firm’s previous knowledge base and is crucial to the firm’s innovation 
capability. Absorptive capacity is therefore the “ability to recognise the value of new 
external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990, p.128). Zahra and George (2002) disaggregate those phases into a 
firm's potential absorptive capacity (acquisition and assimilation of knowledge) and 
realized absorptive capacity (transformation and exploitation of knowledge).  
The knowledge acquisition stage has to do with the firm’s interface with the external 
environment which is to say its learning capability to identify opportunities and acquire 
knowledge already created outside (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 
2002). Such a capacity is a function of prior related accumulated knowledge and is 
therefore path dependent (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
The knowledge assimilation stage includes routines that allow the firm to process the 
knowledge provided by external sources. It refers to the capability to transfer 
knowledge between departments and individuals (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This 
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capability of internal innovation should be prioritized against buying absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
The knowledge exploitation stage underscores the application of knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), because only when absorptive capacity is realized may competitive 
advantage be assured (Zahra and George, 2002). It implies the capability to combine 
new knowledge with different applications (Zahra and George, 2002). Firms refine 
existing competencies or create new ones to, exploit knowledge through systematic 
routines over time (Zahra and George, 2002). The learning outcomes include new 
products, for example. The process discussed above allows the firm to combine both 
internal and external knowledge through both an exploitative and explorative process 
(March, 1991).  
Research on absorptive capacity has been the subject off some criticism. Lane et al., 
(2006) claim that, firstly, the focus on research and development (R&D) and 
exploitation learning disregards the importance of business knowledge and also more 
explorative learning. Secondly, it prioritises the structural aspects of an organisation’s 
processes, disregarding the role of individuals. The acquisition of new knowledge is 
mediated by individual gatekeepers with diverse knowledge (e.g. Seaton and Cordey-
Hayes, 1993). The diversity of internal perspectives is crucial because excessive 
homogeneity of internal views can lead to resistance to external ideas (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Growth-oriented firms involve other key people and delegates 
throughout the organisations, which imply a greater heterogeneity in internal views 
(Birdthistle et al., 2009).  
Nevertheless, to absorb new ideas individuals must be receptive to them. The more 
individuals and groups within the firms are receptive to new ideas, the greater the 
chances of efficient absorption of knowledge from outside (Morales et al., 2007). The 
concept of receptivity (Seaton and Cordey-Hayes, 1993) is closely related to absorptive 
capacity and consequently to organisational learning. Receptivity comprises the 
organisation’s overall ability to be aware of, to identify and take advantage of 
knowledge, in the way the user sees it within his “world”.   
Absorptive capacity is about acquiring and disseminating knowledge in a certain area, 
whereas organisational learning deals with transforming individual learning into 
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collective learning. According to Lane et al., (2006), such a recursive relationship has 
been under examined, namely in how different learning processes implicate causality in 
firms’ absorptive capacity and non-R&D content and contexts. On the other hand, 
Birdthistle et al., (2009) alleged that it is likely that growth-oriented SMEs experience 
intense organisational learning, they are generally most innovative, and they have strong 
links with other key actors external to the organisation.  
The field of learning in SMEs is still therefore fragmented and has not fully explained 
the interplay between individual experiential learning, organisational learning, and 
contextual dimensions. It is, therefore, of particular interest to further examine how 
diverse events enter into the organisational learning equation in growth-oriented SMEs 
and their influence on firms’ absorptive capacities and different entrepreneurial 
capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002; Abdelgawad et al., 
2013), including the extent to which the ability to learn leads to more learning and to 
more absorptive capacity (Bosch et al., 1999).   
2.8. Growth and the learning process: summary 
From the insights obtained from the literature review, one can conclude that a firm’s 
growth and learning ability are two closely related concepts. The growth and success 
partly depend on the learning processes to deal with events and intra-firm learning 
processes are influential in coping with situated critical events (Penrose, 1959). 
According to Wynarczyk et al., (2013), the research focus should therefore shift 
attention from abstract evolutionary stages (e.g. Greiner, 1972) to different modes of 
growth and related learning events within an innovation system. The emphasis should 
therefore shift form the differences in ‘what growth’ to the qualitative differences in 
terms of ‘how’ firms attain such growth (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010). 
According to Liao et al., (2003), there is a consensus on GOFs’ main characteristics 
such as that they display high economic value, show proactive organisational 
responsiveness and exhibit dense learning interactions. However, there is little research 
on their learning and growth processes as their learning behaviour is likely to vary 
according to the context upon which they rely. This study focuses on GOFs, with 
particular reference to the contexts on which they are said to be highly dependent, 
focusing on the key role of the entrepreneur/owner-manager (or entrepreneurial team). 
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With respect to the learning mechanisms of SMEs, perspectives from organisational 
learning could offer insights. There exists a vast corpus of literature regarding 
organisational learning, but only a few strands are of use here to analyse growth-
oriented SMEs. The organisational knowledge literature deals with knowledge flow 
within organisations and resembles the resource based view in the literature (e.g. Grant, 
1996). Although there is a concern about knowledge, sources and outcomes of 
organisational learning, the view is taken here that it is more useful to focus on the 
process, and causal inferences, and the interdependencies amongst factors.  
This study focuses therefore on GOFs through a social perspective that takes into 
account their interplay with contextual events. We concentrate on SMEs, which are 
likely to show greater learning intensity, centred on the decisions of their owner-
manager, whose entrepreneurial learning is given a special emphasis (Figure 2.1).   
We therefore attempt to integrate perspectives on entrepreneurial and organisational 
learning to examine the learning processes of growth-oriented SMEs, in particular in 
relation to their processes of knowledge absorption over time.  
Figure 2.1 Learning processes of growth-oriented SMEs 
 
 
As growth-oriented SMEs are highly influenced by the context in which they operate, 
the next chapter sets out the conceptual framework to be employed in this study and 
considers in detail the specific Portuguese and sectoral context relevant to this research.  
  
Organizational learning: 
Absorptive capacity 
Entrepreneurial capability 
Learning outcomes 
Entrepreneurial learning  
Learning triggers 
Learning modes ('by doing', by 
networking, etc.) 
Learning scope (individual, group, 
organizational, inter-
organizational) 
Type of knowledge 
 43 
3. Chapter Three: Context and firm learning 
3.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, situated learning theories suggest that learning 
occurs mostly within the social relationships in which an individual or a group is 
engaged (Wenger, 1998). Organisational context is also known to have a significant 
influence on the available opportunities for owner-managers and also conditions the 
modes by which they learn (Zhang et al., 2006). The entrepreneurial learning literature 
sees the entrepreneur’s life and behaviour as being motivated by the wider context of 
business growth and personal development (e.g. Cope, 2003). So, the more the 
entrepreneur searches and shares knowledge within the firm, the better is the knowledge 
dissemination and adaptation to the environment (Liao et al 2003) or, the higher the 
organizational embeddedness of EC, the greater the novelty (e.g. radical changes) a firm 
will generate (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). Similarly, learning in growth-oriented SMEs 
can only be understood in terms of their wider social, industrial and institutional context 
(Macpherson and Holt, 2007). 
This chapter examines the importance of context to firms’ learning, drawing upon 
recent theories of interactive learning and the concept of ‘open innovation’ (e.g. Oakey, 
2013) to develop a conceptual framework appropriate to this study. The learning 
literature focuses upon learning as a collective process, and the previous review of this 
literature indicates that learning between firms, institutions and other actors is one of the 
key factors influencing their learning capacity (e.g. Wynarczyk et al., 2013). In order to 
understand how interactive learning takes place within a given spatial context, 
understanding of the particular national, regional and sectoral contexts in which firms 
are embedded is required.   
In this chapter we first examine the role of context in firm’s learning processes, with 
particular consideration of this in relation to less favoured and intermediate regional 
contexts. From this we develop a conceptual framework to inform the study. The 
chapter then considers the elements of the Portuguese national and sectoral context 
which are pertinent to understanding the learning processes of growth-oriented SMEs 
analysed in the rest of this study.  
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3.2. Learning in context 
3.2.1. Interactive learning and spatial context 
Learning is an interactive process and although firms are paramount in accumulating 
knowledge, other actors and institutions – e.g. sources of knowledge and technical 
knowledge such as research centres, universities, suppliers, customers -  perform an 
extremely influential role, as well. Nelson and Winter (1982) point out that firms 
accumulate knowledge directly from their environment, for instance through recruiting 
new staff. Lundvall (1988) further argues that countless interactions take place both 
within the firm learning process and beyond firm boundaries.  
The concept of interactive learning has been applied both to the national and regional 
levels (e.g. Wynarczyk, 2013) in an attempt to explain the extent to which regional 
economic agents manage to learn both internally at their own initiative and through 
collective learning. Interactive learning and regional development theory developed 
initially in the 1950s (Boekema and Rutten, 2007), as theorists realised that innovation 
could be a vehicle to develop both firms and regions and that spatial economic 
concentration allowed firms to benefit from ‘external economies’.  
Perroux (1955) was the first to incorporate the concept of innovation in regional 
development theory. Perroux argued that development in capitalist economies was 
dynamic, focused around ‘growth poles’ and ‘propulsive industries’ which benefit from 
local external economies and also prompt innovation, dragging forward other less 
innovative industries. Myrdal (1957) introduced the need for governance to avoid the 
unbalancing effects of market mechanisms, identifying that if unregulated, markets 
would cumulatively attract additional capital, trade and labour at the expense of other 
less developed regions. Consequently, in the end, the state would be required to act as a 
powerful ‘top down’ referee. Hirschman (1970) similarly demonstrated that regional 
development occurs irregularly across regions, giving rise to inequalities between core 
and less favoured areas, in which the state should actively create complementary 
external economies.  
In the 1980s, Piore and Sabel, (1984) reintroduced the concept of the industrial district, 
emphasizing how proximity binds regional development and institutions, with economic 
success being owed to localized regional interactions involving small firms within the 
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region. The resulting concept of new industrial spaces demonstrated how regional 
agglomeration was rooted in lower transaction costs (e.g. Storper and Christopherson, 
1987; Scott, 1988) and that the presence of common economic characteristics and 
related networks are conducive to innovation. This role of networking for collective 
learning was similarly emphasised through the concept of the ‘innovation milieu’ (e.g. 
Aydalot and Keeble, 1988; Camagni, 1991). More recently, work influenced by 
Chesbrough’s (2003) concept of ‘open innovation’ has re-focused on how firms can 
increase their absorptive capacity, innovation and market growth by attaining externally 
developed technology and interacting with a wide range of external actors and networks 
(e.g. customers, competitors, suppliers and research institutes). Dahlander and Gann 
(2010) suggest that ‘openness’ to innovation has to some extent always existed, based 
on outflows and inflows of ideas and resources, as in the case of diverse types of 
partnerships. The question is, in their words, “Why are some firms profiting more than 
others from ‘openness’?” (Dahlander and Gann, 2010, p.706). 
Interactive learning theory draws from these different literatures to highlight the process 
and spatial dimension of learning, the way the process of learning can be organized, and 
the tangible and intangible ‘infrastructures’ that support learning. These concepts 
overlap, particularly given that clusters, networks and institutions of innovation may 
operate over varying scales (e.g. country, region, world), although particular importance 
has been attached to interactive learning supported by regional institutions of innovation 
(Morgan, 1997; Storper, 1995; Boekema and Rutten, 2007). The notion of interactive 
learning contends that actors are strongly and flexibly connected one to another and are 
open both to intra-regional and interregional learning processes with different 
knowledge (e.g. Boekema and Rutten, 2007). Firms should be studied within the 
idiosyncratic context of their real social interrelationships because learning is a social 
process whereby contextual factors play a role (e.g. Oakey, 2013). In particular, social 
interaction in SMEs plays a crucial role in the knowledge symmetry between firms and 
context (Liao et al., 2001). For instance, external networks vary within different sectors, 
are related to external resources and could, therefore, influence the improvement of 
institutional knowledge in a given firm (Fontes, 2003). 
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3.2.2. Firm learning in less favoured and intermediate regions 
The concept of interactive learning is primarily informed by the experiences of favoured 
regions, mainly in Europe and North America that are well endowed with sophisticated 
learning infrastructures such as good laboratory facilities, incubator centres or venture 
capital. Although the interactive learning concept has been extensively studied in 
developed contexts, few studies have focused on ‘less favoured’ and intermediate 
regions (Boekema and Rutten, 2007).  
Rosenfeld, (2002) describes the characteristics of a less favoured region as follows:  
weak infrastructure; lack of access to capital, technology, and innovation; a cultural 
tendency towards regional insularity and isolationism; low educational levels and low 
skilled work force; and a hierarchical industry structure. Landabaso (1997) argues that 
less favoured regions in general lack the institutional frameworks needed to support 
learning, innovation and growth. Here there is a limited capacity for cooperation and 
coordination among private firms and other institutional actors (e.g. Universities), and 
public institutions and agencies are often inefficient. Other development contexts, such 
as the case of Portugal, display many of the characteristics of ‘less favoured’ regions 
alongside elements of the more advanced learning environments associated with 
‘favoured’ regions. This has led some authors to classify Portugal as an ‘intermediate’ or 
peripheral developing country (e.g. Fontes, 2007). 
SMEs in less favoured regions, with few information and knowledge sources, may 
require particular support in technology-related areas or expertise to cope with 
contextual constraints. SMEs operating in less favoured and intermediate regions often 
constitute the majority of firms, with small size (often micro) family owned enterprises 
being particularly dominant, often concentrated in traditional industries and with a 
limited ability to respond to new competitive pressures. These SMEs do not have in 
general the necessary resources to innovate (e.g. managerial capabilities) and often 
demonstrate a lack of absorptive capacity with regard to external knowledge. A lack of 
effective institutional support, including from regional knowledge providers (e.g. 
research and technology transfer centres), is often decisive in trapping firms into low or 
no-growth paths (Landabaso, 1997).  
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In short, less favoured regions are characterised by a number of learning shortcomings: 
little regional receptive capacity; poor learning infrastructure; less developed financial 
systems with little seed capital and highest interest rates; few knowledge intermediaries 
to distribute technology; little cooperation among public and private actors; closed 
markets with little knowledge of supply and demand; difficulties in accessing external 
know-how; and low levels of assistance for innovation to local SMEs (Landabaso et al., 
1999)
5
. Therefore there is a need to analyse in greater detail how those GOFs found in 
less favoured or intermediate regions are able to overcome their comparative 
disadvantages with respect to innovation capacities, in order to better understand the 
learning processes involved. 
3.2.3. Contextual dimensions of learning and innovation 
To inform understanding of the learning process of SMEs, there is a need for an 
understanding of context in terms of economic, institutional, industry and market 
characteristics and their spatial embeddedness across local, regional, national, and 
supranational scales.  Complementing learning theory (Zhang et al., 2006; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) with insights from regional perspectives  (Wynarczyk et al., 2013) 
provides a basis to better understand how growth-oriented SMEs learn within a wider 
regional and industry innovation context (Macpherson and Holt, 2007).  
These contextual dimensions to learning and innovation are depicted in Figure 3.1. Here 
the organisational and entrepreneurial learning of growth-oriented SMEs is related to 
the wider micro and macro contexts in which they operate. Environmental 
characteristics can lead an SME to realise the shortcomings of its existing knowledge 
base, stimulating them to learn. Turbulent and unpredictable environments pose a 
particular challenge, prompting the need to learn (March, 1991), to absorb and 
disseminate external knowledge (absorptive capacity) and shape resources to 
opportunities (entrepreneurial capability), with owner-managers performing a central 
learning role as the main decision makers, and knowledge gatekeepers (Child, 1997).   
                                                          
5
 Limburg (Netherlands), and Lorraine (France) are identified by Boekema and Rutten (2007) as good 
examples of less favoured regions.  
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Figure 3.1 Contextual dimensions of learning and innovation  
 
 
3.3. Conceptual framework  
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context and entrepreneurial and organisational learning in the learning process of 
growth-oriented SMEs, as well as incorporating notions of absorptive capacity and 
entrepreneurial capability (see Figure 3.2). Although context and intra firm dimensions 
seem to be intertwined in an idiosyncratic way (e.g. Macpherson et al., 2007), the 
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these different concepts interplay in practice.  
The purpose of such a conceptual framework is to provide a visual or written product 
that ‘explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the objects of study – the key 
actors, concepts, or variables – and the presumed relationship among them’ (Miles and 
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entrepreneurial and organisational learning processes of growth-oriented SMEs are 
influenced by distinct geographic and industry contexts. It is considered as a tentative 
and incomplete theory, constructed but yet to be confirmed by empirical investigation 
(Maxwell, 2005).  
Figure 3.2 Research framework 
 
The proposed model integrates the importance of context, conceived in terms of 
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(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990); sensing, selecting, and shaping opportunities, and 
synchronising their resources in pursuit of these opportunities (Abdelgawad et al., 
2013). This exploitation and exploration process of knowledge development and its 
intervening actors and learning outcomes, is of paramount importance to the 
understanding of learning processes.   
Organizational learning and the use of knowledge in SMEs is dependent on two key 
elements: individuals (owner-managers), and internal capabilities. Firstly, decision-
making relies on the individual managers’ judgement, and his/her knowledge can also 
influence the exploration and exploitation of the learning resources. Secondly, the 
internal capabilities (e.g. internal relationships), can significantly affect the firm’s 
learning capability.  
Here the concepts of absorptive capacity and entrepreneurial capabilities play a crucial 
role. Absorptive capacity is knowledge-centred and strictly focuses on converting 
external knowledge to internal knowledge exploitation. Entrepreneurial capabilities 
reside in the firm’s core team, which includes the owner-manager. These entrepreneurial 
capabilities enable the concurrent recognition, discovery, and creation of opportunities, 
which extends the boundaries of the firm and influences the convergence of internal and 
external conditions. This permits a simultaneous reaction to external change 
(exploitation) and the discovery of opportunities (exploration) (Abdelgawad et al., 
2013). 
The fact that entrepreneurial capability comprises a portfolio of different capabilities 
related to opportunity exploration and exploitation, means that it is continuously 
deployed in different forms and contexts to create avenues for efficient learning 
(Abdelgawad et al., 2013). This prompts the question: how is this variety of capabilities 
created and combined, in different contexts, to maintain the effectiveness of 
entrepreneurial capability?  
Studies on absorptive capacity have tended often to neglect non R&D related 
dimensions, such as the contextual influence of a less favoured or intermediate 
developing region, characterised by poor infrastructure and support for knowledge 
transfer (Lane et al., 2006). Such contexts present several constraints to innovation and 
business growth and fall well-short of the practices associated with more favoured 
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regions. The case of Portugal for example, presents a constraining economic 
environment characterised by institutional rigidities and low absorptive capacity yet at 
the same time shows a growth in knowledge/science indicators and a number of 
emergent industries (OECD Annual Report 2007). These particularities of the 
Portuguese context are now considered in further detail in the rest of this chapter. 
3.4. The Portuguese context 
Intermediate development contexts, such as the case of Portugal, display characteristics 
of both ‘favoured’ and ‘less favoured’ regions (e.g. Fontes, 2007). This distinctiveness 
makes the country and its heterogeneous regions and industries an attractive field to 
observe the influence of different learning events on different firms’ learning process. In 
this section we first consider key elements of national level macro environment, before 
moving on to consider the micro level environment provided by particular sector 
contexts relevant to the case study firms analysed in chapters five and six.  
3.4.1. Economy and institutions 
Since achieving Membership of the European Union (EU) in 1986, Portugal has become 
a more diversified and increasingly service-based economy. Throughout this period 
successive governments have privatized many state-controlled firms and liberalized key 
areas of the economy, including the banking, financial and telecommunications sectors 
(OECD, 2012).  
In the second half of the 1990s, the prospect of entry into the single European Currency 
led to a period of growth and relative affluence in Portugal, with the generation of a 
large current account deficit. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) brought to 
Portugal exchange rate stability, falling inflation, and falling interest rates that, in turn, 
lowered the cost of public debt and helped in achieving fiscal targets. For instance, the 
GDP per capita on a purchasing power parity basis rose from 51% of the EU average in 
1985 to 78% in early 2002 (Eurostat, 2012a). However in the 2000s, Portuguese GDP 
per head fell from just over 80% of the EU 25 average in 1999 to just over 70% in 2007, 
whilst the unemployment rate increased by 65% from 2002 to 2007, (Eurostat, 2012a). 
Furthermore, the composition of economic growth became highly dependent on a 
credit-fuelled boost in domestic demand. 
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In 2009, the ratings agency Standard and Poor lowered its long-term credit assessment 
of Portugal to "negative" emphasizing the country's structural weaknesses in the 
economy and weak competitiveness. In 2010, Portugal had called for international 
financial assistance to address its large current-account deficit through corrective 
policies.  Since then Portugal has experienced a traumatic economic period of sustained 
high unemployment, low productivity growth, and a huge budget deficit, and has just 
emerged out of a major international financial assistance programme funded by the EU 
and IMF.  
Portuguese businesses are concentrated largely within old and low growth industries 
comprising textiles, wood/furniture, food products, beverages and tobacco and the 
manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products (INE, 2012b). Portugal still 
exhibited in 2012 an economic structure characterized by poorly competitive specialised 
industrial sectors and smaller pockets of more innovative growth activity. The current 
general characteristics of Portuguese economy are detailed below in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Portuguese economy – key figures 
Key economic characteristics 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 
GDP per capita 
€185 billion (2012)                                                                               
€17,365 (2012 est.) 
GDP by industry Agriculture 2.1%; industry: 23%; services: 74.9% (2012) 
Inflation                                                                                 2.9% (2012) 
Labour force                                                                                    5.54 million (2012 est.) 
Labour force by occupation   Agriculture 11,9%; industry: 28,5%; services: 59.8% (2011) 
Unemployment                                                                            16.9% (As of December 2012) 
Main industries                    
Textiles, clothing, footwear, wood and cork, paper, chemicals,          
auto-parts manufacturing, base metals, dairy products, wine and 
other foods, porcelain and ceramics, glassware, technology, 
telecommunications; ship construction and refurbishment; 
tourism 
External Exports  €45.34 billion (2012) 
Export goods 
Agricultural products, food products, oil products, chemical 
products, plastics and rubber, skins and leather, wood and 
cork, wood pulp and paper, textile materials, clothing, 
footwear, minerals and mineral products, base metals, 
machinery and tools, vehicles and other transport material, and 
optical and precision instruments 
Main export partners 
Spain 24.8%, Germany 13.6%, France 12.0%, Angola 5.5%, 
United Kingdom 5.1% (2012) 
Imports   €56.01 billion (2012) 
Import goods 
Agricultural products, food products, oil products, chemical 
products, plastics and rubber, skins and leather, wood and 
cork, wood pulp and paper, textile materials, clothing, 
footwear, minerals and mineral products, base metals, 
machinery and tools, vehicles and other transport material, and 
optical and precision instruments, computer accessories and 
parts, semi-conductors and related devices, household goods, 
passenger cars new and used, and wine products 
Main import partners 
Spain 31.6%, Germany 12.4%, France 6.8%, Italy 5.4%, 
Netherlands 4.4% (2012) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) stock €35.5 billion (30 November 2012) 
Gross external debt €414 billion (1 January 2012) 
Public debt 107.8% of GDP (2011) 
Revenues €94.67 billion 
Expenses €107.4 billion (2012 est.) 
Source: INE 2012 (National Statistics) 
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The current economic crisis has worsened the country’s pre-existing structural 
problems. As a whole, the European economy was undermined and experienced a 
period of low or negative GDP growth rates. In Portugal this situation severely limited 
private consumption, the availability of credit for working capital, and possible 
investment in new businesses, generating few employment opportunities (Eurostat 
2012a).  Despite these economic difficulties, in economic terms Portugal is still 
considered a high income economy
6
, albeit displaying a GDP of only 81% of the EU-27 
average (Eurostat, 2012a). 
The impact of the economic and financial crisis on SMEs was critical as the Portuguese 
economy is principally made up of SMEs. In 2011, SMEs represented 99% of total 
manufacturing firms, accounting for 79% of total employment; as situation which led to 
growing concern by the government over the prospects of these firms (INE, 2012a). The 
economic crisis worsened the problems that SMEs faced in general and which had 
traditionally hindered their innovation and growth processes, such as lack of finance, 
qualified labour, and poor access to information and advice (Santos, 2000).  
Consumption has contracted due to the restrictive fiscal consolidation measures and as 
long term unemployment has risen due to adverse developments affecting labour-
intensive sectors in particular. Demand for Portuguese goods within Europe has also 
been in decline as other European economies experienced a sharp slowdown, thus 
pushing Portuguese SMEs to target overseas markets, necessitating additional 
international business knowledge and expertise. Varum and Rocha (2013) show in their 
study of employment and Portuguese SMEs during the crisis, that Portuguese SMEs 
grew very little in size over this time. Thus, during the economic recession, SMEs in 
impacted sectors reacted not by reducing employment rapidly, as they were already 
small, but rather by paying low wages and reducing investment.  
Portugal has been judged to demonstrate below European average levels of institutional 
efficiency in areas of governance, legal and financial provision (ICON Group 
International, 2007). Government policies are complicated by excessive bureaucracy 
and cronyism within national government departments and local authorities, with local 
initiatives hampered by overly-centralised decision-making (Cabral, 2007). Some 
studies estimate a productivity gap of about 30% as organisations endure inefficient 
                                                          
6
 A country with a Gross Domestic Product per capita of €19,800, in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012a). 
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bureaucracy and labour market imperfections (Cabral, 2007). The current Portuguese 
legal system is also slow, with cases taking years if not decades, to be resolved, with 
companies experiencing considerable difficulty, for example, when seeking to recover 
payments from clients through judicial means.  
Official decision-making processes tend to be overly centralized in general, and 
obtaining government approvals or permits can be time-consuming and costly, for 
example when applying for Portuguese funding programmes (ICON Group 
International, 2007). However, protection of property rights is assured, although these 
consist of a very time consuming process compared to patenting registering abroad. 
Therefore most companies opt for co-patenting their intellectual property at the 
international level (ICON Group International, 2007).  
More positively, there are established tax credits for Portuguese companies investing 
abroad and new programs for technology based companies aimed at  stimulating public-
private partnership and the recruitment of postgraduates. Also, public programs for 
addressing the SMEs' lack of financial assistance have been reinforced by an export 
credit insurance scheme that offers financial assistance for costs involved in developing 
international markets, particularly in Portuguese speaking countries. This includes trade 
missions, international exhibitions and market research (www.portugalglobal.pt) (Pinho 
and Martins, 2010).  
3.4.2.  Portugal’s national innovation system 
The structural weaknesses evident in Portugal’s economy and institutions are reflected 
in its national innovation system. Indicators for business R&D and innovation fall short 
of the OECD median and, according to Eurostat (2012b), However, Portugal is 
considered as a country that is ‘catching-up’ with respect to innovation. This view is 
based on performance in relation to a series of indicators: 
• Results of the ‘Summary innovation Index’ (SII) are below the EU- 27 average, 
although it has recorded positive average growth on this indicator;  
• The share of employment in science and technology is below the EU average, 
although the country has shown an Annual Average Growth Rate (AAGR) above 
that of the EU;  
 56 
• The country holds a Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on R&D 
(GBAORD) of 1.4%, well above the EU-27 average of 0.76% (Eurostat, 2012b).  
Lisbon is the region with the greatest number of firms with higher technology-related 
characteristics whilst in terms of introduction of product innovations and commitment 
to internationalization, firms from the region of Lisbon present similar values to the 
firms from North and Central regions (Lopes and Teixeira, 2009). However, the country 
displays internal disparities as some areas, even around cities such as Aveiro, Oporto 
and Setúbal, demonstrate a weak innovation base whilst others, such as the Centro and 
Norte regions, show a higher innovation rate within the EU-27 region (Eurostat, 2012b). 
Other studies (Martins et al., 2006) suggest substantial regional differences in the 
development of Portuguese regions and municipalities regarding the indicators of 
competitiveness, cohesion and environmental quality as demonstrated in Figure 3.3 
below (INE, 2012b):  
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Figure 3.3 Regional development of municipalities  
 
In Figure 3.3, cluster 1 - "less developed rural areas", is formed by the municipalities’ 
located deep inside the country and stretching to the coastal area of Alentejo; cluster 2 - 
"more developed rural areas", comprises municipalities of intermediate socio-economic 
level; cluster 3 - "coastal urban areas", includes the coastal districts where purchasing 
power is well above other areas, excluding Lisbon and Oporto, which comprise cluster 4 
- "The two major cities", which hold the highest degree of development and 
competitiveness. The figure illustrates the asymmetric nature of the country in terms of 
overall development and competitiveness with a notable contrast between the more 
competitive coastal area and the inland regions (Martins et al., 2007). 
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Santos (2000) argues that the relative lack of economic dynamics in Portugal’s less 
favoured regions arises from the limited learning capacities of their innovative systems. 
There is a weak interface between innovation support infrastructures and very weak 
interaction between key actors, thus severely limiting the possibility of effective 
regionally based innovation systems.  
This weakness is compounded by the tendency of Portuguese firms to be rather inward-
looking and to lack a culture of cooperation. Furthermore they demonstrate human, 
technological and financial handicaps, namely, the predominance of non-qualified 
labour, the lack of investment in R&D and other, less tangible factors, such as the low 
density and quality of innovation infrastructure and the thin institutional base (Santos, 
2000; Eurostat, 2012b). The Portuguese learning context presents therefore 
characteristics of a less favoured region. 
3.4.3. Venture capital and R&D investment  
Access to finance or other resources and sources of advice on new markets and clients 
are crucial to GOFs (Etienne et al., 2008). The Portuguese context is characterised by a 
shortage of financing sources, particularly long term investment targeted at R&D 
projects. According to Teixeira and Grande (2013) in a study of barriers to spin-off in 
Portugal, the principal barrier to the firm development was of a financial nature (cash 
flow; capital investment; R&D investment), principally in terms of the very 
underdeveloped domestic venture capital market. 
As a result, SMEs, facing obstacles in accessing external finance, are highly dependent 
on internal equity to finance their investments. Bartholdy et al., (2012) in a study of the 
funding sources used by Portuguese SMEs, found that internal equity was the primary 
funding source. On the other hand, bank loans were experienced as expensive and found 
to be secondary in relation to internal equity. Moreover, GOFs had to show substantial 
internal equity to persuade the bank to expand loans for some tangible assets.  
Intangible assets (e.g. R&D and design capabilities) are associated with asymmetric 
information which firms are keen to protect, also reinforcing a tendency to rely on 
internal equity. Portuguese GOFs have been found to make particular use of short-term 
bank loans, principally to obtain short-term liquidity and occasionally, together with 
leasing, to finance tangible assets (e.g. machinery) which are less associated with 
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asymmetric information (Bartholdy et al., 2012). In terms of long term investment, their 
internal equity is critical in funding R&D projects. 
Additionally, public support for R&D in SMEs has been shown to have had relatively 
little impact. Serrasqueiro et al., (2011) for instance, in a study about the funding 
sources of Portuguese SMEs’, argue that these firms evidenced high rate of internal 
self-funding together with short-term debt to fund their R&D activities. This 
complicates their operations and R&D investments as they need to pay off the debt over 
a short and constant period. Also, the Portuguese stock market is less developed and 
most Portuguese SMEs do not meet the requirements needed to achieve listing. 
3.4.4. Education and workforce 
The Portuguese educational system demonstrates a number of limitations, with levels of 
both education and R&D spending being low relative to other members of the EU 
(Eurostat, 2012b). This overall weakness is also reflected in the lack of competent 
managers, engineers and certain skill areas. In addition, the high level of employment 
protection promotes low labour mobility, resulting in a limited capacity to rearrange 
human resources in response to new business opportunities. Some structural reforms 
have been carried out to address these problems, including increased training in the 
labour force to provide better education in terms of ICT skills, vocational training 
schemes and generalized access to World Wide Web (The Economist Intelligence Unit 
Limited, 2009).  
The human workforce remains a key bottleneck, although doctoral graduates in 2009 
were above the OECD median (Eurostat, 2012b). The poor indicators for R&D suggest 
that investment in science, technology and innovation in Portugal in the last decade, 
although necessary, has not yet proved sufficient to enable the Portuguese innovation 
system to promote a growth of value added firms. Figures from Eurostat (2012b) further 
this poor picture of Portugal’s innovation system:   
• Gross domestic expenditure in R&D was 1.66 of % share GDP (against 2,1% in 
EU-27); 
• The proportion of research and development personnel by sector is less than 1%; 
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• Employment in high and medium-high-technology manufacturing industries 
amounts 12.8% of total employment (against 18.9% in EU-27);  
• The total number of R&D personnel saw a significant increase between 2005 
and 2010 in Portugal (15.3 %), compared to the average of 2.6% in the EU-27; 
• The stocks of Human Resources in Science and Technology (HRST) increase in 
average 3.2% annually from 2005 to 2010;  
• Portugal accounted for the smallest share of HRST among the labour force in the 
EU, with 22.0%.  
Most of these indicators are well below the 27-EU average and highlight the weak 
linkages between Portuguese universities and industry. According to Santos (2000), 
there are a considerable number of reputable research institutions, but the process of 
knowledge transfer to industry remains inadequate. Teixeira and Fortuna (2004) 
confirm a long-term relationship between poor productivity and weaknesses in the 
education levels of human capital and internal innovation capability in Portuguese 
SMEs. Improvements in the quality of human capital would therefore seem to be 
particularly important for Portuguese economic growth, through its impact on 
productivity and indirectly via the wider uptake and application of new knowledge 
within industry.  
According to Teixeira and Grande (2013), the weak linkages between universities and 
SMEs are attributable to cultural differences and the lack of entrepreneurially minded 
staff within the university sector, further reducing the possibilities for productive 
interaction with industry. For instance, graduate courses in most Portuguese business 
schools fail to address many of the most relevant issues for SMEs’ international 
managers (Pinho and Martins, 2010). 
Studies show that Portuguese owner-managers often lack business knowledge, in terms 
of marketing, sales and customer service and experience difficulties in dealing with 
business uncertainty and issues related to exporting to international markets (Pinho, and 
Martins, 2010; Teixeira and Grande, 2013).  Lack of knowledge of potential client 
markets, particularly in identifying clients overseas is compounded by a substantial lack 
of formal training for managers that do not have sufficient competences for dealing with 
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the high level of competition in foreign markets (Pinho and Martins, 2010). 
Furthermore, there is a lack of institutions and services in market-oriented activities 
(e.g. market monitoring). 
Oliveira and Teixeira (2011) similarly found a lack of international business skills in 
some SMEs’ owner-managers, including amongst the executive teams of high tech 
firms.  Pinho and Martins (2010) identified the need for a more focused vocational 
training of managers, for instance in terms of design and formal exporting, targeting the 
needs of SMEs in order to augment their marketing effectiveness. In particular, 
Portuguese SMEs reveal a lack of product suitability in terms of product design, 
important to accomplish different client preferences and diverse socio-cultural settings.  
3.4.5. Firms’ ‘openness’ to innovation 
In Portugal, the proportion of innovative enterprises, i.e. those which had introduced 
products that were new to the market or own-developed process innovations, 
represented 20.5% of the total between 2008 and 2010 (Eurostat, 2012b), compared to 
the EU average of 23%. These data suggest that these firms (mostly SMEs) innovate 
moderately, at just below the EU average (Eurostat, 2012b). Santos (2000) posits that in 
Portugal, innovations rely on already existing knowledge and evolve incrementally. 
However other studies dispute this and suggest that Portuguese SMEs build learning 
capability mostly through informal and distant networking processes (Vale, 2004). 
Indeed, Lopes and Teixeira (2009) in their study on ‘openness’ in terms of innovation in 
70 firms located in Portugal found that ‘openness’ practices were only partially diffused 
throughout these firms, being more widespread in terms of external absorption of 
knowledge rather than two-way knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer is not a 
systematic practice of the surveyed Portuguese companies, since less than 10% of the 
surveyed firms licensed their technology to other organizations, indicating a lack of 
awareness about the economic potential of internally created technology to third parties. 
The study shows that a very low percentage of companies ‘opened’ their transfer of 
knowledge and technology to other organizations whilst the vast majority (77.1%) had a 
rather closed innovation model (Lopes and Teixeira, 2009). 
Lopes and Teixeira (2009) further argue that firms located in a country with a poorly 
developed innovation system tend to share a relatively closed approach to innovation, as 
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compared with companies located in countries with advanced technological 
development. Their study found that 60.0% of the studied companies acquired their 
technologies casually (Lopes and Teixeira, 2009), which indicates that in general, 
Portuguese SMEs carry out an informal and unsystematic search for new opportunities. 
Interestingly, some companies displayed relatively ‘open’ approaches to innovation, 
including in some traditional, albeit knowledge intensive, sectors (e.g. Iberomoldes 
(moulds); Aerosoles( footwear)), but principally in the more high tech sectors related to 
information and communication technologies (e.g. Portuguese Telecom). Moreover, 
another study on the learning ability of Portuguese SMEs (Fernandes and Ussman, 
2013), concluded that these companies demonstrated little organisational learning, with 
their owner-managers evidencing a decision making process strongly confined to the 
top management team that neither exploited the possibilities presented by their 
employees, nor designed the  firms’ operations  to create learning opportunities. 
Another relevant characteristic of Portuguese SMEs relates to the nature of the 
partnerships they engage in. Portuguese SMEs, principally the low tech firms with little 
R&D intensity, tend to interact with other companies rather than with scientific and 
technological organizations like universities or R&D institutes, showing little 
‘openness’ in terms of innovation.  Hence the study by Oliveira and Teixeira (2011) 
found no cases of firms involved in co-operative R&D efforts with a partner/business 
associate. Also according to Laranja (2009), the proportion of SMEs with innovation 
activities, involved in innovation co-operation with universities, is of 5%, relatively low 
compared with 9% in Europe, whilst the main source of external co-operation for firms’ 
innovation in Portugal is external suppliers (i.e. of equipment).  
Dorrego, et al., (2013) in a study about the influence of relational capital on product 
innovation in Portuguese SMEs, showed that relational capital has a positive impact 
principally through vertical relationships with customers and suppliers (an effective way 
to gather business knowledge), aimed at improving the firm’s product innovation 
capabilities whilst other more ‘horizontal’ relationships (with partners and competitors, 
shareholders, investors and other institutions), did not show a significant effect on 
product innovation at the studied companies. 
These findings reflect a lack of local cooperative culture and networking amongst 
Portuguese SMEs and in relation to other potential innovation actors.  Although most of 
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the literature on innovation in SMEs tends to highlight the role of physical 
(geographical) and cultural proximity, Portuguese firms’ partners tend to be located 
abroad, with little evidence of regionally embedded innovation networks and practice 
(Santos, 2000). Hence innovation is not necessarily dependent on proximity between 
key actors (shown to be lacking in the Portuguese case) and effective regional 
innovation systems; strongly embedded actors and networks are also dependent on 
strong linkages beyond the region.  Teixeira et al., (2013) argue that technologically 
more complex projects in particular are more likely to involve ‘culturally’ and 
geographically more distant partners. Conversely, SMEs from weaker regions in terms 
of human capital and innovative performance may, in general, lack networking 
competencies, compelling them to concentrate on more culturally proximate partners 
(Teixeira et al., 2013). 
3.4.6. The institutional context of innovation 
Institutions – including a range of government policies, laws and regulations and how 
they are implemented – have a crucial impact on economic growth and the effectiveness 
of innovation systems. In Portugal, a number of studies indicate that poor regulation and 
excessive bureaucracy is a barrier to business development and growth in general.  For 
instance, a report by the OECD (2012) identifies important regulatory limitations, such 
as significant delays in the court system or the transposition of EU regulations that are 
still below the EU average. Similarly, Teixeira and Grande (2013) found that many 
firms experience regulations and bureaucracy as crucial barriers to firms’ innovation. 
According to the OECD (2012) however, Portugal has made significant progress 
towards the development and implementation of policies for better regulation within a 
short time span. Specifically, it has launched programs for improving the quality of the 
legal system and reducing administrative barriers (e.g. Simplex
7
, ICT portals for 
citizens and business) that have simplified the procedures for establishing a business or 
licensing. These programs have promoted the sharing of regulatory databases and more 
inter-ministerial cooperation. Such initiatives need, however, a change towards a more 
cooperative culture across the administration, relying on more open exchanges in the 
development of new policies and regulations. 
                                                          
7
 A program focused on administrative simplification, aiming at improving regulatory frameworks, 
processes and procedures of central government. 
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The national innovation system is highly centralised, with the majority of institutions 
that provide direct support for innovation being politically and financially dependent on 
the central administration. It has been argued that this highly vertical structure prevents 
horizontal cooperative behaviours between the regional actors, within a context where 
regional/localised innovation is weak and poorly resourced (Santos, 2000).  
According to Laranja, (2009), Portuguese organisations related to technology transfer 
were established by central government initiative and funded by European structural 
funds, which complicated the connection between local industrial activity, government-
funded institutes and firms undertaking R&D. There are sector technology associations, 
located in regions that specialise in particular industrial sectors (e.g. footwear), which 
provide technical support services (e.g. testing), information and demonstration actions. 
A further component of the Portuguese innovation system corresponds to institutes and 
associations whose initiative and mission have considerable input from academia - the 
university-based institutes for R&D and technology transfer.  The number of patents 
registered in these institutes is low, as well as the proportion of innovative enterprises 
involved in cooperative activities with universities (Laranja, 2009). 
The findings of these various studies indicate the extent to which poor institutional 
infrastructure, particularly in terms of innovation support, has contributed to   Portugal’s 
uneven development. Portugal demonstrates characteristics of a less favoured region – 
e.g. institutional inertia, lack of access to innovation, low levels of skilled workers and a 
mature industry where competitiveness is based on low technology and labour costs. 
However, it also possesses a good physical infrastructure for transport and 
communications and a high rate of investment in higher education.  
This complex picture in terms of economy, institutions and innovation presents a 
distinct configuration of growth opportunities and barriers to its diverse owner-
managers and SMEs.  Hence, Portugal provides an appealing ‘laboratory’ to observe 
how growth-oriented SMEs deal with both the general economic crisis and weaknesses 
related to national institutions. This study therefore aims to better understand how 
Portuguese entrepreneurs and firms from diverse industries cope with this macro 
context in accessing knowledge, personnel, markets and support.   
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3.5. The sectoral context  
In addition to this wider macro context, there is a need to recognise the particularlitie of 
sectoral contexts. This recognises that different dynamics of learning and growth are 
likely to come into play according to varying sectoral characteristics relating to issues 
such as  technology and the nature of competition and regulation,. For instance, a 
general regulation applied to all businesses in an economy is likely to impact differently 
on different sectors, such as biotech and footwear.  
This study focus on the learning processes through which entrepreneurs and firms 
acquire knowledge/ qualification, partners, finance and markets, in different locations 
and sectors, over time. As discussed, a large proportion of Portuguese SMEs are 
concentrated in traditional manufacturing industries such as footwear and wine, 
although this dominance of traditional sectors is changing, with high tech sectors such 
as biotech and software contributing to significant improvements in innovation 
indicators (Eurostat, 2012b). However, high technology and potential high growth 
industries remain underrepresented in the Portuguese productive fabric. In 2012, high 
and medium high-technology sectors represented only 3.1% of all companies – INE, 
2012a) and there were only 40 biotech firms nationally. This study therefore focuses on 
growth-oriented SMEs operating within both traditional and high tech sectors. These 
sectors comprise: biotechnology, ICT, moulds, footwear, wine and cork.   
3.5.1. The biotechnology industry 
Traditionally the biotechnology concept consists of ‘applying either micro-organisms 
or biologic systems components to obtaining value added products and services’8. The 
new biotechnology science has a wide range of applications including the agro food 
industry, life sciences, textile, chemical, environment and services such as consulting. 
In this study, the applications to the life science industries will be analysed.  
The biotech industry, which is multinational in scope, innovates continuously through 
for example networking and strategic alliances with other actors and across multiple 
stages of product development, in order to grow. Firms’ learning processes tend to 
expand towards an international innovation scope, involving multiple institutions, 
                                                          
8
 Diagnóstico do Instituto da Biotecnologia e das Ciências da Vida em Portugal. (Industry Diagnostic of 
the Biotechnology Institute and Life Sciences in Portugal) April 2005.  
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policies and firms (Fontes, 2003). The industry presents distinguishing learning 
mechanisms of interest to understanding the learning process in growth-oriented SMEs 
(Orsenigo, 1989; European Commission, 2002).  
Learning and growth seem most intertwined in biotech SMEs because there is a need to 
explore new knowledge at an inter-organisational level in order to succeed. Such 
knowledge, while scientific, tends to be highly protected given the competitive 
importance of intellectual property and reliance on patented knowledge. Given that 
most biotech owner-managers are young technologists short of business knowledge and 
the Portuguese context does not provide enough managerial skills, it is of interest to 
understand how management capabilities and appropriate investment sources are 
attained in order to grow.  
To use effectively indigenous capabilities and external networks, entrepreneurs and 
firms need to establish close relationships with actors within their innovation system, 
such as knowledge centres, where advanced scientific and technological knowledge is 
produced (Fontes, 2007). This process is more difficult for firms peripherally located 
away from the main knowledge concentrations. The search for knowledge at a distance, 
and the establishment of distant relationships was found to be more costly, slower to 
achieve (because trust may take longer to develop), and more complex to manage 
(Edwards et al., 2005).  
The history of the Portuguese biotech industry can be traced back to the 1990s, although 
significant numbers of start-ups only emerged in the 2000s. The sector is still small but 
growing, with just over 40 biotech companies in Portugal in 2012, most of which were 
created between 2001 and 2006 (a growth rate of 85%). These businesses tend to be 
small and dependent on highly qualified staff (i.e. with 5 to 20 high qualified people, 
e.g. PhDs), distributed over the areas of Lisbon (85%), Porto and Coimbra and with 
their clients concentrated in the health care, agro-food and environmental sectors.   
Such development in recent years is associated with a combination of favourable factors 
(Fontes, 2007), namely the increasing quality of some research institutions as well as 
the availability of a large number of underemployed young scientists. These have 
combined with changes in the institutional context, such as increasing interest from the 
investor community and new public support programmes, which led to increasing 
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initiatives involving the commercial exploitation of biotech R&D knowledge. This is 
despite the lack of a national strategy for biotechnology or an integrated strategy that 
addresses, in a coordinated way, the various actors and need for a more effective 
domestic network (Fontes, 2007). 
Portugal has emerged as a promising setting to address these issues, given the 
dependence of biotech firms on being able to obtain scientific and technological 
knowledge through a (diverse) combination of indigenous and foreign sources despite 
the Portuguese context of a highly centralised knowledge infrastructure and little public 
support (e.g. public funding, international business training). In the Portuguese context, 
these particular SMEs set a specific learning trajectory. They have benefited from 
private investments in R&D and the launching of new biotechnology parks, such as the 
Biocant Park, which is now hosting 15 companies linked to research. Particular venture 
capitalists (e.g. Biocant Ventures) have financed the initial stages of biotech projects 
(AICEP, 2012). This has meant that this sector has evolved in the absence of supportive 
policies and in a context in which indicators for business R&D and innovation and 
public R&D expenditure still falls short of the OECD median. From this standpoint, 
Portugal provides an interesting context in which to further examine the entrepreneurial 
and organisational learning processes within biotechnology SMEs.  
3.5.2. The information and communication technology (ICT) industry 
The ICT industry can be defined as involving a ‘combination of services and 
manufacturing industries that capture, transmit and fix in an electronic way data and 
information’ (OECD, 2007). The industry’s main branches are manufacturing, 
telecommunication services and other ICT services. In general, the growth and learning 
processes of specialized ICT SMEs tend to be different from that of more mature 
industries. They often show growth through rapid internationalization, enabled by the 
use of external networks (Saarenketo et al., 2004). The division of labour through 
specialization and vertical integration tends to be quite similar to the biotechnology 
industry as are their learning outcomes (OECD, 2002).  
ICT is nowadays a high globalised industry and there is pressure for firms to 
internationalize early to keep up with the competition. The so called ‘opportunity 
windows’ in these markets are often short, and there is not enough time to learn solely 
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‘by doing’ as knowledge about products and markets become obsolete extraordinarily 
quickly (Saarenketo et al., 2004). Firms therefore have to learn quickly how to adapt 
and deal with high rates of technical advance and associated uncertainties. 
According to AICEP (2012), the market value of ICT in Portugal had reached € 3.220 
million in 2010, which represented a decline of 2.7% compared with 2009. The ICT 
market in Portugal has been negatively impacted by the current financial crisis and 
difficult economic situation, which has discouraged investment and forced consumers to 
economise. The number of ICT firms in Portugal account for 0.8% of the overall firms 
(against 1.7% in 2002), while their turnover account for 3.6% within the total of 
enterprises (against 7.65% in 2002) (INE, 2012b). This study will analyse the 
manufacturing branch, which constitutes 4% of the total number of ICT firms, and 
accounts for 16% of employment in the industry. 
In Portugal, Fontes (1998; 2007) argues that SMEs producing high tech software have 
faced particularly adverse conditions because of the lack of effective support and 
resources at both national and regional levels. They display relatively low levels of local 
“mass” in terms of R&D activities and therefore are forced to search distant knowledge 
sources, engaging in learning through networking. As with biotechnology firms, they 
face a low local demand for electronic and information technologies and engage mostly 
in global markets. There seems to exist few complementarities between SMEs of high 
tech software and local large companies, which suggest a low level of inter-
organisational learning at regional level (Fontes 2007). Finally, ICT SMEs are given 
little institutional support and guidance considering, for instance, the low level of 
collaboration between local research establishments and private companies, or the lack 
of academic entrepreneurship and public support programmes.  
ICT firms seem to face similar constraints to those experienced by firms in other 
Portuguese high tech sectors. Moreover, they seem to learn mainly through imitation, 
often by adapting innovations created elsewhere to the distinctiveness of their own 
particular market niches, and can thus be considered ‘creative imitators’, adopting a 
defensive approach to innovation (Fontes, 2007). Nevertheless, although ICT 
companies provide evidence of a successful absorption of external knowledge, namely 
through imitation, it is opportune to understand by what other learning processes these 
companies combine their internal and external knowledge in order to grow.  
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3.5.3. The mould industry 
A mould is a container used to put something into a particular shape. A steel mould 
comprises a female and a male part that when fitted together originate a narrow gap, in 
which the fluid (such as plastic, glass, rubber, aluminium or other material) passes and 
shaped. Moulds are therefore manufactured for a wide variety of industries – e.g. 
automobiles, electrical industries and electronics. Nonetheless, an individual mould is a 
highly customised product, serving exclusively to produce the piece for which it was 
designed, which in turn, influences the way the mould is produced, its delivery time and 
its cost (Rodrigues, 2002).  
According to the Portuguese Mould Industry Association (CEFAMOL), the moulds 
sector consists of 532 companies, mostly SMEs, committed to the production of 
specialized moulds and tools, and employs about 8,000 workers. The Portuguese sector 
accounts for almost 1% of companies, 1.1% of employment, 0.8% of turnover and 1.4% 
of Gross Value Added (GVA). The main target markets for the Portuguese moulds are 
within the European Union, which accounts for 80% of sales (INE, 2012b). In 2011, the 
industry exported about 364 million euro (almost 1% of national exports). Plastic 
moulds account for nearly all of production, which is largely aimed at international 
markets and represented almost 80% of the total exported by the industry in 2011. The 
client industries are principally the automotive industry (72%), packaging, electronics 
and telecommunications, and household appliances. 
The industry is highly concentrated geographically in central Portugal in the towns of 
Marinha Grande and Oliveira de Azeméis, which has fostered innovation and 
organisational competitiveness (Camagni, 1991). In the 1980s the Portuguese mould 
industry underwent a remarkable development. Internationally, the plastic market was 
growing quickly; plastic goods were becoming more fashionable and the sheer 
flexibility of plastic as a material meant that its use grew considerably in many different 
applications. In the 1990s, the Portuguese mould industry continued to grow, but at a 
slower rate, as a result of increasing competition, an international economic crisis at the 
beginning of the decade, and high interest rates.   
The Portuguese mould industry has grown to gain a global significance due to 
increasing international demand and the experience of domestic mould producers, 
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which means they provide accurate design, quick delivery times, competitive prices, 
and technical assistance. Portuguese companies have become global suppliers of 
precision moulds, primarily for the plastics industry (AICEP, 2012) and have shown 
over the years a capacity to adapt to markets and technological changes, and respond to 
the threat of the Asian mould industry with lower production costs (Moreira et al., 
2009).  
Despite being a traditional sector, the mould industry relies on high technology and 
supplies highly demanding client sectors, such as the automotive sector. According to 
Lopes and Teixeira (2009) such technological intensity relates to a relative ‘openness’ 
in terms of innovation procedures - i.e. with regard to the use of external knowledge and 
technology and transfer of technology to other organizations. 
It is of interest to understand how the entrepreneurial experience of predominantly 
industry oriented owner-managers suits a high internationalized sector that demands 
high customer proximity and co-development.  
3.5.4. The footwear industry 
The Portuguese footwear industry represents about 3.2 % of all companies, 5.6% of 
employees, 2.4% of the volume of business, and 3.1% of GVA. It has particular 
specialization in leather footwear, which accounts for 88.2% of companies, 92.7% of 
employment, 89.8% of GVA and 88.3% of the volume of business of the leather and 
leather goods industries (INE, 2012b).  
In 2011 the industry’s exports were about 1,551 million euro, representing 3.7% of 
overall Portuguese exports and an increase of 15.5% from 2010. This industry is finding 
new markets and is already strongly internationalized across more than 132 countries. In 
2010 Portugal was the 11th largest shoe exporter in the world (AICEP, 2012).  
The Portuguese footwear industry is currently undergoing a consolidation phase. After 
adapting to new competitive situations, which led to the closure of a number of 
international factories, the footwear industry is now growing again. In recent years, the 
industry has downsized, repositioning its business model by moving production 
capabilities towards higher quality designs and markets, with strong brands and 
adopting a more proactive business posture.  
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Made up mostly of SMEs, this industry employs about 33,000 people according to the 
industry’s association (APICCAPS); its production is around 62 million pairs per year 
(20th producer in the world as per volume), mainly to meet international demand (90% 
of production is aimed at international markets). Although it faces increasing 
competition from low cost producers, the footwear industry still produces a trade 
surplus and positive contribution to the country’s trade balance within the 
manufacturing sector (AICEP, 2012). 
According to APICCAPS, women’s shoes correspond to nearly half of national leather 
footwear production and 45% of total shoe production. This is significant in terms of 
value, because of the higher average shoe price, which represents more than 25 euro per 
pair. Footwear produced with the contribution of other materials (textiles and plastics) 
corresponds to one-fifth of national output and accounts for only 13% in terms of value, 
given that the average price is lower (around seven euro per pair). Leather footwear, 
with almost 900 exporting companies represented 85% of Portuguese footwear exports 
in 2011, and increased 16% compared with the previous year. 
This sector is of particular interest due to recent efforts to strategically reposition itself 
from a low cost product to the production of a highly customised and quality shoe, with 
a relatively high level of technological intensity and correspondent ‘openness’ in terms 
of innovation procedures in transferring knowledge and technology (Lopes and 
Teixeira, 2009). Such change indicates a major innovation in terms of in-house capacity 
and flexibility in moving towards high quality demand at international level. Thus, it is 
interesting to explore the learning processes by which owner-managers in this 
traditional industry have responded to changing international conditions.  
3.5.5. The wine industry 
Portugal has held since 1756 the oldest demarcated wine region in the world, the Douro 
valley. At the beginning of the 20th century, several wine regions were demarcated and 
in 1986, these regions were re-defined as Portugal joined the European Union (The 
Oxford Companion to Wine, 2006). Overall, the Portuguese wine industry represents 
1.5% of companies, 1.2% of employment, 1.8% of the volume of sales and 1.9% of 
GVA in the manufacturing industry (INE, 2012b). According to IVV (The Vine and 
Wine Institute), wine exports accounted for 1.6% of overall Portuguese international 
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sales by value. The importance of the industry to the national economy is reflected in 
the fact that 7% of all agricultural land is devoted to wine production (IVV, 2010). 
Portugal is ranked 5th among European wine-producing countries and 10th at the world 
level (IVV, 2010).  
Recent years have seen a campaign to restructure vineyards, in order to meet market 
demand, with support from European Community aid. In 2012 there were 11 wine 
producing regions in Portugal, each with a different culture that is reflected in the wine 
produced. Since Portugal’s accession to the EU, the industry has benefited from 
substantial investment in up-to-date production techniques and technology, bringing 
about substantial improvement in the quality of its wines.  
The Portuguese wine market is highly competitive and is composed of many 
organisations, including small, medium, and large private companies as well as 
cooperatives. The wine produced by cooperatives is the product of the small landowner 
farmers, who deliver their grapes to the cooperative for processing, distribution, and 
sale. In terms of regional structure of wine production by volume, the regions of Tejo, 
Beiras and Lisbon produce 40% of the total, while the Setúbal Peninsula and the 
Alentejo amounted to 20%. The regions of Minho, Douro produce in average 37% of all 
wine. In Madeira, the wine production accounted for 1% of total and Trás-os-Montes 
accounted for 2% (IVV, 2010).  
In 2008, there were 30,000 wine producers registered with the regulatory body. 
Research suggests that the Portuguese “wine cluster” does not have an articulated 
strategy for its development and growth (Pestana and Santos, 2007). This may be 
explained by the small scale of many of its producers, limiting the extent to which they 
can, individually, create market power in foreign markets. Moreover, the choice of the 
export markets has tended to be based on easy sales (targeting culturally near markets) 
instead of consumers that may give higher returns. Recent change has focused on 
applying new processes, technologies, expertise, and creates new brands, in order to 
boost all Portuguese wines in the markets. 
The distinctive characteristics of the sector therefore include its traditional structure of 
individual firms that rarely collaborate, its high labour intensity, heavy reliance on 
social capital and with some recent experience of modernisation and technological 
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upgrading in support of internationalisation. It is therefore opportune to study how firms 
in this sector have responded to the opportunities and challenges posed, given their 
heavily traditional knowledge base and the need for learning and innovation.  
3.5.6. The cork industry 
About 32% of the world’s cork forests are found in Portugal, along with 22% in Spain 
and 37% in the Maghreb. Portugal is proceeding with a reforestation policy at the rate 
of 10,000 hectares per year, and has a forested area of 730,000 hectares of cork trees 
(23% of national forest). In the cork industry, Portugal is the world leader in the 
production and transformation of cork, accounting for about 53% of world production, 
with 90% for export. This industry produces cork wines, discs, different types of floats, 
shoe soles, printing paper, cigarette tips, bath mats, table mats, hat bands, fishing rod 
handles, and different kinds of packing. Cork wool is produced for cushions and 
mattresses and granulated cork employed chiefly as insulating material in shipbuilding, 
as protective packing for fruit and eggs and as tubing for plastic substances.  
This industry is, therefore, of significance to the national economy, representing 1.2% 
of GVA and 1.3% of employment, 1.6% of the volume of business in the manufacturing 
industry, 2% of all national exports, and about 17.5% of total exports of forestry 
products (AICEP, 2012). Bottle corks account for more than 70% of the export total and 
the Alentejo amounts for 72% of all cork produced in Portugal. The manufacture of 
cork products is spread over 12 districts with Aveiro and Setúbal representing the main 
focus on employment (58% and 28%, respectively). 
Forest products represent about 5.3% of national GVA, 14% of industrial GDP, 5% of 
industrial employment and about 11% of Portuguese exports (INE, 2012b). SMEs 
prevail in the industries of wood, furniture and cork. According to the sector association 
(AIMMP), the wood sector represented about 5,000 companies and 54,000 jobs. These 
companies created a 2.5 billion euro business, of which 52% has aimed at international 
markets. It accounts for 2.2% of national GVA, and 9.4% of GVA in the manufacturing 
industry (INE, 2012a).  
Cork, a traditional Portuguese product, is an extremely light, compressible, elastic and 
flexible material, practically impervious to moisture. The combination of such qualities 
in one substance led to its widespread industrial utilization. It became extremely 
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prominent following the invention of glass bottles and the massive growth in sales of 
beverages which drove the large-scale production of suitable cork wines.  
This sector has increasingly diversified into varied products beyond the traditional cork 
stoppers; additionally, it is highly internationalized and has progressively enhanced its 
technological sophistication. This recent improvement in innovation performance makes 
the sector an interesting case study of how both technological improvements and 
internationalization are impacting upon the firms’ growth and learning processes.  
3.6. Context and firm learning: summary and conclusions 
This chapter has examined the need for a contextual dimension, in terms of economic, 
institutional, industry and market characteristics, to inform understanding of the 
learning process of growth-oriented SMEs. Building upon this, we have set out an 
informing conceptual framework for this study, which integrates the notion of context 
with concepts of entrepreneurial and organisational learning. This provides a framework 
through which to analyse the interplay between entrepreneurial, organisational and 
interactional learning processes within firms and how they are realised in specific 
national, regional and sectoral contexts, specifically here, in relation to the case of 
Portugal. 
Portugal displays a set of distinct and significant characteristics in relation to firm 
learning and innovation. These include its peripheral location, prolonged economic 
crisis and uneven development, shortcomings in terms of its public support and 
institutions, and low levels of collaborative innovation activity within its national and 
regional economies.  Portugal is considered a ‘catching-up’ country with respect to 
innovation. Despite significant advances over recent years, it is still characterised by 
low levels of employment in science and technology (Eurostat, 2012b) and an 
innovation infrastructure that relies on centralised government-funded institutes with a 
weak interface with local R&D firms and industry which limits knowledge exchange. 
Portuguese SMEs operate in general within traditional sectors and tend to be relatively 
‘closed’ in terms of transferring knowledge and technology from and to other external 
actors, with their preference not to engage in collaborative partnerships thus limiting the 
potential for two-way inter-organisational learning. Some studies also show that weak 
interaction between regional innovation actors prevails, with few examples of local 
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partnerships.  Learning and innovation is more often a result of vertical interactions, for 
instance between clients and suppliers. In contrast, those sectors where survival is more 
reliant on accessing external knowledge and resources (e.g. biotech) tend to develop 
partnerships and alliances that are international in nature, meaning that their innovation 
activities and related networks do not become regionally embedded.  
The weak linkages between Portuguese universities and industry increase the difficulty 
of developing competent managers with relevant international business knowledge. The 
lack of effective linkages between Portuguese SMEs and local regional actors, limits the 
extent of regional learning processes. At the same time, the domestic venture capital 
market is underdeveloped, which influences the lack of investment in science, 
technology and innovation (e.g. in the development of design capabilities). 
Government policy makers and other key actors in industry, such as sector associations, 
have largely recognised and accepted this scenario, and reforms have been underway in 
recent years. Steps are being taken to involve public and private actors (e.g. through 
financing schemes), but it remains to be seen if and how the main bottlenecks will be 
addressed and whether a local capability development process can take off. Portugal is 
also carrying out necessary reforms in order to shift its economic profile. Yet, the 
change has been slow, and the recent global crisis has worsened the situation. At the 
sector level, evidence suggests that firms continue to experience similar problems of 
limited knowledge supply and demand, institutional rigidity and lack of finance. 
Overall, indicators suggest that Portugal continues to remain one of the least favoured 
regions within the EU in relation to innovation. 
The rest of this study will explore in further detail the influence of this complex and 
uncertain context upon the learning processes of a sample of growth-oriented SMEs and 
their owner-managers/leaders. The research methodology adopted and the 
methodological challenges presented by this research are considered in detail in the next 
chapter.   
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4. Chapter Four: Research methods 
4.1. Introduction  
The particular object of study for this research was a set of economically significant 
SMEs, commonly referred to as growth-oriented SMEs, which were investigated in 
order to better understand the development of their learning processes. To achieve this 
we adopted a qualitative case study approach as this appeared to provide the most 
appropriate means of understanding this research phenomenon (Stake, 1995). Few 
existing qualitative studies address the learning relationships between SMEs and their 
environment, upon which GOFs seem to be particularly reliant (Etienne et al., 2008). 
Current research on entrepreneurship primarily offers snapshots of individuals and 
organisations disregarding their stories. Here, a set of nine growth-oriented SMEs, from 
different industries and learning contexts, are analysed in greater depth.  The adoption 
of a qualitative case study methodology enabled investigation into how interactive, 
organisational, and entrepreneurial learning combine to influence SMEs’ learning 
outcomes, and provides insights into the interaction between these dimensions which 
quantitative studies struggle to achieve. 
This chapter presents the overall research methodology used in this research. It details 
the methods employed in this study and the different stages involved in the research 
process, namely the phases of the case study research, and how data was collected, 
analysed and reported. It also reflects on how these methods evolved in face of the 
challenges faced in undertaking the research.  
4.2. The chosen paradigm 
Interactive learning theory provides a useful starting point from which to study the 
learning processes of SMEs within the Portuguese context. SMEs constitute a complex 
bundle of interactions in which actions often vary with goals, activities lack clear 
structures, and measurement is difficult (Curran and Blackburn, 2001).  The meanings, 
interpretations, intentions and world views of owner-managers, as well as the shared 
practical understandings of a firm as an organisation, are critical to understanding 
processes of interactive learning. To access such meanings and shared understandings 
the study adopted a qualitative paradigm in order to uncover the learning relationships 
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of growth-oriented SMEs and how these related to their absorptive capacity and 
entrepreneurial capability. 
SMEs often have an extreme range of forms because of operating in different industries, 
with different entrepreneurs’ background, skills and partnerships. Statistical 
generalisation is thus hard to obtain (Curran and Blackburn, 2001) and case study 
research strategy can be extremely effective when investigating complex change 
processes, where boundaries between phenomenon and real life context are not evident 
(Yin, 2003; Stake, 1995). It is also an appropriate research strategy when the ‘how’ 
research questions prevail and the investigator has little or no control over events (Yin, 
2003). 
The case study approach is well suited to the examination of learning processes, 
following them over time and accounting for different levels of analysis (Boekema and 
Rutten, 2007). Hence, analysis of real actors and their interrelationships in a social 
context is the most comprehensive and effective way to understand and explain how 
learning in different settings has contributed to the experiences of the sample of 
Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs. 
4.3. Research design 
The study adopts a multiple case study design as this is ideally suited to a comparative 
exploration of organisational processes in different organisations and contexts 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) while still capturing their particular characteristics (Yin, 2003). 
Cross-case patterns are identified from multiple sources of evidence to provide reliable 
and accurate theory and capture novel findings that may exist within the data (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Comparison between cases follows a replication logic to ensure a 
more robust study (Yin, 2003). The chosen theoretical framework (see section 3.3) was 
used to guide to the study individual cases in detail, and then successive cases were 
analysed to identify cross-case patterns.  
Yin (2003) defines case studies as descriptive, exploratory and explanatory. In this 
study, all three of these approaches were utilised. A descriptive approach was adopted 
to illustrate the firms’ learning processes and an exploratory approach was followed to 
bring insights into the ‘what’ issues arose. An explanatory approach sought to answer 
the questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’, aiming to establish a comprehensible causal 
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relationship between the processes. In this way, the qualitative approach allowed the 
study to address the behavioural aspects of the organisational learning process (e.g. 
Zahra and George, 2002). 
The chosen study design arises directly out of the theoretical framework previously 
outlined (section 3.3 and Figure 3.2) which focuses attention on the interplay between 
entrepreneurial learning, organisational learning and context (Oakey, 2013). Indeed, in 
order to learn firms must absorb and process both internal and external knowledge, 
which in turn influences their absorptive capacity and entrepreneurial capability. Such 
processes are carried out by entrepreneurs and other individuals in a social and spatial 
context.  
4.4. Research questions 
The central objective of this research is: to better understand how the process of 
entrepreneurial/ organisational learning of growth-oriented SMEs interplays with their 
contexts over time. To achieve this, the study set out to answer a series of research 
questions:  
1. What is the nature of the learning process in Portuguese growth-oriented 
SMEs?  
This is the main question of the study. It is an exploratory question centred upon the 
process. The focus of the study is on how particular SMEs succeed in an intermediate 
developing region context. In attempting to better explain the causal links between 
organisational and entrepreneurial learning processes within a given context, the 
following sub questions were identified: 
1.1. What is the influence of context on the learning processes of Portuguese 
growth-oriented SMEs?  
The aim here is to understand how particular environments influence the firms’ learning 
processes, including their ability to learn (e.g. Liao et al., 2003). The macro 
environment relates to wider economic institutions, which include public support, 
regulation, credit and taxation. The micro environment relates to particular industries, 
markets and a firm’s internal context which includes competitive issues, infrastructures, 
daily practises between firms, availability of knowledge/resources, market size and 
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regional networks. The firms’ internal context relates to their strategic posture, whether 
proactive or reactive, and their financial and absorptive capacity.  
1.2. What is the role (and relationship between) entrepreneurial and 
organisational learning in responding to critical contextual events and 
challenges in Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs? 
This seeks to ascertain the role of entrepreneurial learning within the 
organisations studied. It attempts to understand how the experience of the core 
entrepreneurial team and the way they deal with critical events, influences the 
organisational learning process (e.g. Cope, 2003). Significantly, the study evolved 
a stronger focus on the entrepreneurial capabilities of key entrepreneurs given the 
important role of these individuals in the firms’ critical events combined with the 
difficulty in interviewing other actors.  
1.3. How do we best conceptualize learning processes in growth-oriented 
SMEs?  
The aim is to capture how the organisation acquires and distributes both business and 
R&D knowledge through learning, with reference to the role of a firms’ absorptive 
capacity and different modes of learning. It also aims to understand the scope of 
relevant learning interactions and the subsequent outcomes (Zhang et al., 2006). 
The development of an appropriate research methodology that links the overall 
conceptual framework to the answering of these research questions is set out in Table 
4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Questions and methods matrix 
What is the nature of the learning process in Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs? 
 Methods 
Conceptual Issues 
Research Sub-
questions 
Relevance to 
Research Objectives 
What data? 
How to get 
it? 
How to 
analyse it? 
To understand growth-
oriented SMEs’ learning 
processes and outcomes. 
(Liao et al., 2003; 
Abdelgawad et al., 2013; 
Voudouris et al., 2010; 
Zhang et al., 2006; Zahra 
et al., 2006; Leitch et al., 
2010). 
Identify how 
entrepreneurial learning 
and distinct types of 
knowledge interplay with 
organisational learning in 
the selected SMEs (Liao 
et al., 2003; Abdelgawad 
et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 
2006; Zahra et al., 2006).  
 
Understand  the role of 
distinct contexts and 
learning events on 
growth-oriented SMEs’ 
organisational learning 
(Dahlander and Gann, 
2010; Barkham et al., 
1996; Macpherson and 
Holt. 2007) 
How do we best 
conceptualize learning 
processes in growth-
oriented SMEs? 
 
 
 
What is the role (and 
relationship between) 
entrepreneurial and 
organisational learning in 
responding to critical 
contextual events and 
challenges in Portuguese 
growth-oriented SMEs? 
 
 
What is the influence of 
context on the learning 
process? 
It is related to 
objective (i): How a 
particular geographic, 
industry and innovation 
context influences the 
learning processes and 
subsequent growth of 
SME. 
 
It is related to 
objective (i): How a 
particular geographic, 
industry and innovation 
context influences the 
learning processes and 
subsequent growth of 
SME. 
 
It is related to 
objective (i): 
How a particular 
geographic, industry 
and innovation context 
influences the learning 
processes and 
subsequent growth of 
SME. 
Public 
documentation  
 
Interviewees – 
owner-
manager, a 
supplier, or a 
client, or a 
partner 
 
 
Public 
documentation  
 
Interviewees – 
owner-
manager, a 
supplier, or a 
client, or a 
partner 
 
  
Public 
documentation  
Interviewees – 
owner-
manager, a 
supplier, or a 
client, or a 
partner  
Information 
collection  
 
Interview 
 
 
 
Information 
collection  
 
Interview  
 
 
 
Information 
collection  
 
Interview  
Deductive / 
inductive 
categorization  
and connection 
strategies  
 
 
 
Deductive / 
inductive 
categorization  
and connection 
strategies  
 
 
 
Deductive / 
inductive 
categorization  
and connection 
strategies  
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4.5. Case study methodology 
At the heart of the research methodology is a case study method. This provides a 
flexible approach suited to descriptive, explorative and explanatory research questions, 
thus allowing the creation of a variety of perspectives (Yin, 1994). It was particularly 
appropriate here because the learning phenomenon of SMEs was difficult to study 
outside its business and national settings. The case study methodology also allowed for 
the development of a longitudinal approach. The rest of this chapter explains how 
individual cases were selected, and how the case studies were conducted and analysed. 
It also reflects on how the research methodology encountered a number of challenges 
and consequently evolved to meet these. 
4.5.1. Selection of cases 
The selection of cases was based on the extent to which they offered an opportunity to 
develop theoretical understanding and to learn the most about the chosen objects of 
study within the research time span (Cope, 2003; Stake, 1995). The present study 
adopted a purposeful selection in which cases were selected to provide information that 
could not be obtained through other means (Maxwell, 2005). Generalization was 
eventually to be achieved through linking the study conclusions with the development 
of theory, research questions, or other cases. Each case study is unique as data were 
collected from diverse sources as appropriate to the case under investigation (Yin, 
2003).  
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), four dimensions must be considered in the 
selection of cases: target; actors; events; and processes. With respect to the present 
study, those dimensions are displayed in Table 4.2Erro! A origem da referência não 
foi encontrada.. 
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Table 4.2 Definition of study dimensions 
Dimension Choice 
Target  
Growth-oriented SMEs from both high tech and 
traditional industries 
Actors  Owner-managers and other relevant actors  
Events  
Institutional, business, social and intra firm learning 
stimulus 
Processes  
Absorptive capacity; learning mode, learning scope, 
learning outcome;  
 
Target   
The initial step was to decide the ‘target set’ to be studied in order to assess the target 
population to be accessed (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The research targeted SMEs as 
they are overrepresented amongst growth-oriented firms, tend to be relatively 
entrepreneurial and display intense learning activity (Etienne et al., 2008). Consistent 
with the research problem identified and the adopted theoretical framework, the initial 
criteria for the selection of cases were that they had to be SMEs, displaying growth 
orientation, be part of different sectors and from different geographic regions in 
Portugal. This was in order to compare the influence of distinct contextual factors. 
Substantial growth in terms of sales was identified as being important as in these growth 
situations learning processes were likely to be particularly intense.  
A theoretical sampling strategy was employed. Relevant SMEs were selected to fit the 
rationale of the intended research. Cases were identified after consulting with people 
knowledgeable about Portuguese SMEs and accessing public sources of relevant data on 
Portuguese SMEs (e.g. IAPMEI – Institute to Support Portuguese SMEs and 
Innovation). A sample of growth-oriented SMEs was identified on the basis of 
prospective sales turnover; i.e. firms that were regularly growing faster than the average 
in their industry groups. The process of selecting firms then went through the following 
stages. First statistical data (annual growth in sales and employees) provided by 
IAPMEI and INE was analysed in order to consider SME performance in more detail. 
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Second, industrial associations and academics aware of the Portuguese business milieu 
were contacted by phone to confirm the previous public information.  
Through this exercise, six enterprises were identified initially both from high tech and 
traditional manufacturing industries. All the enterprises were contacted via email to 
explain the main purposes of the study and request one interview with the owner-
manager, adding that their participation would be invaluable.  It was stressed that the 
research was for academic purposes only. A follow up telephone call was made to 
confirm the interview.  The request was accepted by all owner-managers who in general 
were available, with the exception of one (Pelcor), who chose to delegate the first 
interview to her assistant and collaborated in a second interview.   
ICT and biotech SMEs were targeted in this study due to their high rate of innovation 
and intense learning processes even within more marginal regions. All firms were 
addressed through email followed by a phone call to confirm their participation in this 
study and their owner-managers’ availability. However, there were sometimes delays in 
confirming interviews, which required the researcher to make persistent demands by 
phone and email. The transfer panel held in June 2010 suggested the addition of three 
more enterprises from traditional Portuguese industries in order to strengthen the 
comparison between sectors. Hence, three other growth-oriented SMEs from the mould, 
footwear and wine industries were identified and included in a research sample of nine 
firms, overall.  
The project rationale was to seek balance and variety among contrasting cases. As 
growth-oriented SMEs exist across different industries the study sought to include firms 
that represented characteristics common to particular sectors. This included firms from 
high tech industries (e.g. biotech) and others from traditionally low tech industries (e.g. 
cork, wine). According to the existing literature, SMEs in traditional sectors seem to 
rely mostly on tacit knowledge and geographical proximity, making their innovation 
efforts particularly dependent on the regional environment. In contrast, high tech 
ventures seem to depend more on knowledge that is codified and exchangeable through 
linkages with international networks of excellence (Bellini, 2002). The study deals with 
SMEs that are growth-oriented ventures, from a variety of sectors, hence allowing 
comparisons between cases and enabling the development of theoretical understanding. 
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All the cases shared some characteristics that made them comparable, including their 
consistent and substantial growth in terms of sales. Thus, the approach was a 
comparative case study that applied the same research questions to a set of distinct 
SMEs, and compared them with each other to draw conclusions. The purpose of data 
collection was therefore to replicate the phenomenon in a methodical way, and to 
explore different dimensions in line with the guiding conceptual framework. 
Actors   
Once the growth-oriented firms were selected the key actors identified were managers 
within these firms who were not only pivotal in the learning process, but who also had 
strategic responsibilities with regard to adapting firms to their context. Interviews with 
the firms’ owner-managers or CEOs were therefore appropriate because they, 
themselves, participated in the learning and growth issues being investigated.  
It was also intended to interview a wider group of key actors inside and outside the firm 
including those who made up the entrepreneurial team. A request was made to interview 
these other key staff (e.g. technical managers and specialised staff involved in 
innovation) although this was largely met by refusal across all cases.  It appeared that 
this refusal was largely due to concerns relating to the need to protect firm’s 
confidential information. However, a number of key external actors (seven) with whom 
firms had collaborated with were interviewed: one client (from the ICT sector), one 
supplier (footwear) and five partners (one from biotech, cork, and moulds, and two from 
footwear). 
As SME owner-managers are busy people and in order to overcome any scepticism 
about the research and gain their co-operation, it was necessary to emphasise the value 
and relevance of the research The researcher negotiated the necessary trust and 
reciprocity through presenting the researcher, the study and institution as of high 
quality, able to provide useful practical insights to the owner-manager, as well as 
ensuring the confidentiality of sensitive data. In this way, the study sought to provide a 
worthwhile experience to owner-managers and to avoid them feeling ‘used’. 
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Events  
Analysis particularly focused on how critical incidents and external environmental 
variables impacted on firms’ learning processes and growth in different ways (Bell and 
Young, 1998 and Bell et al., 2004). In this manner it built on the previous discussion of 
the connection between external triggering stimuli and growth (e.g. Greiner, 1972), 
organisational learning theory (Zhang et al., 2006), and interactive learning theory 
(Boekema and Rutten, 2007; Dahlander and Gann, 2010). This approach is discussed in 
further detail in chapter five. 
Processes  
The study aimed at following up the cases across two years to identify developments in 
their learning processes. During that period, two periodic interviews were negotiated to 
explore the learning processes of SMEs in their context over time. The study of an 
enriched sequence of events is paramount to understand processes and outcomes 
(Sadler-Smith, et al., 2001). This study therefore links process and outcome aiming at 
holistic insights rather than singular understandings. Context, process, and the outcome, 
were thus researched within and between cases (Pettigrew, 1990). 
4.6. Profile of case firms 
This section provided a descriptive profile of the individual cases, in terms of their main 
activity, history, resources, and basis of their competitive advantage. The nine firms that 
took part in the research were from diverse industries (see Table 4.3), were all privately 
owned, had differing ages and sizes, and at the beginning of the study had a growth-
oriented profile in terms of sales.  
Three enterprises were from the ICT industry, two firms from the biotech industry, and 
one firm each from the mould, wine, footwear and cork industries respectively. All the 
enterprises were private owned. Examining nine SMEs allowed a more in-depth 
analysis of their entrepreneurial learning processes over time, although this limited the 
scope for more exhaustive interviewing of other relevant related actors (e.g. suppliers, 
clients and partners). Nine case replications in different industry contexts constitutes a 
high degree of certainty to multiple case results, given that Yin (2003) argues that a 
large degree of certainty is likely to be achieved by six or more replications.  
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The companies were divided into two groups to facilitate the case study analysis and 
provide a basis for comparison of the learning processes and innovation involved: a) 
high tech firms and b) manufacturing firms in more traditional Portuguese industries 
(e.g. shoes, cork and wine) (see Table 4.3Erro! A origem da referência não foi 
encontrada.). Two were spinouts from universities; one a start-up from the biotech 
industry and the other a software firm with more than a decade in operation, which had 
spun-out a further four firms.  
Table 4.3 Firms’ Basic Features 
 
 
Company 
Birth date Industry Domain 
High tech 
YDREAMS  2000 Software Games, virtual marketing; 
BIOTECNOL  1996 Biotechnology 
Clinical assays and development 
cancer treatments; 
BIOALVO  2002 Biotechnology 
Industry drug development in the 
nervous system diseases;  
ALTITUDE 1995 Software 
Customer Relationship, 
Management (Call Centers); 
NFIVE  1996 Software Electronic ID cards; 
Traditional 
PELCOR  2003 Cork Cork  products; 
MOLDENE  1983 Moulds 
Moulds for plastic injection 
(knowledge intensive); 
SOMARQUES  1973 Footwear  Women’s shoes; 
ACSMV  1956 Agro-food  Wine. 
 
The one firm from the mould-making industry, which is often considered a traditional 
industry in Portugal, is defined here as ‘knowledge intensive’ as it adhered to Bell et 
al.’s (2004) categorization criteria of having a high level of scientific knowledge 
embedded in both product and process. Following Bell et al.’s (2004) conceptualization, 
ICTs and biotech firms were considered to be technologically-based as they 
incorporated advanced new technologies in their products and processes. Moreover, 
high tech firms tend to demonstrate high knowledge intensity in their marketing and 
sales functions as well, which was not the case in the mould-making company which 
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exhibited sophisticated knowledge intensive processes in its productive and design 
functions only (e.g. computer-driven processes). 
Although the firms in the sample varied in size, it was believed that this factor should 
not serve as the prime basis for categorization due to the importance of factors other 
than size and also due to variations between sectors. All companies were SMEs at the 
beginning of this study although one case grew in its number of employees to be 
classified as a large enterprise from 2010 onwards. In our sample, biotechnology and 
younger firms were smaller compared with mature internationalised firms, regardless of 
the industry, while all of the firms in the manufacturers group are considerably smaller 
than the largest firms (YDreams and Altitude). Seven firms were small in size (50 or 
fewer employees); one was medium-size firm (51 to 250 employees). The one case 
(Altitude) which grew rapidly to employ more than 250 employees during the study had 
380 employees by 2010 and 454 by 2011, as it increased its number of sites worldwide. 
Two firms that had expanded their activities and sales abroad subsequently downsized 
and reduced their number of employees (see Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Employment and sales growth (2010-12) 
Year  2010 2011 2010/2011 
2008/2009 
2009/2010 2010/2011 
2011/2012 
Company 
Nº of 
employees 
Nº of 
employees 
Growth of 
employees 
(%) 
Growth in 
sales (%) 
Growth in 
sales (%) 
Growth in 
sales (%) 
Growth in 
sales (%) 
YDREAMS 150 100 -33 150 100 300 20 
BIOTECNOL 25 26 5 40 40 35 -10 
BIOALVO 15 15 0 0 300 30 18 
ALTITUDE 380 454 19 23 13 7 14 
NFIVE 25 12 -48 9 11 -30 0 
PELCOR 4 5 25 4 7 40 35 
MOLDENE 50 55 10 25 20 40 34 
SOMARQUES 50 50 0 
30 
30 0 
-4 
ACSMV 38 38 0 22 27 4 46 
 
At the outset of the study (2006) all of the firms selected demonstrated their growth-
orientation in terms of 25% current yearly sales growth; and most reported sales growth 
above 20% on average for the three preceding years in line with the OECD’s ‘high 
 88 
growth’ criterion. However most were unable to sustain this earlier substantial growth 
rate and experienced decreasing sales after 2008, which many attributed to the global 
economic crisis (see Table 4.4). Although all the firms studied were increasingly 
internationalising they also reported falling domestic sales. From 2008, only two 
manufacturers and one high tech firm increased sales through international business. As 
Figure 4.1 Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.shows, two firms 
(YDreams and Bioalvo) demonstrated particularly irregular growth patterns 
characterised by high peaks of sales growth followed by troughs. Another (NFive), 
experienced an abrupt fall in growth in 2010/11, while two others (Biotecnol and 
SOMarques) reported negative results in 2012. 
 
Figure 4.1 Firms’ growth profile in terms of sales (%) 
 
Note: * In 2005/2006, ALTITUDE had a growth rate of 80%, NFIVE 60% and PELCOR 33%, in terms of sales 
4.7. Data collection and sources 
Qualitative research methods were selected for this study in order to generate data that 
is rich in detail and contextually embedded. In this study, data collection was structured 
so as to focus on the key issues, avoid dealing with an excessive amount of data and to 
facilitate analysis, while also including the possibility of revision where new insights 
emerged. In addition, triangulation of different methods and data was applied to validate 
constructs (Yin, 2003) and generate a broader and more secure understanding of the 
research issues. 
Triangulation of different methods not only allowed the production of a more complete, 
holistic, and contextual picture of the SMEs studied but also enabled checking the data 
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received from various sources and examining it from different perspectives, thus 
reducing the likelihood of misinterpretation. For example, the central role of the owner-
manager in the firm’s learning process as claimed by some of the owner-managers we 
interviewed, was triangulated wherever possible by interviewing a partner 
representative or other key external actor and through careful analysis of other source 
materials.  
The study involved data collection through multiple sources, combining data from 
personal interviews with data from an array of other sources including  press releases, 
published news articles, corporate web sites, sector related publications, firms’ 
directories, product catalogues and available secondary data (see section 4.9 for further 
discussion). The main objective was, therefore to obtain a depth of focus on the research 
object. The aim was to collect sufficient information to describe and explain the unique 
features of each case, as well as to highlight the characteristics common to the overall 
group of cases. This comparative case study approach also aimed to obtain an 
integrative perspective of the growth-oriented SMEs studied by drawing the various 
elements of their process of entrepreneurial learning into a cohesive interpretation. The 
variety of data sources use across the case studies is shown in the following Table 
4.5Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.. 
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Table 4.5 Data sources 
Firm Key informants Secondary data sources 
YDreams 
CEO – interviewed in 2009/11/05 and 
2011/12/09; Director of Luxury Products of  
L’Oreal Portugal (a firm’s client), interviewed 
in 2012/02/24. 
Across all cases: press releases; firms’ 
news; published articles; corporate web 
sites; magazines (e.g. from the sector 
association); statistical data; firms’ 
directories; product catalogues; 
Biotecnol  
CFO, interviewed in 2010/03/04 and 
2011/01/27; Managing Director of Pharmis (a 
firm’s supplier), interviewed in 2012/02/03. 
Bioalvo 
CEO, interviewed in 2010/04/18 and 
2011/12/02. 
Altitude 
CEO, interviewed in 2010/02/18 and 
2011/12/09. 
NFive 
CEO, interviewed in 2010/04/19 and 
2011/12/16; CEO of Strike (a firm’s partner), 
interviewed in 2012/02/15. 
Pelcor 
CFO, interviewed in 2010/04/11; CEO, 
interviewed in 2011/12/28; President of 
Portuguese Cork Association (APKOR), 
Interviewed in 2013/05/08. 
Moldene 
CEO, interviewed in 2010/12/16 and 
2012/01/26; President of the Portuguese 
Association for the Mould Industry 
(CEFAMOL), Interviewed in 2013/01/24. 
SOMarques 
CEO, interviewed in 2010/12/20 and 
2011/12/14; Sales manager from a firm’s 
supplier of soles, interviewed in 2013/01/07; 
President of the Association for the Footwear 
Industry (APICCAPS), interviewed in 
2013/07/22. 
SMV 
CFO, interviewed in 2010/12/29; CEO, 
interviewed in 2011/12/07 
 
Qualitative interviews were chosen as the primary methods of data collection, given 
their ability to probe and bring in-depth insights to events and to track learning 
processes and patterns over time. Such methodological choices partly rely on the 
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characteristics of the research site. GOFs in Portugal rely heavily upon the role of their 
pivotal owner-managers. These constituted key respondents in this study and are best 
accessed via interviews.  
Data collected from the individual owner-manager needed to be triangulated with 
additional interviews with other actors. Although some external actors were 
interviewed, the methodology evolved towards a stronger focus on the owner-manager. 
This happened due to several reasons: because they were key respondents, the most 
accessible during the study and were often the only actor who had been present at all 
stages in the development of the firm (being frequently the firm founder). Also, the 
large number of case studies covered in the study involved a trade-off in the depth 
which individual cases could be examined. In this way the research moved towards a 
stronger focus on the role of the owner-manager and processes of entrepreneurial 
learning than had been originally expected. 
4.8.   Semi-structured interview 
Semi-structured interviews were adopted and the topic guide centred on decisions and 
actions taken over time and related to contextual episodes (Cope, 2003). This provided 
the owner–managers’ historical perspective of the learning process; how entrepreneurs 
and firms adapted to change and what values guided these decisions. It focused directly 
on the case study topic and provided insights into causal inferences. Interviews were 
audio taped when allowed and later transcribed as soon as possible to produce a more 
accurate record and monitor the development of the project (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  
Owner-managers were interviewed first, given their centred role and, from here, it was 
decided which other people should be interviewed. The owner-manager was considered 
therefore both a respondent and an informant of other relevant sources of contrary or 
corroboratory evidence. The triangulation of data was useful because even if it did not 
always lead to consistent findings, it led to a better understanding or to new questions 
that could be answered by later research. 
There is no way to mechanically ‘convert’ research questions into interview questions 
and other relevant methods. Research questions formulate what broad understanding is 
sought, with specific interview questions being designed to gain that understanding 
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from interviewees (Maxwell, 2005). The adopted interview topic guide was therefore 
designed to generate insights into the research questions, and to be unambiguous to 
respondents.  
The interview topic guide was designed to be administrated in a face-to-face interview. 
Although intended to pursue a consistent line of inquiry, the sequence of questions was 
designed to be fluid rather than rigid. In other words, it intends both to fulfil the needs 
of the line of inquiry and put ‘nonthreatening’ questions. It was also designed to help 
elicit information from face-to-face interaction and was thus semi structured in order to 
facilitate flexible inquiry (see Appendix i and Appendix ii).  
The interview topic guide was subject to a pilot test in order to identify unproductive or 
inappropriate questions and to reduce other possible bias, and inaccuracies due to the 
poor formulation or lack of focus to the questions. The interviewer was therefore able to 
probe both the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of learning and growth processes. The resulting verbal 
data were supplemented with other sources, including documentary evidence (Yin, 
2003) where possible.  
Owner-managers were formally interviewed twice during the data collection, and each 
interview lasted from one to two hours. The first interviews unveiled substantial 
inferences which were examined and corroborated in further interviews. Repeated 
interviews allowed changes to be tracked over time, such as major strategic decisions 
from which had resulted important learning outcomes. They also allowed the 
corroboration of data from previous interviews.  
Owner-managers were informed about the need for them to be interviewed over a two 
year period, and were asked to provide their cooperation. The schedule for these 
interviews was made in advance and according to respondents’ availability, so as not to 
interfere with their daily activity.  The first case to be approached helped to refine data 
collection plans regarding both the content of the data and procedures to be followed. 
4.9.  Secondary data sources 
Press releases, firms’ news, internal written documents, published articles, corporate 
web sites and other sources contributed to data collection, as well as other documentary 
data obtained through contacts with customers, suppliers, partners, or service supporters 
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(see Table 4.5Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.). Documents were 
used to corroborate evidence from other sources and as inferences to further inquiry 
(Yin, 2003).  
These sources of evidence are exact and stable and can be reviewed repeatedly. The 
study of documents was extremely useful in formulating interview questions and testing 
the information mentioned in interviews. However, there were also constraints as for 
example where access was restricted to preserve confidentiality. Occasionally, the 
provision of some important additional information which was agreed at the end of the 
interview (e.g. consultancy studies upon the company) was never provided, despite the 
recurrent insistence by email. Significantly, the owner-managers generally preferred to 
limit information provision to that which was already in the public domain (e.g. product 
catalogues), in order to preserve business confidentiality. Moreover, documents found 
in the chosen study objects were produced with different objectives other’s than the 
present study (e.g. product catalogues aim at marketing efforts rather than academic 
purposes). Nevertheless, this documentation was useful to produce inferences and 
corroborate other data (Yin, 2003).  
4.10. Data analysis 
Each interview was transcribed and constituted a ‘single study’ with its own 
conclusions based on its own facts and its interpretation. Further, the cases were 
analysed following a rationale of replication. Generalization resulted from the potential 
correspondence between case conclusions and theory (Miles and Huberman, 1994) from 
a data-theory interaction process. The research attempted to isolate causal connections 
by a process of analytical abstraction through which the researcher condensed more and 
more coherent understanding of the phenomena, progressing from the specific 
happening to formalization of key variables within a model (Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  
4.10.1. Single-Case Analysis 
At first descriptive analysis was attempted: tentative ideas about categories and 
relationships were written in notes from reading field notes and listening to interview 
audiotapes. Analysis and coding of transcribed interviews took place as soon as 
transcriptions were available. Coding sought to ‘fracture’ the data and rearrange them 
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into categories that facilitated comparisons between things of the same category and 
help in the development of theoretical concepts (Maxwell, 2005). This coding and 
categorisation helped in interpreting the data and in relating it to the initial research 
questions and framework.  
Coding was done using codes from a ‘start list’ of theoretical categories generated from 
previous studies (Miles and Huberman, 1994); and generated substantive codes, which 
emerged from the interviewees’ accounts of what was going on. Further interviews were 
reread specifically for codes which had emerged from previous interviews. As patterns 
or themes were identified, recoding was carried out accompanying the development of 
dimensions of a given theme (Maxwell, 2005). For example, under the category 
‘learning triggers’ a set of codes emerged such as ‘lack of business knowledge’ or ‘lack 
of regional network’. Although the codes were labelled with abbreviations to facilitate 
access, they were also illustrated numerically to frame several text segments (see 
example in Appendix ii). 
The analysis relied on the comparison between empirical evidence and previous 
categories of known relevant literature and themes were identified openly from data, as 
well.  The analytical framework was developed before, during and after data collection 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). This involved constant judgments by the researcher with 
respect to which data were selected and presented in order to tell a story that was 
coherent and faithful to the observed phenomena (Stake, 1995).  
Different sources of information, principally from interviews with owner-managers and 
external actors (e.g. the president of sector associations), firms’ websites and product 
catalogues provided in interviews, were triangulated. Matrices were constructed from 
the data and used to identify patterns, comparisons and trends arisen from different 
sources of information. Further questions and possible routes of inquiry were devised to 
answer the questions which emerged from the matrices. At this point, it became evident 
that the owner-managers’ meanings prevailed over other sources of information because 
they were the key respondents, the more accessible, the more present over the firms’ 
development and, because they would not approve the conduct of any further interviews 
with their employees.  As a result, the research changed towards a greater focus upon 
entrepreneurial learning. 
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Finally, interview summaries were written to help to identify common threads and 
useful quotes, used as examples in writing up the research. A compilation of quotes is 
useful to appreciate contrasts and similarities (Maxwell, 2005).  
In the current research, within case analysis was carried out for a single firm through 
content analysis matrices that categorize processes and outcomes. These tables were 
built for three themes: 
• Knowledge base, learning triggers, and responses; 
• Learning processes; 
• Learning outcomes 
The different elements of the learning process were categorized into seven factors 
building on the Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) concept of absorptive capacity, Zhang et 
al.’s (2006) organisational learning framework, and Abdelgawad et al.’s (2013) concept 
of entrepreneurial capability.   
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Table 4.6 Elements of learning process 
Factors of the model Definition 
Knowledge base 
Early knowledge, which influences absorptive capacity and learning 
orientations; 
Knowledge type 
Business knowledge: the specific market and institutional knowledge of a 
business;  
R&D knowledge: the specific knowledge to research and develop 
products and services; 
Learning triggers  Contextual events that stimulate learning, such as competition or a crisis. 
Learning modes 
The way knowledge is acquired, either more experiential and exploitative 
(‘by doing’), or explorative (e.g. planning, networking, searching, 
imitating);  
Learning scope  
The knowledge sharing that can be individual (e.g. owner-manager, CEO), 
group (e.g. owner-managers’ team), intra-organisational (firm) or inter-
organisational (e.g. partnerships); 
Learning outcomes  
Capabilities and competitive advantage that result from the learning 
process; 
Entrepreneurial capability  
A firm’s capacity to sense, select, and shape opportunities, and 
coordinate their strategic moves and resources in exploration of these 
opportunities;  
 
4.10.2. Cross-Case Analysis 
Single case analysis was followed by cross-case analysis to compare data between cases 
(Yin, 2003). Dimensions emerging from theory and analysis allowed the identification 
of similarities and differences between cases; and different information from different 
sources was compared to reinforce conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The developed conceptual framework breaks down the main themes into factors, while 
the cross-case matrices facilitated the identification of patterns and the related variables 
involved (Miles and Huberman, 1994). During the cross case analysis high technology 
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ventures and traditional manufacturing firms were identified as having different 
learning behaviours. Then, cross case matrices were built to better outline these 
patterns, in which their characteristics, relations and outcomes were discussed and 
displayed across the groups of firms (e.g. Table 6.1). Additional cross group matrices 
were developed on the major themes (e.g. Table 6.8). The data were aggregated and 
repackaged through identifying relationships and aiming at an explanation. Contrasting 
finding and similarities were sought between high technology and manufacturing firms 
in terms of their environmental triggers, learning processes and outcomes. 
4.11. Validity 
The test of quality of any research is the extent to which its conclusions can be 
generalized convincingly to any wider audience and fellow researcher (Curran and 
Blackburn, 2001). Therefore, the conduct of case studies must follow procedures that 
ensure the quality of written up research. Validity is about the credibility of research, 
and the extent to which the strategies and methods accurately assess the phenomena 
involved (Maxwell, 2005), and it is enhanced through emergent relationships (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
This study follows the validity criteria suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
Yin (2003): construct validity – the extent to which measurement questions actually 
measure the presence of the studied concepts; internal validity – to set causal 
relationships and determine what alternative explanations can be eliminated; external 
validity – the extent to which the results can be generalized to other relevant contexts; 
reliability – to ensure the operations within the case study can be repeated with the same 
results. To achieve this, several steps were followed (see Table 4.7): 
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Table 4.7 Validity mechanisms of case study 
Tests Methods 
Construct Validity 
Use of different sources of information; the statement of the problem and main 
concepts are set out; theoretical representativeness of cases is set; a chain of 
evidence is set;  
Internal Validity 
Identification of case patterns; explanation of identified relationships; identify and 
report discrepant evidence;  
External Validity Replication to all cases; 
Reliability 
Use of a case study protocol; store all information about cases – notes, 
documents -   in a case study database and compare it.  
 
Triangulation of different sources of information was followed. Such diversity provides 
richer data and reinforces evidence about the relationships between contextual learning 
stimuli and organisational learning. For example, public information on the firms was 
analysed in the light of the already codified data to triangulate different sources of 
information. 
A chain of evidence was developed. Beginning with the literature review, and 
proceeding through problem statement and identification of main concepts to produce a 
set of research questions that guided data collection and analysis. Such guidance 
reinforced the reliability of the information. In addition, because it is based on a ‘start 
list’ of existing dimensions from previous studies, construct validity and internal 
validity were reinforced. Finally, a case study protocol was set (Yin, 2003), which 
included the research tools, rules and procedures to be followed during the investigation 
(see Table 4.8).  
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Table 4.8 Case study protocol 
Phase Procedures Criteria 
Research Site 
Selection  
Criteria definition  
SMEs that exhibit growth that is more than 20% above the 
industry average  over the three preceding years or more 
than 25% yearly (in the absence of industry statistics); 
To be a privately owned SME; 
Access to cases  
Address the owner-manager through email and phone and 
explain them the purpose of the investigation;  
Scheduling interviews with owner-managers; 
Request additional corporate documentation if necessary to  
complement  available public information;  
Sources of 
information  
Diverse sources and 
respondents in order 
to triangulate them  
Exhaustive search on media about firms’ related news;  
Research on the selected firms web sites and others’ related 
partners, suppliers or customers; 
Use of thematic and generalist internet search engines; 
Analyse corporate products;  
Interviews with owner-managers and other relevant industry 
actors as identified through preliminary interviews;  
Data Collection  Set a time schedule  
Data collection carried on from 2007 to 2014; 
Interviews took place from 2009 to 2013; 
Data coding  Coding  
The identification of a previous ‘start list’ of existent codes 
makes it easier to compare cases by categorizing analysis; 
Coding eases further categorizing and connecting analysis;  
Data analysis  Guided by literature 
A  categorical and connecting analysis of the learning 
processes in the light of context learning stimulus; 
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4.12. Ethical Issues 
This research raised some ethical concerns in order to ensure that the participants were 
approached with discretion and in no way affected for instance in terms of their 
professional and personal status. This was partly guaranteed by following Middlesex 
University’s regulations and guidelines for conducting ethical research and by obtaining 
approval from the Business School’s Ethics Committee.  
• Permission was gained to identify the case study firms by their proper names 
within the thesis;   
• Free choice of participants and their points of view were respected;  
• Taking sides with people in the business or getting involved in internal debates 
was avoided; 
• Comments that disagreed with the researcher’s interpretation of events were 
respected, and moral or ethical opinions were avoided;  
• An open and reciprocal relationship between researcher and organisations was 
attempted;  
• The empirical work in the field was always subject to the owner-manager and 
other relevant parties timing needs so as not to annoy people or disturb 
organisational daily activity;  
• Any publication will be forwarded to the participant organisations prior to 
publication, so as to avoid factual errors and ensure that no information of value 
to competitors is divulged;  
• Information commonly agreed not to be published was not used publicly;  
• Known sensitive issues (e.g. finance) were treated with discretion;  
• All duplicated research materials were stored in a locked location to respect 
confidentiality. Such data were only made available to researcher and 
 101 
supervisors involved in the project. Requests for access were considered on a 
case by case basis and under consent of interested individuals.  
4.13. Conclusions 
The research design described in this chapter was designed to accomplish the research 
goals. This included electing to take a comparative case study approach and to develop 
an interview guide which was applied to the owner-managers plus a number of key 
other actors across a sample of nine selected firm cases. The case study method allowed 
for systematic analysis and augmented confidence in the findings. This approach was 
particularly useful for responding to how and why questions about a set of events (Miles 
and Huberman 1994).  
As part of the process, proposed methods changed as firms were approached and 
difficulties arose. First, it had been intended to negotiate with the owner-managers over 
the use of a diary log in which they would write down relevant events to ease tracking 
responses to major learning triggers. However it rapidly became apparent that no 
owner-manager was willing to cooperate in the use of such a data collection tool, and 
this was dropped entirely from the research method. Second, it was intended to 
interview internal actors other than the owner-managers to gain different viewpoints 
over how learning processes within firms developed as well as to corroborate the 
owner-managers’ statements and increase the data robustness. Such initial goals 
however were unfeasible as the owner-managers didn’t trust the researcher to question 
their employees.  
A limited number of actors who interacted with the firm as suppliers, clients or partners 
were interviewed when allowed and this did provide useful complementary insights into 
the owner-managers’ statements. Despite the original intention of exploring 
organisational learning from multiple perspectives, actually, the methodology shifted 
towards a stronger focus on the owner-managers’ accounts. This methodological change 
resulted in an increased emphasis on the nature of entrepreneurial learning and its 
relationship to wider processes of organisational learning in response to diverse critical 
events.  
In general, the owner-managers showed a high degree of co-operation with the study 
and made a valuable contribution to the research by agreeing to two in-depth interviews 
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over a two year period, although they acted to restrict the focus of the research. The 
second phase of qualitative interviews was an opportunity for the researcher to clarify 
important issues for the understanding of the whole analysis. These valuable oral data 
were complemented with other written data sources available on firms’ sites and 
websites.  
Limitations of the research related to the limited validity and generalizability of the 
findings. However, the main aim of the study was to gain an understanding of the 
complexity of the research problem. The analysis followed an increasing process of 
analytical abstraction that begun with creating the text to work on, trying and coding 
categories to find a set that fitted (see Appendix ii), identifying major themes, and 
finally focusing the analysis and reporting around these themes. The results of this 
analytical process are set out in detail in the next chapters five and six. 
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5. Chapter Five: Learning in growth-oriented Portuguese SMEs: 
within case analysis 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the individual cases in relation to the research questions, 
focusing on the firms’ early foundational knowledge base, critical factors that have 
triggered learning and the resulting  processes and outcomes at the firm level. The 
chapter seeks to describe and explain learning processes over time through content 
analysis of the case study data, including the use of tables and matrices, following the 
method suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994).  
As explained in the preceding chapter, an important criterion for selecting the nine cases 
was that they were all experiencing high rates of growth at the beginning of the study 
and had achieved this, in part at least, through their strong orientation toward 
innovation.  From here, the themes to be investigated were identified in the light of the 
literature discussed in Chapter 2, which in turn, was reflected in the interview questions 
(Appendix i). 
The main themes explored in the interviews with owner-managers related to their roles 
in relation to: (a) the firm’s early knowledge base (i.e. at the start-up and immediate 
post star-up phase), learning triggers and responses; (b) the type of knowledge 
accumulated and learning processes involved; (c) learning outcomes. The goal was to 
explore the basis on which growth-oriented SMEs were able to respond to and learn 
from events affecting their operations and markets in order to be successful. Interview 
data and their meaning were analysed, firstly through the interview transcript, secondly 
through thematic analysis, and finally through categorical content analysis (Appendix 
ii).  
Interview transcripts were edited; themes within them were identified, and then sorted 
by category. Categories were derived with the main research questions in mind, in turn 
reflecting the interview questions. Each case study is explained with reference to the 
three themes identified: 
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a) Early knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
This section describes the company’s initial knowledge base and its evolution over the 
study, drawing mainly from the narrative provided by the owners/founders. According 
to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), the knowledge base of new firms plays a key role in 
how they respond to contextual triggering events and their learning processes over time.  
The section also examines the challenges that firms faced as revealed in the interviews, 
and how they responded to triggering events.  A notable theme that emerged from the 
interviews was how critical learning events often triggered higher level learning and 
subsequent reconfiguring of organisational capabilities.  
b) Knowledge types and learning processes 
This second main theme relates to the knowledge types and learning modes and scope 
demonstrated by firms when coping with external events, focusing on business and 
R&D knowledge. Business knowledge is defined as market and institutional knowledge 
pertaining to a business, at either the domestic or international level, including, for 
example, knowledge of sales operations or partnership procedures. R&D knowledge is 
the product-specific knowledge and technological know-how needed to develop new or 
improved products and services. This can include, for instance, knowledge about 
manufacturing processes and the provision of support services. 
The section also includes an analysis of how new knowledge was acquired by firms in 
terms of the learning modes while sensing, selecting and shaping opportunities. A broad 
spectrum of potential learning modes is suggested in the literature (Zahra et al., 2006; 
Huber, 1991; March, 1991), ranging from unplanned to systematized, or from 
exploitative to more explorative.  If learning derives from direct experience and internal 
routines are established ‘by doing’, it is considered here as low level or exploitative 
learning. This occurs when relatively minor (or incremental) adjustments are made to 
existing procedures, typically because a particular situation has been encountered and 
dealt with in a similar way in the past
9
.   
Conversely, high level or explorative learning is defined here in terms of combinations 
of new non-routine knowledge aimed at doing significantly new things, including as a 
                                                          
9
 As also reflected in Argyris and Schon’s conception of single loop learning (1978). 
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result of the critical scrutiny of existing procedures with an eye toward change
10
. Such 
high level learning is characterised by the exploration of novelty, openness to external 
knowledge, influences and potential partnerships (as suggested by the concept of ‘open 
innovation’). This is often a result of external contacts and networking, imitating, 
improvising, training, experimenting through trial and error, ‘grafting’ (i.e. hiring 
external staff or acquisition of another enterprise), or even as a result of planning that 
draws heavily upon external information. High level learning can also involve ‘learning 
how to learn’11, in reflecting on how to learn better and to renew existing capabilities 
through strategic change and accessing up-to-date knowledge. Finally, this section also 
explores the scope of the specific learning processes involved, whether at the individual, 
team, organisational or inter-organisational innovation levels.  
c) Learning outcomes 
The research examined the outcomes of firms’ learning in terms of the acquisition and 
combination of new capabilities and how these have contributed to their competitive 
advantages. The role of capabilities is considered in terms of the Penrosian theory of the 
growth of the firm (Penrose, 1959), which places considerable emphasis on the 
importance of learning capabilities and firm’s characteristic strengths as a source of 
competitive advantage. A capability is considered to be the capacity for a number of 
resources (e.g. knowledge) or other capabilities to be effectively combined within the 
firm. In particular, entrepreneurial capability is here deemed to comprise the 
combination of capabilities that allow firms to gain competitive advantage and to grow.  
This includes the sensing of possibilities (e.g. by seeking), selecting new insights and 
planning, shaping opportunities (e.g. by a new recombination of existing resources / 
capabilities into a distinct product), and synchronizing internal and external resources 
for the exploration / exploitation of those opportunities over time (e.g. by continuous 
sensing of up-to-date external knowledge) (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). 
This chapter examines firms’ knowledge base, knowledge type, and learning processes 
in relation to the learning outcomes within each case study. This analysis then provides 
the basis for the cross case analysis, reported in Chapter 6. Each case study is described, 
analysed, and explained in relation to the main research questions.   
                                                          
10
 This takes place when explorative situations reveal the inadequacy of existing ‘theory in use’ (Argyris 
and Schon, 1978), calling into question the appropriateness of existing procedures. 
11
 This is similar to Argyris and Schon’s concept of deutero learning (1978). 
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5.2. YDREAMS 
5.2.1. Introduction  
YDreams specialises in software for the computer games and virtual marketing 
industries.  It was founded in 2000 by its current chairman, António Câmara, and four 
former colleagues from a research lab in New Lisbon University's Faculty of Science 
and Technology, in Monte da Caparica, the Great Lisbon Area, Portugal. In 2013 
YDreams employed around 120 people and had its headquarters in the US with global 
offices in Barcelona, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and New York.   
In recent years it has developed full-scale interactive environments and products, and 
building up its intellectual property in the area of interactive technology and design. It 
has researched and developed proprietary/patented technologies in areas such as image 
processing, augmented reality and gesture-based interfaces with application in a range 
of projects and products. Indeed, it has developed over 500 projects for global clients in 
three main strategic areas: Projects, Products and R&D.  
YDreams Life (projects) worked on the conception of interactive architecture, creating 
interaction experiences for accessing content that is based on intuitive touch (e.g. for 
museums)
12
. Finally, in-house proprietary technology grounded upon YLabs, was the 
core of the company and worked independently from its commercial units, in areas such 
as augmented reality or image processing, developing the firm’s proprietary platform 
software. The important critical events in the company’s history are summarised below: 
• 2001: started developing location-based gaming technology, releasing its first 
mobile game in 2002; 
• 2003: took the first steps in augmented reality software;  
• 2004:  commenced its international expansion with one co-founder, relocating 
to Barcelona to open YDreams Med; 
• 2006: raised 8.5 million Euros in venture capital from ES Tech Ventures and the 
North American firm Herrick Partners and started operating in Brazil;  
                                                          
12
 A product such as Architek – the Interactive Solutions Creator - was designed to create interactive 
applications, such as interactive floor projections, by which the final user may customize all contents. 
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• 2007: opened an Office in Austin, Texas (US); 
• 2008:  created an entrepreneurial network for developing revolutionary products 
conjointly with the AR Consortium
13
 and joined with a North American partner 
to found the New York-based Audience Entertainment
14
; 
• 2010: created a spin-out company, the Ynvisible, which focused on the 
development of new technologies in printed electronics; 
• 2011: created two more spin-out companies: YVision, whose focus was Natural 
User Interfaces (NUI), developing and producing Software Development Kits 
(SDK) that enabled engaging the NUI applications, and YDRobotics, 
specializing in robotics;  
• 2013: developed another spin-out, the Azorean, which focused on developing 
drones to explore the deep sea.
15
 
5.2.2. Early knowledge base, learning triggers and learning responses 
Knowledge base  
The firm’s knowledge base was largely founded on the owner-manager’s strong 
academic background in software platforms (Table 5.1). Prior to establishing YDreams 
he had spent several years abroad and built a solid international and informal network of 
contacts in the software industry
16
. These contacts were a critical resource that the 
owner-manager has been able to draw upon in setting strategic directions, organizing 
spin-outs world-wide and diversifying to R&D related businesses/spin-outs, while 
maintaining the core R&D capabilities of the firm. The core R&D team, made up of 
engineers from the Institute for ICT engineering (INESC
17
) was considered a core 
capability and kept almost unchanged during this time. 
                                                          
13
 A group of global companies that are pioneers in the development and creation of augmented reality 
technology and tools. 
14
 A global company that creates and commercializes audience games for grand-scale venues. 
15
 Ydreams Informática SA - Corporate Information  (2013). 
16
 E.g. through participating in projects at Virginia Tech University and MIT (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) that he has used from the beginning. 
17
 A private association based in Lisbon, with a mission to research, educate and advise on ICT related 
issues. 
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The firm’s lack of in-house business knowledge was an early key weakness of 
YDreams, attributable to the fact that both the owner-manager and his core R&D team 
were technical specialists and lacked requisite managerial/business knowledge and 
experience. This constraint was addressed earlier by drawing on expertise available 
through the firm’s external alliances and consulting sources: “All the managers were 
researchers … and we did not know anything about management. Then we talked with 
some people who told us to think of a new product, get the necessary investment, and 
focus on the potential market” (YDreams, owner-manager). First, the firm attained 
prestigious partnerships in relevant business developments
18
and second, as the 
partnerships evolved, it specialized in different market segments through spinning off, 
in order to gain proximity to key markets. By 2012, as a result, the company had 
developed a much stronger business capability, which further facilitated its growth, 
international business development and attracted investors to the board of the firm.  
Learning triggers and responses  
In the beginning, difficulties experienced in developing a supportive domestic network, 
accessing finance and disappointments related to attempts to access public support
19
  
compelled the firm to internationalise while relying heavily on its own internal 
resources (see Table 5.1). Government regulation regarding patenting was experienced 
as overly bureaucratic and time consuming, impeding their ability to introduce new 
products.  Simultaneously, the lack of local marketing expertise and prestigious global 
partnerships were experienced as major obstacles to effective promotion of their 
products abroad (section 3.4): “Portugal is a disaster regarding marketing and sales, 
and mostly in potential partnerships … there is no enterprise on a par with our business 
with its headquarters in Portugal” (YDreams, owner-manager).   
                                                          
18
 Conjoint product development in the long term with large companies such as Dell and Hewlett 
Packard. 
19
 For example in relation to ensuring bank credit, which was very demanding in terms of the guarantees 
required and also public payments, being very delayed. 
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Table 5.1 YDREAMS’ knowledge base, learning triggers and learning responses 
 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced Responses 
Owner-managers’ 
knowledge in 
software platforms 
acquired through 
academic research  
(PhD) and previous 
international 
academic networking 
(2000) 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge on 
business partnerships 
through international 
networking and 
spinouts (2012) 
Lack of finance; 
Lack of domestic partnerships and 
public support;  
Bureaucracy in implementing financing 
aid; 
 
Increase internationalization (2004); 
Lack of international business 
knowledge  
Hire international  business knowledge 
(2007) 
Internal climate deteriorated; 
Unpaid wages; 
Lack of investment in marketing; 
New investments in a new business 
/prestigious partnership (2008);  
Outsource marketing efforts to 
partners (2008); 
Domestic trouble in getting paid; 
Competitive intensity;  
Global crisis and lack of confidence; 
Vertical integrated markets; 
Spinning out five ventures (2008-2013); 
Reduce staff (2009); 
Business diversification (2009); 
Create global products with leading 
partners (2008); 
Successful distinct product (2011). 
Move headquarters to USA (2011); 
 
ICT firms, being highly market focused and aiming at a customised product, tend to 
seek and build close collaborative relationships with key partner / client firms, often at a 
global level. Furthermore, ICT firms tend to interact collaboratively with partner / client 
firms with whom they engage for purposes of conducting ‘open innovation’. YDreams 
therefore chose to internationalize further by developing alliances with well-known 
international firms. It thus acquired business knowledge of the markets it was seeking to 
penetrate and developed a strong reputation within the sector, which was critical to 
attracting important new investors. It also recruited external expertise in the form of a 
business developer with experience in one of the major overseas markets (the US). 
Later, such recruitment proved insufficient in the face of the domestic constraints 
previously described. Also the growing economic crisis further aggravated a poor 
domestic environment characterised by lack of confidence, bank retraction and 
deleverage. The company continued to struggle to enhance its intellectual property, 
brands and reputation in its target markets.  
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From 2007/2008 onwards, the firm’s continued poor performance (i.e. in terms of 
growth/profitability) was further compounded by the impact of the world economic 
crisis. A key characteristic of the ICT sector shows a strong link between process 
technology, product technology, and product characteristics that leads towards 
integration (e.g. the convergence of computing and entertainment technologies), with 
the ICT products becoming part of broader integrated systems. Specifically, the vertical 
integration in the computer games and virtual marketing sectors continued to grow 
(with increasing acquisitions and merges), as shareholders’ confidence deteriorated and 
it became increasingly difficult to collect domestic payments. YDreams addressed these 
constraints by diversifying to new businesses, and developing relationships with 
prestigious international partners. In 2011, YDreams relocated its headquarters to the 
US in a bid to improve its reputation in this key market. Nonetheless, the worsening 
global economic environment resulted in a drop in sales, with knock-on effects on the 
firm’s internal climate to some extent, with the need for layoffs.  In response, the firm 
announced new investments, new key partnerships and boosted its marketing efforts to 
recover its reputation.  
As the company sought to strengthen its business knowledge and develop new client 
and partner relationships, it spun off five related ventures during 2011/12 and 
diversified to different businesses in order to encourage complementary competences 
and strengthen its product. This restructuring involved laying off entire teams, some of 
whom went on to create closely-related and competing start-up firms in the vicinity. 
5.2.3. Learning processes  
Table 5.2 summarises the principal learning processes (in bold) identified in this firm. 
YDreams demonstrated high learning intensity through a combination of several 
learning modes, namely exploitatively, ‘by doing’ and by explorative networking, 
searching new business opportunities, planning business goals and improvising new 
products and processes. The firm was compelled to learn new routines frequently along 
its life cycle, but only rarely having recourse to ‘grafting’ external expertise and the 
imitation of others’ practices. It continuously reconfigured its distinct capabilities in 
different products by proactively integrating external knowledge in its R&D units 
through international partnership, spinning out and relocation, with the owner-manager 
being central in sensing relevant knowledge and selecting opportunities. 
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Internally, the company accorded particular priority to protecting and nurturing its R&D 
knowledge and R&D department that were considered the “backbone of most of 
YDreams technologies”20. Its core technology of augmented reality software supported 
its businesses and R&D department. The YLabs department tended to rely on existing 
in-house knowledge and developed the firm’s proprietary platform software by its own 
means, ‘by doing’: The “main source of knowledge starts internally, with people 
presenting immense creativity, crafted by the experience they have.” (YDreams, owner-
manager). Incremental innovation happened at R&D level, through an exploitative 
learning around existing core technologies.  
Externally, other learning modes were crucial to absorb external knowledge. The 
company became increasingly internationalized by networking with partners and clients 
and searching new clients, first by distance networking and second, by moving its 
headquarters abroad and spinning off. Since start up, such inter-organisational learning 
was very intense,
21
 constantly changing internal procedures: “partnership was very 
close, through a permanent interaction, very R&D centred and focused on newness” 
(L’Oreal22). YDreams engaged by networking in prestigious long-term alliances (e.g. 
Dell, Microsoft) and added new external knowledge to that previously obtained by 
listening to important players (e.g. the former CEO of a Bank).  
In this way, the firm’s reputation and trust were increased, enabling the acquisition of 
international business knowledge and closeness to crucial markets (e.g. the US market, 
with a vast client and partnership potential to explore). Consequently, this promoted 
strategic planning at an international level, led to the creation of a number of spin-offs 
and increased the influx of consultancy advice and investment (e.g. from Netscape, 
Lloyds, or Apple). Frequently, and whenever necessary, the company improvised new 
products and processes through sporadic ‘brainstorming’ sessions to change plans 
rapidly
 23
, in which decisions were taken after collective discussion, involving both 
business managers and R&D staff, who exchange knowledge. 
In its inter-organizational learning at international level, the firm was compelled to 
‘graft’ (recruit) external business managers to fulfil its lack of business knowledge and 
                                                          
20
 YDreams Informática SA - Corporate Information (2013). 
21
 The firm counted  more than 80 meetings with US firms in several conjoint and long-term projects. 
22
 Interview with Rosario Costa, Director of Luxury Products of  L’Oreal Portugal, a firm’s client in 
February 24st 2012. 
23
 E.g. Improvising in contracts already formed that had to stop because they were unveiled as not viable.  
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reputation in foreign markets. These external business managers (e.g. including a 
Finnish manager from Nokia) provided some increased networking capacity, 
temporarily enabling the company to access business knowledge and diminished the 
marketing-related constraints posed by location. However, with the growing recognition 
of the difficulty of managing and promoting its growing international activity from a 
peripheral location like Portugal, the firm decided to move abroad. Closeness was 
crucial in dealing with distant clients and partners, who demanded continuous 
collaboration.
24
 Also, the company on occasions selectively imitated some of the 
successful practices of other competitors, with a history very similar to YDreams.
25
  
Table 5.2 YDREAMS Learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’ R&D, Business Team, owner-manager  
Networking  R&D, Business  Owner-manager and other actors 
Searching  R&D, Business Owner-manager 
Planning  R&D, Business  
Owner-manager, partners, managers, 
and technologists 
Improvisation  R&D, Business Owner-manager and technologists 
Learning to learn  R&D, Business  Owner-manager and team 
‘Grafting’ Business Owner-manager and other actors 
Imitation R&D, Business Owner-manager 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
 
YDreams ability to learn, adjust and synchronize internal and external resources was 
evident in the way it was able to modify its structure and business goals, such as when it 
moved its headquarters to the US or developed new spin off companies. Each time it 
carried out these structural and strategic changes, the company had to change critical 
procedures, reconfigure basic assumptions and how it approached the learning of new 
routines, and significantly reformulate its activities in the pursuit of the more profitable 
business opportunities. This included, for instance, redesigning staff positions, 
abandoning developed products, making radical shifts, such as quitting the environment 
and entertainment businesses to focus on culture and advertising; hiring external 
                                                          
24
 Partnerships and service level to the clients were of a high level of technical sophistication. Audience 
Entertainment, for example, resulted from a YDreams partnership with a North American partner, in that 
a close planning of product development was necessary from the beginning. 
25
  It imitated the practices of firms such as Apple, Dell, IDO, and Hewlett Packard in functional areas 
related to industrial design, human-resource management, growth strategy and product development. 
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management, founding new branches and creating spin-outs such as the Azorean, to 
develop remote-controlled drones to explore the deep sea. 
The owner-manager served as a bridge between the external business and internal R&D 
knowledge that creatively emerged from the R&D team. He participated in internal 
general meetings and ‘brainstorming’ sessions, in which knowledge dissemination 
occurred by planning and improvisation. This allowed for the integration of the 
individual and collective knowledge needed to better shape opportunities. According to 
the account of the YDreams owner-manager, in the absence of complete business 
knowledge “improvisation is ‘built in’ and comes from me and my co-founders who 
have such capability”. New strategic directions were set by reviewing and revising 
existing plans in the light of the external knowledge and understanding gained from 
partners and consultants. In the owner-manager’s words, “I only orchestrate and the 
others play their instruments .... I still lead the entire group ... setting the way to follow 
... communicate it and convince people.” (YDreams, owner-manager). 
5.2.4. Learning outcomes  
Table 5.3 summarises the evidence relating to how YDreams has been able to develop 
its capabilities and competitive advantage through learning. By external learning, the 
company achieved new business capabilities for operating internationally in highly 
demanding markets (e.g. the US), building long-term partnerships, and recruiting 
competent international staff to work on its behalf (e.g. Nation Cinemedia): “we were 
able to reset the firm ... and to restore the initial flexibility by spinning off and 
acquiring partners that are able to sell for us” (YDreams, owner-manager).  
The resulting inter-organizational learning allowed the company to achieve external 
complementary capabilities (e.g. marketing and R&D skills from partners) for their 
R&D to create an original global product and to compete globally and near key markets. 
For instance, the partnership with Disney increased the firm’s global profile and 
exposure throughout the entire cinema network. A similar situation arose with the Intel 
group in relation to hardware products. Important partnerships also attracted important 
 114 
clients and investors to YDreams, who preferred to work with an experienced firm in 
which they could trust
26
.  
YDreams also continued to pursue its core R&D, continuously improving its efficiency 
and simplifying its procedures: “we intend to keep an integrated perspective at product 
level ... now we have much more efficiency ... in terms of core competences however, 
everything remains the same” (YDreams, owner-manager). This led to efficiency gains 
through the design of its products and services (e.g. screens, robots, software). 
Table 5.3 YDREAMS Learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage  
Integrative software able to combine synthetic and 
real information; 
 
New international businesses established; 
 
Long-term partnerships with large 
customers/partners established; 
 
Ability in recruiting internationally. 
Software applications  on augmented reality and 
new interactive surfaces; 
 
Products able to integrate different functions / 
technologies; 
 
Specialized spin-outs; 
 
Prestigious reputation; 
 
Investment capacity;  
R&D capacity. 
 
Those new capabilities led to competitive advantages that included an integrated vision 
at product level, diversification capacity through spin-outs (e.g. editorial market with 
Invisible), and increasing business specialization. The company also attracted additional 
investment due to its increasing reputation: “the key word is confidence that we’ve 
gained ... we are doing well with several investors” (YDreams, owner-manager).  
5.2.5. Summary  
This case presents great diversity on its learning modes and provides a number of key 
insights. Firstly, it shows how prior R&D knowledge was crucial in providing a basis 
for further efficiency-related exploitation at the R&D level. The networking undertaken 
by the owner-manager – both at business and R&D level – and the core R&D team were 
                                                          
26
E.g. new investment was gained by Invisible from big players – such as Silver Plant Bank, Cemapa, or 
Grupo CUF – in order to initiate small manufacturing units. Also, Audience Entertainment attained major 
investment from one of the major studios of Hollywood.  
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part of the company’s knowledge base, which the firm sought to improve by upgrading 
its capabilities in its core products.  
Firstly, the owner-manager played a key role in the firm’s learning trajectory and how 
this was entwined with his own path of entrepreneurial learning. He had a proactive 
strategic orientation and global vision from the outset. His bold decisions to address key 
knowledge gaps – by recruiting requisite expertise, spinning out new firms as separate 
entities, and moving the company’s headquarters to a foreign location – all 
demonstrated that he was proactive and growth orientated. He shared relevant 
knowledge inter-organisationally through key partnerships, and planned strategically 
and broadly as well, with external inputs feeding the decision-making process. He also 
promoted collective learning within the business through planning and less formal 
activities such as ‘brainstorming’ meetings, developing a culture of learning in order to 
shape opportunities.  
Secondly, a number of external learning triggers compelled the firm to look beyond the 
R&D knowledge resources, which provided the basis for its start-up and original 
competitive advantage. The company was able to improve its performance through 
international networking at the R&D level, relying on its competent R&D staff. On the 
other hand, those learning triggers also revealed the difficulty in communicating the 
firm’s ethos and marketing its products abroad and in obtaining domestic partnerships 
to support this. Moreover, an inter-organizational learning scope at international level 
and difficulties experienced in relation to Portugal’s system of intellectual property 
protection resulted in the decision to create new spin-out ventures located in relevant 
overseas markets. Other learning triggers came in the form of intense competition and 
the ongoing economic crisis, which forced the company to diversify its businesses and 
internationalize further. The company co-developed its products in partnership through 
a high ‘openness’ in terms of innovation procedures. Specifically, the company sought 
internationally complementary R&D knowledge through networking and spinning out, 
whilst also acquiring external expertise at the business level. On the other hand, at the 
same time it continuously improved its in-house core R&D capabilities. 
These learning triggers and processes contributed to the nurturing of new product 
development capabilities in terms of building crucial partnerships and strategic alliances 
with other international businesses, and recruiting expertise internationally. It was the 
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firm’s commitment to continuous R&D-based improvement within its specialised 
niches, while developing long-term partnerships and reputational effects, that 
strengthened its resource base and current competitive advantage. Its entrepreneurial 
capability, which mainly centred on the CEO’s leadership and coordination capacity, is 
reflected in how it has been able to apply its business capability to overcome the 
domestic constraints faced, while also combining internal core R&D capabilities with 
external technology to achieve global and integrative products adapted to suit the needs 
of clients in various industries. 
5.3. BIOTECNOL 
5.3.1. Introduction  
Biotecnol is a Portuguese research-based biotechnology company that specialises in 
multi-specific antibody products that target human cancer.  Currently, Biotecnol’s 
Tribord proprietary platform allows the generation of multi-specific antibody products 
and combines different antibody fragments. It owns and exploits the exclusive rights of 
this proprietary technology.  
The company was initially headquartered in Oeiras, Greater Lisbon (Portugal) and from 
2013 has been located in New Brunswick in the United States. It was founded by Pedro 
de Noronha Pissarra, the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
27
, and Andrew Kelly, 
the chief scientific officer, whose training included various R&D projects
28
 and who 
supervised the firm’s research programmes and intellectual property issues. It started 
with a workforce of just two people in 1998, funded through a combination of private 
capital (72%) and Portuguese venture capital (28%), and operated as a consultancy 
services provider to Portuguese pharmaceutical and European biotech companies. 
Gaining revenues because of the lack of long-term financing sources has always been a 
concern within the Portuguese context (see section 3.4). The major critical events faced 
by Biotecnol along its life cycle are as follows:  
                                                          
27
 Noronha Pissarra held an international R&D background (e.g. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
USA) and a Master's Degree in science and technology management. 
28
 e.g. European Community ÉCLAIR. 
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• 2000: it raised its first investment from private shareholders and was able to 
begin operating independently, which allowed it to evolve into the first 
pharmaceutical biotech R&D driven company in Portugal.  
• 2004: it attained additional financing from its institutional shareholders 
InovCapital
29
, which enabled it to start implementing its current business model 
and evolve from research toward a product development company that targeted a 
high-value proprietary pipeline in selected areas of oncology
30
.  
• 2005: the shareholder, Pharmis
31
, entered into the structure of Biotecnol and 
invested in property rights to develop a biological molecule for cancer 
treatment
32
.  
• 2008: Biotecnol ended its public shareholding and established a wholly owned 
subsidiary, Biotecnol Pharmaceuticals Inc, in Durham, North Carolina, in order 
to expand its activities into the US
33
.  
• 2012: the company entered into an important partnership with the 
pharmaceutical company, Roche, and moved its headquarters to the US.  
• 2013: it concentrated its proprietary rights in the US and has delocalized its 
service providing activity to Portugal through a spin-out, Rodon Biologics. By 
moving the firm’s products to the US it also increased the perception of its value 
creation and access to investment. The company's core activities were centred on 
the in-house development of novel biopharmaceuticals, although it also provided 
process development services for clients.
34
  
 
                                                          
29 InovCapital (along with AICEP Capital) is a state owned venture capital firm created by the 
Portuguese Government in order to develop and help national companies to grow. It changed its name to 
Portugal Capital Ventures as of 15/06/2012.   
30 The importance of the oncology market was reinforced by the merging of two major companies in 
2009, Roche, and Genentech. 
31
 Pharmis is a privately owned pharmaceutical company established in 1991. It has diversified its 
investments throughout the years, entering into the biotechnology sector and initiating the development of 
its own pipeline of products. 
32
 Such financing rounds came through shareholder loans with high interest rates and to be paid shortly 
after, that limited severely the company’s cash flows. As the cash flow needs persisted, these shareholders 
soon became creditors, with their loans’ interest rate escalating. 
33 The US had a mature market of biotechnology, in where the number of patents filled and investment 
availability was huge. 
34
 The revenues from the services providing have partly funded the development of an internal pipeline of 
products, based around recombinant antibodies. 
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5.3.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses  
Knowledge base 
Table 5.4 summarises the firm’s R&D knowledge base. Most of its owner-managers 
held a PhD in the field, and the firm’s experience as a services provider in clinical 
testing proved to be paramount in achieving R&D experience in international 
partnerships, enabling the firm to start producing products on its own. The recruitment 
of a chief financial officer (CFO), who had experience in coping both with the 
international environment and domestic public shareholders, brought additional 
business knowledge to the firm. This CFO, who arrived after the start-up, was important 
in addressing the needs of domestic shareholders and in targeting attractive international 
markets, and financing sources. His scientific and technical background added to his 
previous experience in the banking sector and in the Private Equity business combined 
to optimize Biotecnol’s management.  
By 2008, the CFO had implemented a new management system that allowed better 
control over the company’s activities, particularly its cash flow, as well as a clearer 
allocation of each member of staff to each task. As a result, by 2008, the new 
management team was able to increase the firm’s services to third parties and to 
improve operational results. By 2011, although keeping its services operational to 
ensure constant cash flows, the company was able to turn its debt into equity
35
, and 
attracted additional North American investment and focused on the Tribody proprietary 
platform
36
.  
Biotechnology firms tend to be highly reliant on new scientific knowledge, and 
therefore proximity to medical or other biosciences research facilities is particularly 
important. Firms in this sector tend be co-located with or close to universities and 
laboratories for this reason, while also interacting with clients who may be more distant, 
notably pharmaceutical multinationals. Biotechnology firms are often heavily research 
intensive, whereas in the ICT sector firms are more involved in close-to-market 
innovation activity. Biotecnol has, since its inception, been R&D driven, focused on a 
proprietary product, and has improved its R&D core capabilities through an integrated 
                                                          
35
 Rendering creditors as part of the shareholders’ structure. 
36
 In spite of the European sovereign debt crisis arrival that reduced the number of contracted projects and 
forced a new firms’ restructuration to maintain the cash inflow. 
 119 
approach that consolidates its intellectual property position. In 2013, the company 
attained additional business capabilities by absorbing international business knowledge, 
by moving to the US and engaging in local partnerships with research centres and 
hospitals. Also, it was able to secure additional funding through private shareholders, 
enabling it to continue developing its core product assets in the pre-clinical setting
37
.  
Table 5.4 BIOTECNOL Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced Responses 
Owner-managers with 
a PhD and diverse 
background in research 
and bank finance 
(2003);  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business knowledge on 
accessing partnerships 
and raising investment 
(2013) 
 
Lack of national knowledge offer 
and demand; 
Excessive bureaucracy in 
accessing funds; 
Take advantage of local R&D staff (1998) 
Internationalizing by consultancy (2000); 
Public shareholding (2000) 
Little revenues from services 
providing 
Development of its own quality products 
(2002); 
Lack of domestic long term 
investment sources; 
Excessive control from public 
shareholders; 
Need of international business 
knowledge; 
Recruiting of a business manager (2008); 
Regain strategic control (2008); 
Focus on more attractive international 
shareholders (2008); 
Restructuring, new R&D and market flexible 
approach (2009); 
Strategic partnerships (2009); 
Competitors  delocalisation to 
lower cost regions 
Focus on high standard niches (2010); 
Economic crises  
Establish headquarters in US, near 
investment sources, partners and markets 
(2012); 
Spin out a services provider firm in Portugal 
(2013); 
 
Learning triggers and responses 
The product approval process in biotechnology tends to be heavily regulated and 
product development lead times in application areas such as drug discovery tend to be 
very long (as much as 10–15 years). In addition to this limitation, amid a general 
economic crisis, the firm struggled with the domestic constraints of excessive regulation 
(for instance in relation to accountability rules
38
) and a lack of attractive partnerships 
                                                          
37
 E.g. It raised 20 million dollars investment in 2013, mainly from North American venture capitalists 
such as JP. Morgan. 
38
 Since its start-up, Biotecnol has been required to classify all the expenditures of its activity, including 
those related with the development of proprietary products, as costs of the year in its financial statements. 
This situation meant that the pay out of patents was always classified as costs, instead of investment. If it 
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and appropriate financing (Table 5.4).The legislative framework for regulating patents 
was experienced as overly bureaucratic, complicating and limiting the relations with 
public partners, universities and other biotech companies in the region
39
.  
A potential advantage of the biotechnology sector is that investment in the capabilities 
and assets necessary to create an effective biotechnology system may be rewarded by 
high rates of return resulting from the widespread applicability of the technology, 
including within other sectors.  
Portuguese investors, however, tend to be risk-averse and the domestic environment did 
not present the setting required to develop the capital intensive R&D activity required. 
Although Portuguese venture capital existed, it was neither sympathetic nor targeted 
towards the biotechnology sector. Public shareholders were very focused in reducing 
costs, and unwilling to make long-term investments (‘full burn’ investment): “it cut off 
all the financing alternatives in the area of high added value businesses ... the investors 
invest small amounts, when the money ran out the enterprises ask for more but the 
investor does not lend it ... and no bank will lend money for a 10 years period” 
(Biotecnol, CFO); “public aid was a barrier as it prevented the firm from applying for 
international programs” (Pharmis40).  
Additionally, there is a tendency towards increased concentration in the biotechnology 
sector as evidenced, for instance, by the takeover in 2009 of Genentech, the largest of 
the American new biotechnology firms, by Hoffman La Roche. However, it was 
problematic to attract foreign investment to Biotecnol: the Portuguese government’s 
credit rating was downgraded to junk status by the international credit rating agencies, 
and the country had little tradition in the biotechnology sector. 
The company responded to those constraints principally by networking and recruiting 
external expertise. First, given the lack of investment to develop proprietary products in 
the long-term, it became partly self-financed through selling services to third parties. 
Second, it attracted relevant expertise that could better communicate the firm’s ethos 
abroad and raise investment: “The owner-manager has been able to graft expertise at 
                                                                                                                                                                          
had been considered an intangible asset, Biotecnol would have had better financial year statements and 
better chances to apply for funding. 
39
 Arantes-Oliveira, Nuno, Bioempresas em Portugal (Portuguese Biotechs), Boletim de Biotecnologia, 
2013.) 
40
 Interview with António Barbosa Pharmis’s Managing Director in February 3rd 2012. 
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the international level by offering them a future shareholding in the firm in order to 
spare financial resources” (Pharmis). The recruitment of an external financial manager 
in 2008 was key to overcoming unfavourable public control and boosted the firm’s 
internationalization. 
Third, the firm responded by engaging in prestigious partnerships that allowed it to gain 
awareness and to leverage internal technology through complementary external 
capabilities, given that applications of process biotechnologies can often be found in a 
large number of product areas
41
. However, in-house internal core capabilities were still 
highly protected, including by carefully selecting partnerships in relation to IP and to 
maximise the reward to shareholders: “Biotecnol is actively exploring partnering 
activities that can complement our expertise in biologics product development” 
(Biotecnol, CFO).  
Finally, new biotech companies need huge amounts of venture capital to pursue R&D 
and, as the domestic economic crises worsened and venture capital became ever more 
scarce, the company decided to establish its headquarters in the US, near critical 
markets and sources of venture capital. In 2013, the company spun out a subsidiary in 
Portugal, whose mission is to provide services to third parties so that Biotecnol Inc., 
having moved away from a country in economic crisis, could strictly focus on research 
and intellectual property
42
.   
5.3.3. Learning processes   
Table 5.5 summarizes how the firm has learned, and the nature of the principal 
processes involved. R&D and business knowledge were combined in most learning 
modes. Also, informality and a culture of learning facilitated knowledge flow and 
exchange and the subsequent realisation of opportunities: “the meetings are informal 
and tacit although some are formal and bring together directors and administrative 
staff” (Biotecnol, CFO). 
                                                          
41
 The process technologies include classical methods of selection, recombinant DNA techniques, cell 
fusion, tissue culture, protein engineering, and bioprocessing. Combinations of these technologies may be 
applied to the research and development of a large number of products such as pharmaceuticals (e.g. 
insulin, interferon, and vaccines), industrial chemicals (e.g. enzymes, other proteins, and ethanol), and 
new plant varieties (Arantes-Oliveira, Nuno, Bioempresas em Portugal (Portuguese Biotechs, Boletim de 
Biotecnologia, 2013). 
42
 Biotecnol – Corporate information, 2013 
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The company was primarily focused on exploiting its core R&D internal capabilities, 
continuously improving, rather than innovating by creating new opportunities and 
pursuing novelty. The company learnt principally ed on exploiting its core R&D 
internal capabilities, continuously improving, rather than innovating by creating new 
opportunities with partners and clients at international level and planning rigorously its 
business goals. These main learning modes relate to the need to research, engage in 
partnership and plan for long term R&D horizons in biotech companies. Biotecnol 
learns exploitatively ‘by doing’ while leveraging internal technology and experience: 
“we prefer the stability ... our experience is fundamentally d on exploiting its core R&D 
internal capabilities, continuously improving, rather than innovating by creating new 
opportuniwledge .... the industry is very strict with regard to routine proceduresr 
(Biotecnol, CFO).  
In addition, the company learnt by networking with larger influential partner companies 
(e.g. GSK, Roche), which allowed access to additional capital, findings from associate 
universities and product applications from different partners. It has achieved knowledge 
from business partners along the production stream that starts at R&D and ends in the 
pharmacy
43
. Also the owner-manager performed a key role in searching and identifying 
a pipeline of potential products that match Biotecnol’s R&D capabilities:  “we ‘switch 
on the antenna’ and are continually aware of what is going on worldwide” (Biotecnol, 
CFO); “the firm is constantly aware of what is going on by searching constantly” 
(Pharmis).  
Planning was paramount because of the importance of the return of investment (ROI) in 
the long-term. The company planned strategically to anticipate market needs with 
respect to properly positioning its core Tribody technology and to find the right 
financing
44
: “we plan proactively ... we plan seriously and we ‘don’t go with the wind’’ 
(Biotecnol, owner-manager). Frequently, the firm ‘learns to learn’ better as when, for 
example, it was forced to change shareholding, or restructure towards product 
development, or shift its facilities to the US
45
: “I would say that we have changed, 
                                                          
43 Although the company is inside the process it needed other complementary people and knowledge, 
such as specialists on formulation and people who know the product such as service providers, suppliers 
and clients. 
44
 The business was moving from pharmaceutical companies to the hospital / medical / doctor areas, 
towards greater specialisation of clients and investors. 
45
 E.g. as when it was decided to turn the firm’s debt into equity to face an estimated investment round 
that did not occur; or the owner manager decided to divide Biotecnol’s structure into (1) services 
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disrupted and restarted ... we had to change radically the procedures ... involving all 
the staff and with a complete commitment with our strategy … the development has 
been more through disruption than by evolution.” (Biotecnol, CFO).  
The company sought and developed new opportunities by both exploiting its internal 
capabilities and seeking new client industries and new shareholding at the international 
level, in partnership with large pharmaceuticals. However, some learning modes were 
less evident. Biotecnol rarely acquired external expertise. The imitation of others’ 
procedures was absent since its initial discover was patented for 20 years and large 
pharmaceuticals lobby to avoid imitation from generic brands. Also, Biotecnol hardly 
ever had to learn new procedures by trial and error or improvised new products and 
processes, because the amounts of investment involved, the accurate planning and 
highly demanding clients left no room for error at R&D level
46
: “the history of our lives 
had a lot to do with our target, with few resources at first” (Biotecnol, CFO). Finally, 
the firm preferred to develop additional needed competences through the practices of 
informal learning by its longstanding team, rather than by formal training. 
Table 5.5 BIOTECNOL Learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’  R&D, Business Owner-manager and other staff 
Networking  R&D, business Owner-manager and other actors 
Searching  R&D, business Owner-manager  
Planning  R&D, business Owner-manager and other actors 
Learning to learn  R&D, business Owner-manager and other staff 
‘Grafting’  Business Owner-manager and other actors 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
 
The owner-manager was paramount in terms of co-ordinating the various inputs from 
different individuals and groups – a function that appears to have been central to the 
firm’s entrepreneurial capability. He played a key role as a knowledge gatekeeper, first 
in sensing and selecting major opportunities (e.g. attaining international shareholding), 
and then in shaping it, in linking external and internal knowledge, principally by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
providing and (2) development of proprietary products; or to move the headquarters to the US, seeking 
new investment. 
46
 There are exacting plans followed in terms of investment and R&D testing and protocol and the return 
of investment in the biotech industry in terms of product development takes more than 10 years. 
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planning at corporate level and learning how to better learn new procedures (Table 5.5 
47
). He has shared knowledge internally, through periodic and informal meetings, and 
mainly by setting strategic goals: “the CEO is a sort of pivot and also the main person 
responsible for networking and internationalization” (Biotecnol, CFO).   
5.3.4. Learning outcomes   
Table 5.6, shows how the above-discussed learning processes enabled the firm to 
acquire new capabilities. The company attained strategic flexibility and was able to 
enter into new businesses in partnership (e.g. Genentech and Roche) in order to license 
its core technology ‘Tribody antibodies’ for distinct malignant cells treatment48. The 
company increased its business knowledge of new markets and investment sources, 
which led to capabilities in dealing with prestigious international partnerships, meeting 
market demands and raising important investment: “the company adds R&D capacity to 
partners which in turn provides financial capacity (e.g. Spanish pharmaceutics)” 
(Pharmis). 
The increased specialization on the ‘Tribord antibody’ technology (in terms of 
engineering, industrial processes and clinical tests), resulted in new competitive 
advantages: “one of our main assets is the networking we are involved in from the 
beginning and that grows daily … which makes it easier to do business, getting more 
reputation, clients, credibility and investors” (Biotecnol, CFO).   
Table 5.6 BIOTECNOL Learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
Strategic flexibility; 
 
New competences on ‘Tribody antibodies’; 
 
Increased international networking capacity; 
 
Increased knowledge on international markets; 
 
Increased capacity in raising investment. 
Improved international reputation; 
 
Strategic diversity; 
 
Specialization on ‘antibodies’ for cancer and liver 
diseases; 
 
Proximity to important US markets. 
                                                          
47
 For instance, he was a regular attendee at the JP Morgan Healthcare Conferences, held every year in 
January in the US and he decided that the Tribody platform should be developed. 
48
 By licensing, the developing project is sold to another company, frequently a large pharmaceutical that 
has the resources to carry on the project while the seller obtains scheduled payments. 
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5.3.5. Summary   
This case study demonstrates the influence of financing constraints in terms of 
ownership/shareholders on a firm’s learning options. The case demonstrated how 
domestic institutional partnerships affected the firm’s international performance through 
an institutional ‘lock in’ that ended up becoming a financial constraint and a barrier to 
further internationalization.  The negative effects of domestic public shareholding were 
critical in triggering change to fundamental procedures by ‘learning how to learn 
better’. 
A lack of effective domestic networks, a collaborative environment and trustworthy 
institutions were important in boosting further internationalization in terms of proximity 
to key markets and investment sources. Hence, the firm had to self-finance by service 
providing, ‘grafting’ business expertise to access international investment, moving the 
headquarters to the US, and a spin-out. The company needed to be near critical sources 
of knowledge support to effectively network with partners and research institutes, 
thereby reducing uncertainty during innovation. Proximity to critical markets 
constituted, therefore, a source of the firm’s competitive advantage overcoming the 
Portuguese (peripheral) location, which had been a major barrier to communication and 
sales.  
The case also shows the importance of the firm’s knowledge base, at the R&D level, 
based on a local core staff, and at the business level based on its owner-managers, who 
addressed domestic constraints and succeeded at the international level. The CEO 
played a central role in leading the firm’s learning behaviour, namely at the business 
level and in adjusting existing routines in response to critical events, principally through 
planning and external searching and networking activities. R&D and business 
knowledge were combined within the organisation, through a highly collaborative team 
that shared knowledge through informal meetings. The firm’s entrepreneurial capability 
was therefore demonstrated in terms of its internal ability to develop unique bio 
ingredients able to target distinct industries and generate important sources of 
investment.  
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5.4. BIOALVO 
5.4.1. Introduction  
Bioalvo operates in the biotech industry and was founded as a biotech drug discovery 
company with its own pipeline of drug treatments for neurological disorders
49
. It was 
founded in 2005 as a spin-off from Lisbon University (Universidade Nova de Lisboa),  
supported by two Portuguese venture capital funds, and targeting international markets: 
“It was born global, through an international advisory board and clients.” (Bioalvo, 
CEO 
50
).  
Bioalvo has benefited since its inception from public investment and European funds 
(Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional (QREN) - National Strategic Reference 
Framework) aimed at supporting biotech innovation. Since its platform technology was 
patented, the company has licensed it to be replicated in downstream client industries 
such as diabetes and heart diseases and also provided specialized consultancy services 
for self-financing. The crucial critical events faced can be summarised as follows: 
• 2010: diversified into a new biotech business based on the discovery of new 
products based on microorganisms from the marine environment, identifying 
new compounds for different pharmaceutical applications and client industries
51
; 
• 2011: implemented a strategic repositioning by focusing on its biotech core 
capabilities in terms of proprietary sea bioactive microbial libraries and patented 
technology, to maximize its products’ applications (e.g. for the health and beauty 
industry);  
• 2012: was able to offer a basic ingredient able to meet the demand of large 
clients. The Global Platform Screening for Drug Discovery (GPSD) platform 
allows developing experimental tests for the identification of new ingredients 
(with scientifically validated bioactivity) for a broad range of markets (and also 
                                                          
49
 The company researches on the pathological mechanisms involved in neurodegenerative diseases and 
identification of new therapeutic targets. The firm’s proprietary bioactive discovery technology (Global 
Platform Screening for Drug Discovery - GPS D) is based on the use of yeast as a model organism, 
because the yeast physiological response is analogous to many human aspects, providing a tool for the 
testing of biological activities with relevant application in commercial products for different cosmetic and 
pharmaceutical markets (Bioalvo – Corporate information, 2013). 
50
 Expresso da Meia Noite, SIC Noticias (1/6/2012) (Newspaper). 
51
 The firm owns a natural extract library, holding unique extracts derived mostly from a diverse array of 
microorganisms that can be industrially produced by laboratorial sustainable culturing methods. 
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its exclusive microorganism collection). Bioalvo was able to expand its consortia 
financed projects and entered the US market via a collaborative agreement with 
the pharmaceutical group AlphaVektor
52
.  
• 2013: carried out its first clinical trial with a product that had been fully 
developed in-house.    
5.4.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses  
Knowledge base 
Table 5.7 summarises the main knowledge base of the firm. The biotechnology sector in 
Portugal is very much university based, with rooted developments in terms of both 
product and process. Bioalvo’s core knowledge resided principally in the R&D 
experience acquired by research staff at Lisbon University prior to the firm’s start-up. 
The CEO ran an international network, related to her previous role as a senior 
researcher in a number of international universities and research institutes. By 2013, the 
initial team of three directors (whose roles were R&D issues, access to funding and to 
new partners/clients, respectively), who came from the firm’s venture capitalist 
shareholder (InovCapital) had accumulated considerable business knowledge as a result 
of their experiences in accessing new partnerships, clients and financing at international 
level. In the meantime, while engaging in prestigious international partnerships (e.g. 
research institutes) the company’s R&D team continuously improved its knowledge in 
terms of new applications for its core technology platform
53
.  
Learning triggers and responses 
Table 5.7 shows that the company internationalized early on in 2006, to some extent to 
take advantage of public investment opportunities (e.g. European funds) and internal 
patented knowledge (on the central nervous system diseases), and to meet emerging 
client demand at international level, as well. Early internationalization enabled it to 
overcome domestic constraints, including a lack of domestic partnerships, financing 
sources and collaborative environment.  The Portuguese biotechnology sector was very 
                                                          
52
 This American group acquired the rights to development and use of extracts from marine bacteria 
collected by Bioalvo. 
53
 The company holds a proprietary pipeline of bioactive ingredients in distinct phases of development, 
with diverse applications across different markets from Therapeutics, to Nutrition, Health & Beauty, and 
Chemical & Household to industrial processes. 
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young, made up of only a few small firms, and located in a geographic peripheral 
region, with little evidence of clustering around universities and other sources of 
research knowledge (e.g. labs) (see section 3.5.1).  
Bioalvo experienced a number of shortcomings in relation to its Portuguese domestic 
context: a lack of resources and support related to internationalisation and international 
markets; difficulties experienced in relation to the country’s inefficient system of 
patenting proprietary rights; a lack of supportive administrative services; difficulties in 
relation to co-ordinating institutionally the different goals of firms and universities 
within formal partnerships; and the lack of appropriate support facilities such as 
technological parks. For instance, the firm experienced difficulty in coordinating 
international contracts because the local consultants had little experience in mastering 
international procedures. Also, Bioalvo experienced difficulties in adapting the firm’s 
long term return of investment goals to the rapid return demanded by its shareholders. 
As a result, delays in obtaining long-term financing also delayed the introduction of 
new products to market, thus also benefitting competitors. As time elapses, the cost of 
maintaining a patent increases, and if the product is not on the market the company is 
losing money.   
Conversely, as Portugal’s accounting rules require patent fees to be classified as costs of 
the financial year instead of investment, the firm appeared to present a poor track record 
in terms of its end of financial year statement, thus reducing its chances of obtaining 
long-term financing. The firm was also compelled to outsource manufacturing capacity 
due to the scarcity of appropriate manufacturing sites or technological parks located 
near potential client firms and other important knowledge sources and partners (e.g. 
universities). There was a “lack of room to produce on a large scale” (Bioalvo, CEO). 
Alternative financing through domestic public funds was excessively time consuming, 
which delayed and put at risk the financing: “there is bureaucracy and inefficient 
management in implementing public funds.” (Bioalvo, owner-manager). Although the 
firm was supported by engaged and committed shareholders, venture capital was 
experienced as difficult to attract, particularly given venture capitalists’ preference for 
other sectors with quicker returns on investment. Bank financing did not suit biotech 
needs in the long-term, because of the high interest rates applied and large amounts of 
investment needed across a time span of 15-20 years. However, the company applied 
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successfully for European financing for a number of substantial R&D projects involving 
other partners
54
 and attempted to earn first its reputation at the international level to 
further build up a domestic client base. Significantly, the financing obtained from 
European projects was less bureaucratic than the domestic ones, although it demanded a 
larger consortium.  
Table 5.7 BIOALVO Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced Responses 
 
The team of directors hold 
PhDs and pre start-up 
informal network; 
Owner-managers and 
founders have different 
professional background 
from predominantly in life 
sciences, but also including 
finance (2005);  
 
 
 
R&D knowledge on new 
ingredients; Business 
knowledge on international 
markets, networking and 
funding (2013) 
 
 
Institutional financing in 2005;  
First patent in 2006;  
Important orders and new 
investment in 2009. 
Internationalize, recruit and 
restructure in product development 
and services (2006); 
Licensing (2006). 
Available local skilled R&D 
labour force;   
Difficulty in communicating 
internationally;  
Difficulty in building domestic 
partnerships;  
Resort to a broad international R&D 
and business network (e.g. 
Universities) (2006);  
Apply for international investment 
programme (2009); 
Lack of business knowledge; 
Recruit an American business 
developer (2010); 
Difficulty in maintaining distance 
business developer; 
Dismissing of business developer 
(2011); 
High domestic bureaucracy to 
access financing;  
Identification of new 
opportunities.  
Diversify to other less regulated and 
risky businesses (2011); 
Internationalized further (2011). 
Need of investment to explore 
potential competitive position; 
Lack of appropriate room to 
install productive units. 
Applies for important international 
financing (2012); 
Built up three additional labs and three 
strategic units (2012); 
Attain important North American 
partnership (2012); 
Held the first trial of a fully in-house 
developed product (2013). 
 
To address those major constraints the company responded in a number of ways. 
Because of the main constraint in accessing long-term venture capital, the company 
started selling consultancy services, the income from which was used to fund its longer 
term projects. Bioalvo also raised funds through licensing of drug R&D for cancer and 
diabetes diseases, by diverse product applications in the North American markets. 
                                                          
54
 E.g. the ‘Bluegenics‘ project involving 14 partners in searching for substances from the deep sea to 
combat osteoporosis and other human common diseases, which has received funding of EUR 6 million 
from the European Commission. 
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However, the diversion of efforts into non-core R&D activities (e.g. service provision) 
also contributed to delaying the introduction of its core product in international markets 
and, in 2012, Bioalvo recruited an American business manager to address its lack of 
international business knowledge: “We are mostly a technological firm with 
technologists; it is not easy for us to get suitable management knowledge” (Bioalvo, 
CEO). However, the firm was not able to afford those who had been newly and 
expensively hired, and they ended up being dismissed after a short period of time.  
Because of its difficulty both in accessing long-term venture capital and acquiring the 
business knowledge needed to market its products in international markets,  Bioalvo 
decided to diversify into the new business of marine microorganisms
55
, aimed at a large 
set of client industries, and with a less regulated and shorter four year investment cycle 
making it easier to obtain financing. In 2012 it internationalized further and created 
three organisational strategic business units
56
 to address emergent strategic areas. The 
company sought to capture additional international funding and positioned itself as a 
specialist in different markets to avoid undifferentiated low-cost competition, 
principally from China and India. In 2013, an important partnership was achieved (the 
first direct client in the US) and in 2014 the firm carried out the first clinical trial of a 
completely internally developed product.  
5.4.3. Learning processes  
Table 5.8 summarises Bioalvo’s learning processes, with the key processes highlighted 
(in bold). Although it learnt organizationally at the exploitative level, and through its 
actions and related learning ‘by doing’, the evidence indicates that the company learned 
principally by networking with clients and partners, seeking new opportunities, and 
planning its business goals, in exploring new procedures. As well as exploiting their 
existing knowledge through the provision of related services, the company explored 
new opportunities in terms of potential new businesses based upon the company’s core 
technology. 
                                                          
55
 E.g. the ‘Lusoextract’ was a 36 months project of 0.9 M € financed by the National Strategic Reference 
Framework (NSRF), involving 7 partners in a large consortium with several universities and research 
institutes, to create a library of natural products. These were extracted from various microorganisms 
samples isolated from distinct Portuguese ecosystems, targeting the pharmaceutical research on new 
compounds. 
56
 These consisted of an innovation unit to interact with clients and suggested solutions, a natural products 
unit and an automated robotic production unit. 
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The company can be seen to have continuously improved its R&D capabilities 
including, for example, as a result of actions taken to further adapt and improve its 
existing products. The learning was especially centred on internal R&D because “the 
firm concentrates on procedure improvements within an industry that is very strict with 
regard to efficiency and safety-related procedures” (Pharmis).  
Furthermore, there is evidence of the firm’s learning being advanced through 
collaboration with external organizations. Bioalvo searches and networks principally 
through the CEO and a recently built internal innovation unit, with partners, clients and 
suppliers. Its owner-manager searched partners and clients to find out how to fulfil 
market demands, for instance by visiting and observing potential partners’ and clients’ 
best practices: “we first listen to the market and find out what we have to do that could 
fulfil the market demands” (Bioalvo, CEO).   
The evidence shows how opportunities were shaped in a process involving an interplay 
between individual and collective knowledge, and by linking and extending the 
company’s strength in R&D through alliances with distant clients and their access to 
funding and knowledge (e.g. PhDs taken abroad). The firm’s networking occurred with 
other European firms to enter into in-licensing collaboration and access external 
knowledge from clients, labs, universities and contracted service suppliers. The 
company was part of a production stream that starts at R&D and ends in the pharmacy, 
thus needing complementary knowledge such as specialists in formulation and product: 
“we focus on consortia which need our technology or our collections of sea bacteria to 
work with ...  partnerships are central to the success. If we do not do it, we are unable 
to build competencies.” (Bioalvo, CEO). Employees who had completed their PhDs 
abroad brought additional contacts. Meetings and conferences were held with mentors 
and partners, located in important markets (e.g. US) which added business knowledge 
and market feedback
57
. Significantly, the option of drawing on specialist consultancy 
support was avoided because the firm felt that they could not afford it. 
Inter-organizational learning was central to communicate, internationalize further, 
access European investment programmes and gather external complementary 
knowledge from diverse actors. The company, dependent on shareholders who wished 
                                                          
57
 E.g. the company networked through the UTEN - University Technology Enterprise Network (UTEN), 
which was a network of professional Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) focused on the 
commercialization and internationalization of Portuguese Science and Technology. 
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to influence how their venture capital was being invested, also thoroughly planned its 
strategy. The planning process occurred through a ‘bottom up’ process with the 
cooperation of all employees, through periodic and formal meetings, in which minor 
adjustments were made.  
Occasionally, the company compared its core capabilities against the market demands, 
and looked at how it could close that gap with an improvised and innovative product. 
This occurred through intermittent ‘brainstorming’ sessions, in which business and 
R&D knowledge, brought by the CEO and R&D staff, were combined: “to compare 
what we were doing internally against what the markets were demanding ... imagining 
the contribution of Bioalvo” (Bioalvo, CEO).  Planning corporate goals and, more 
infrequently, improvising potential innovations constituted principal ways of 
assimilating and embedding external knowledge within the organisation. 
Table 5.8 BIOALVO Learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope  
‘by doing’  R&D, Business Owner-manager, Staff 
Networking  R&D and Business 
Owner-manager, labs, universities, 
contracted service suppliers  
Searching  Business Owner-manager and staff 
Planning R&D and business Owner-manager and other actors 
Learning to learn  R&D and business Owner-manager. staff 
‘grafting’ Business Owner-manager, managers 
Improvisation  R&D and business Owner-manager, staff 
Training  R&D and Business Owner-manager, staff 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
Finally, the firm’s investment needs drove the diversification of its business and 
triggered a process of new learning techniques, ‘learning to learn better’, to change 
existing practices. For instance, Bioalvo significantly changed its organisation structure 
and how it allocated new responsibilities, creating newly defined functions that were 
better able to respond to client demand. “The need for investment and the strong 
competitive position to explore our product were the drivers that pushed us.” (Bioalvo, 
CEO). Bioalvo carried out such a learning mode only on one occasion, in restructuring 
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towards the marine microorganisms bio compounds. Vocational training was rare
58
, 
whereas ‘grafting’ external business expertise was attempted only once and revealed to 
be unsuccessful.  
The management team played a central role in promoting all of these learning 
processes. The CEO, who was also the founder, was pivotal with respect to sensing and 
selecting new business opportunities that were judged to be within the scope of the 
firm’s core capabilities. The CEO attained an integrated perspective of the firm, 
gathered the organizational team and external expertise, represented the company at an 
external level, observed competitors and was open to and constantly seeking 
partnerships that could help grow the business: “I have those traits of an entrepreneur: I 
know what to do and I must allocate resources to do it … I used to supervise those 
processes alone.” (Bioalvo, CEO).  
5.4.4. Learning outcomes  
Table 5.9 shows the capabilities developed by Bioalvo during its history and the 
competitive advantages gained. The firm’s openness to external sources of knowledge 
and resources enabled the company to get closer to important markets, attain financing, 
diversify its business portfolio and find partners to help commercialize its technology. 
Conversely, internal learning led to business specialization and continuous 
improvement in the firm’s products and processes. This helped the company became a 
specialist in an ingredient platform, flexible enough to meet different client needs, 
constituting a trusted and scientifically endorsed product.  
                                                          
58
 For instance, staff who had benefitted from attendance of external training were expected to 
communicate what they had learnt internally by a seminar to others in the firm, attempting to link R&D 
and business into an integrated management. 
 134 
Table 5.9 BIOALVO Learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
New processes for new businesses; 
 
An Integrated product; 
 
More capacity on consultancy 
services; 
 
Acquisition of international business 
knowledge. 
More efficiency through continuous improvement and quality 
control; 
 
Brand awareness through the seal of the scientific community; 
 
Diverse portfolio (e.g. health and beauty client industry); 
 
Better competitive positioning through integrative product base; 
 
More capacity to attract investment; 
 
Organisational improvement. 
 
The networking activities of key staff within the company enabled it to find the large 
partners needed to commercialize its microbial technology under licensing within the 
health and beauty industry, also building the prestige that helped attract new clients. The 
reputation gained in the meantime, by networking with large partners, published articles 
or granted prizes, allowed it to successfully apply for new projects. Bioalvo was also 
able to strengthen its consultancy and financing capacity through attracting investment, 
for example in terms of European projects. The company developed integrated 
procedures within a supply chain that increased the interaction with external partners, 
augmenting thus its business portfolio
59
: “We focus on consortiums which need our 
technology or our collections of sea bacteria to work with ... we apply our technology to 
other potential clients .... we repositioned our image and used capabilities we already 
had but weren’t applied” (Bioalvo, CEO). 
5.4.5. Summary  
This case study of Bioalvo demonstrates the effect of capital and expertise influxes on 
the choice of strategic paths. The firm’s early knowledge was mostly R&D based 
although the head founder/CEO attempted to improve her business knowledge, 
principally during the process of managing, through external searching and networking.  
Although the CEO held business skills at the start-up, they proved to be insufficient to 
                                                          
59
 The company’s technology could serve for instance as the innovation unit of Procter and Gamble, or 
Unilever, providing the technology to research for ingredients upstream, to be combined into a final 
product, downstream. 
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succeed internationally, and the firm’s management skills were developed in the context 
of working alongside (and learning from) other, more experienced managers, in partner 
organisations. Internal learning was also intense, principally in terms of experiential 
‘doing’ and business planning. In addition to the domestic difficulties in obtaining 
relevant business knowledge, the company has faced problems in building partnerships 
with manufacturers in particular.  
Another serious constraint related to domestic sources of finance, with sources of public 
support being experienced as excessively bureaucratic, pushing the company to rely 
more on shareholders. The company needed long-term venture capital, which was 
scarce at the domestic level. When the firm took advantage of European funding it 
rapidly internationalized and was even able to afford external expertise temporarily. 
Once this funding ran out, the firm had to restructure, invest in the less regulated 
business of identification of marine microorganisms, and apply for additional sources of 
investment. Although the company relied heavily on its patented knowledge that needed 
to be improved in order to access important investment sources, it gathered external 
substantial complementary knowledge in terms of clients’ technology, being relatively 
‘open’ in terms of innovation practices. 
The CEO played a central role in promoting the firm’s learning processes. She 
presented a global vision from the outset and accordingly set strategic objectives that 
were engaged with and further discussed collectively and informally. Managing the 
different dimensions of the firm’s entrepreneurial capability required certain leadership 
skills that simultaneously allowed opportunity for exploration while also fostering 
exploitation. In particular, while continuously improving its core research capabilities, 
Biovalvo explored and secured new business clients. This flexibility and responsiveness 
in developing new applications for its core technology can be seen to constitute its key 
entrepreneurial capability. 
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5.5. ALTITUDE 
5.5.1. Introduction  
Altitude Software started up in 1993 under the brand Easy Phone and changed its name 
in 1999. It operates in Customer Relationship Management activity (CRM), with around 
1100 customers in 80 countries and was ISO 9001 certified for its worldwide support to 
clients.  It was the first software enterprise in Portugal that built a software interface 
between telephone and PC. Its product "Altitude uCI"
60
 is a software suite that manages 
in real time enterprise functions such as Customer Service, or Help Desk, thus 
accelerating the creation of services and campaigns via its integrating technology.  
The company provided its products through a suite of selective modules that constituted 
an integrated and tailored approach via close client collaboration
61
. The open 
architecture of Altitude solutions integrates with existing contact centre solutions, 
preserving investments in traditional systems. In 2012, the company employed up to 
400 people worldwide and, overall, had experienced two digit growth in most years, 
although this fell in 2011 from 13% to 7% due to the adverse economic context.  
The company has experienced a number of critical events throughout its history. 
Specifically, in 2002, it faced financial difficulties that compelled it; first, to recruit an 
international business manager; and second, to reduce personnel (mostly in non-R&D 
areas); and third, to change its shareholding structure. Since then its growth has been 
based on its integrative CRM software platform, and in 2012, 80% of its business was 
in overseas markets, the growth in licensing was of 23%, and it had diversified into a 
range of cloud computing related products.  The firm’s products have shared a common 
R&D knowledge base, and a CRM software platform, which was able to integrate 
partners’ and clients’ technologies. It is an accredited provider of software solutions 
(e.g. ISO2001).  
                                                          
60
 Unified Customer Interaction 
61
 E.g. the vendor is allowed to adapt the platform to the partner / client needs. 
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5.5.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base 
Table 5.10 shows that the company was started almost entirely by highly qualified 
founders, all with PhDs and previous experience in R&D. It had a technological and 
international orientation as a software supplier to the banking industry and its board was 
initially made up of technical engineers, holding R&D knowledge on technical support 
(5 top managers). Product development was highly centred in Portugal where product 
developers were crucial, while business development was complemented with 
marketing inputs from local managers
62
. A new owner-manager with international 
business experience was recruited in 2003
63
. He brought new knowledge regarding 
processes, certifications, and products that ended up changing the firm’s strategic 
orientation. 
Learning triggers and responses 
The ICT sector presents strong tendencies towards integration. The convergence of 
computing and communication technologies as a result of digital common technology 
has meant that ICT products tend to become part of broader integrated systems.  Thus 
individual products - like personal and mainframe computers, robots and 
communication systems – are also components of a broader technological system. 
Altitude’s start-up responded to the growing demand for software products from the 
banking industry (Table 5.10). In responding to this opportunity, Altitude began its 
internationalization process first by targeting Brazil, a culturally close country. Then, a 
new product opportunity was identified with regard to a CRM-related technology based 
on the firm’s internal capabilities that incorporated PC and communication systems. 
Altitude developed a new hybrid PC/phone product for global markets and 
internationalized further to escape domestic constraints: in particular, the firm’s 
peripheral location, a lack of a sufficiently supportive/collaborative environment and 
Portugal’s ongoing economic difficulties. 
                                                          
62
 Portuguese technical universities fed the firm’s staff with good engineers and at low cost compared 
with other countries such as Germany or USA. The company has been able to retain most of its technical 
staff, with a decrease of just 15%. 
63
 E.g. he had an engineering degree and an MBA and spent seven years in the USA doing digital 
software to military and three years on Germany in Siemens as a software developer. 
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Table 5.10 ALTITUDE Knowledge base, learning triggers, and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced  Responses 
 
Owner-managers / 
founders, PhDs 
with competences 
in R&D (1993); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competences on 
business networking 
and partnerships 
(2013); 
Need of software by financial 
institutions 
Software built and sold in Portugal and 
Brazil (1993) 
Demand of software that combines 
computer data and phone. 
Development of a product that allows using 
the phone to communicate bank data or sell 
new products (1994). 
Lack of domestic networking, 
cooperation with university, public 
support and competitive intensity; 
Bureaucracy in applying for 
European funds. 
Further internationalization (1995)  
Crash of the ‘dot.com’ titles; 
Difficulty in getting new distant 
partnerships; 
Strategic turbulence in geographic 
segments;  
Shareholders structure. 
Changed investment sources (2003); 
Recruited an owner-manager with previous 
international high tech business experience 
(2003); 
Restructured sales and professional support 
areas (2004); 
Technological evolution; 
Developed PC communication technology 
(2005);  
Very similar competitors’ platforms; 
Produced ‘open source’ suitable platforms, 
compatible with clients’ technology (2009); 
Demand for ‘cloud’ technology 
Diversified to ‘cloud’ technology (2011); 
Acquisition of the Swedish firm to better 
commercialize solutions (2012); 
 
At the domestic level, the company was unsuccessful in applying for European funds, 
which required time consuming applications and targeted only certain industries and 
regions
64
. For example, support related to hygiene and safety at work was available only 
to high tech firms with headquarters located in southern Portugal, which excluded 
Altitude. Thus the company benefited little from public aid. There was also a lack 
domestic partnering opportunities due to the small domestic market with few large 
international brands and universities (see section 3.5.2). Universities were experienced 
as averse to partnership and unable to work within the firm’s short project research 
span. The Portuguese software sector was undeveloped, compared for instance with the 
Netherlands. There were few product development units and the interaction with the 
                                                          
64
E.g. applying for funding was experienced as a very time consuming process in preparing the 
application, ending up losing the time to market. Although the formal support existed, it went through too 
many authorisations to access the funds. Also, Altitude as a group is either considered an SME or a large 
enterprise, depending on considering the employees allocated abroad. Such ambiguity did not accomplish 
the eligibility to public funding. 
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university was sparse in terms of common projects, whilst it was also very expensive to 
find a project coordinator: “Up to the end of the 1990s we felt like we were in a desert 
because we were the only Portuguese firm in this industry” (Altitude, CEO).  
The firm’s peripheral location hindered its ability to engage with key international 
actors and significant events (e.g. such as product fairs in northern Europe), within a 
sector highly dependent on reputation (‘buzz’) worldwide. Brand awareness was 
crucial, particularly in terms of the US, because nine of the ten key players were North 
American. In the meantime, the company experienced the impact of the world economic 
crisis which increased international competition and made it more difficult to develop 
effective international partnerships
65
. Domestic shareholders did not meet the firm’s 
expectations, making it difficult to obtain financing
66
.  
In an effort to address these issues, the company acquired a new CEO with a vast 
international business background, reduced its non-core R&D staff and changed the 
shareholding structure in a way that enabled better access to more European capital. It 
experienced an average sales growth rate of 12.7%, from 2006 to 2009: “We have one 
critical success key, the staff we have in product development … who have been with us 
for 10, 15, 20 years” (Altitude, CEO).  
The firm’s technology continued to evolve towards a more customised PC/ 
communication product, although the products remained similar to competitors’ and 
easy to imitate, bringing the need to develop an open-source platform, at once suitable 
for diverse partners and capable of generating client loyalty
67
. In 2011, based on its 
traditional CRM technology, the company developed a new product based on cloud 
computing, acquired a foreign company to help commercialize it and engaged in 
prestigious partnerships (e.g. including Microsoft) to help build its reputation and 
access to clients’ technology.  
                                                          
65
 The competitors started offering equipment with functionalities and price very similar to Altitude’s, as 
Portuguese firms were ignored against large international players and substitute products on the ‘cloud’ 
were increasing. 
66
 In 2011 the firm did not achieve a two digits growth and several projects were halted or postponed. 
67
Loyalty was particularly valuable as it has been earned by continuous R&D improvement and 
prestigious ISO certifications. 
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5.5.3. Learning processes  
Table 5.11 summarizes the company’s learning processes in terms of the dominant 
modes and scope of these. The evidence suggests that it learns ‘by doing’ procedures 
experientially. It also learns by networking with external stakeholders, planning at 
international level, searching new products and ‘grafting’ external expertise. Frequently, 
the company had to learn how to embrace new procedures related to changing 
technology which led to subsequent reorganization. Altitude was able to orchestrate and 
synchronize the correspondence between its internal and external resources through the 
simultaneous exploration and exploitation of opportunities, thus matching the firm’s 
actions with its rapidly evolving environment. 
The company learned by taking action when adapting incrementally to changes
68
: “this 
business phase is more incremental than inventive and we must adapt continuously to 
regulation and technology changes” (Altitude, owner-manager). It has learned by 
networking with clients, partners and consultants through meetings and workshops, 
attaining proximity to markets and adapting the firm’s technology. For instance, 
Altitude supported continuously its local managers, through for example online 
marketing management - four top managers (product, customer assistance, professional 
services and marketing) plus eight regional managers reported to the CEO. It also 
attained prestigious partnerships and was the first Portuguese ‘gold’ partner to 
Microsoft and its only software vendor: “the technology is ours and the service is theirs 
… It is about the proximity to the final client ... our clients are the main sources and 
channels of knowledge ...” (Altitude, CEO).  
Learning also took place through planning strategically and collectively in  an attempt 
to anticipate future needs
69
. The planning of business goals occurred by a ‘bottom up’ 
decision process, in which all local managers were gathered once a year to analyse the 
industry and set the main goals. There were also periodic meetings held every three 
months to reflect on progress and adjust the business plan and strategy and also monthly 
meetings to analyse occasional operational issues. Altitude followed around 70-80% of 
their set plans, in which results were continuously compared against initial goals: “we 
                                                          
68
 E.g. in addressing domestic restrictions, applying for European funds and accomplishing an expected 
number of opportunities – in 2012 the set goal was to fulfil 50% of opportunities within 100 leads. 
69
 E.g. the company, following a change in marketing demands towards applications in the ‘cloud’, 
predicted  it and designed an appropriate organisation and product to be offered in advance of competitors 
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have been realizing for a long time the need to diversify to the ‘cloud’ but we have 
never thought of how we would transfer our technology” (Altitude, CEO).  
The company searches as well for particular features that could fit its product. The 
searching was made through periodic meetings with clients from different locations, 
online journals and blogs, and listening to the client when selling products and in 
providing post-sales assistance. ‘Grafting’ expertise and external enterprises was a less 
recurrent learning mode instead preferring to achieve proximity to clients in order to 
better fulfil their needs. For example, Altitude recruited local commercial staff and 
acquired a former client, a Swedish company that already used ‘on the cloud’ 
technology.  
Engaging in new ways of better learning involved ‘top-down’ strategic decisions and 
innovation at the highest level, for instance through moving toward new internet-related 
technology: “Our capabilities in taking advantage of new knowledge constitute a 
facilitator. For instance, the ease in which we move forward into a new platform 
technology.” (Altitude, CEO)70.  
Table 5.11 ALTITUDE Learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’  R&D, business  Owner-manager and R&D team  
Networking  R&D, business Owner-manager, clients and partners 
Searching  R&D, business Owner-manager and management 
Planning  R&D, business Owner-managers and regional managers 
 ‘Grafting’ R&D, Business  Owner-manager and other actors 
Learning to learn  R&D, business Owner-manager, R&D team  
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
 
Evidence indicated that the firm’s R&D and business knowledge combined in most 
learning modes and widely, including through international partnerships.  However, it 
also showed that the top management team were central to this both in sensing and 
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 The consultancy Gartner classified Altitude as Leader, Visionary and Challenger during the past 10 
years (Altitude, Corporate information).  
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selecting new opportunities and in identifying potential constraints. The top 
management team ensured the best technology in the product and set priorities 
according to external knowledge inputs. The team of directors participated in all these 
R&D/ business learning levels, through informal means, supervising the R&D teams 
and by periodic meetings. In addition, evidence suggests that Altitude hardly ever 
developed new products or processes by experimental trial and error procedures or 
improvising solutions. Formal training events focused only on post-selling client 
support in different branch locations. 
5.5.4. Learning outcomes 
Table 5.12 shows the company’s learning outcomes. The firm continuously improved 
its R&D capabilities both by addressing issues efficiently, and by absorbing relevant 
external knowledge through external learning with clients and partners: “half of the 
revenue comes up as software licensing and the other half results from close 
professional services” (Altitude, owner-manager). The continuous improvement, 
principally as a result of knowledge management systems
71
, provided rapidity and 
certification (e.g. ISO 2001), while ‘grafting’ external knowledge (via the acquisition of  
three companies to date) constituted a competitive advantage in terms of quick 
acquisition of new capabilities. 
Table 5.12 ALTITUDE Learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
R&D capabilities in building a customized integrative 
software platform; 
 
Continuous improvement; 
 
Networking, ‘grafting’ capabilities. 
Integrative product, with 20 interrelated sub-
products to diverse client units; 
 
New ‘cloud’ technology; 
 
Rapidity; 
 
Certification; 
 
Acquisition capacity; 
 
Professional services; 
 
Prestigious partnerships; 
 
                                                          
71
 E.g. by facilitating intra group communication through a ‘wiki’ model around hot topics, instead of a 
rigid and time consuming work flow. 
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Increasing business diversification throughout technologically-related products, led to 
R&D capabilities in building tailored products, which led to competitive advantages in 
building ‘cloud’ computing based products that involved distributing computing 
compatible with competitors’ platforms over a network72. This continuous improvement 
led to a successful certified product principally at service level, which attracted 
prestigious partners (e.g. Microsoft): “Despite the important role of clients and 
partners, our R&D department is continuously innovating with new tools, programmes, 
etc.” (Altitude, CEO). 
5.5.5. Summary  
A distinguishing feature of this particular case was the effect of the recruitment of 
expertise on the firm’s learning pattern. The company’s behaviour was triggered by 
contextual events such as the limited domestic level and importance of global markets 
in the sector that forced it to internationalize. Further, the company engaged in 
prestigious partnerships and ‘grafted’ external business knowledge, by recruiting an 
international manager and acquiring other firms.  
As a result, the newly recruited CEO brought additional international business and 
product development knowledge and, along with the senior management team, learnt 
conjointly by searching external opportunities. He also played a central role by 
combining internally the acquired knowledge and through planning business goals. All 
of this process was enhanced by the development of the firm’s knowledge management 
systems.  
Another crucial feature in this case relates to the domestic core R&D team, which was 
able to build products through integrative approaches. Such internal R&D capability 
and the successful external partnerships constituted the firm’s competitive advantage. 
The early application of an ambitious business learning model introduced by the CEO, 
and the commitment to continuous improvement, assisted the firm in building 
international business knowledge and in combining different businesses and channels, 
                                                          
72
 The company has 5 key technical areas and 20 interrelated products within it that are suitable to 
competitor components. The company’s software platforms could be customised to distinct client 
businesses, through new distribution and complementary channels. In this way, the firm could provide 
online solutions to fulfil the marketing demand in real time. 
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such as professional services and licensing. In this way, the company’s products were 
co-developed openly with a number of international partners and clients.  
The company’s entrepreneurial capability was based on its ability to build integrative 
systems. The company shaped opportunities by creating ‘open source’ platforms that 
could be adapted to diverse client product needs, including cloud computing 
applications. It also enhanced the integration of collective knowledge through an 
internal ‘workflow system’ and also by outsourcing local professional services. These 
procedures enabled the opportunistic restructuring of the company when required, with 
the top management team being central to sensing and selecting relevant opportunities.  
5.6. NFIVE 
5.6.1. Introduction  
NFive develops software and electronics applications for security, automation and 
identification markets. It started in the identification market, through card design and 
printing software and became a specialized printer driver developer, also developing 
label printing, visitor management software, and related security systems. The company 
started up in 1996 as an international venture in partnership with a French partner. Key 
critical events include
73
: 
• It participated in its first international exhibition (1997);  
• Developed its own smart cards technology (1998);  
• Opened an office in the USA, following a new automation program (1999);  
• Started its electronics research (2000); 
• Developed a new security card product (2001); 
• Established offices in Italy, Singapore and became ISO 2001 certified (2004);  
• Redefined its product lines, releasing its integrated access control package 
solution (2007);  
                                                          
73
 NFive – Corporate information (2013). 
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• Developed the Pen Five, a miniaturized device similar to a flashpoint (2008);  
• Centralized operations in Portugal and started working with ‘master distributors’ 
to reduce costs and better cope with the global economic crisis while releasing 
its first electronic product
74
 (2009); 
• Started developing and producing its own electronics products, offering an 
integrative solution and allowed the licensing of its Pen package online, in the 
internet, on the ‘cloud’ (2012); 
•  By 2013, the company had 40 employees, 400 distributors in 106 countries and 
exported 98% of its business. Over the last decade it has reduced its size, and 
sales have decreased in the last couple of years.  
5.6.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base 
Table 5.13 summarizes the company’s knowledge base, its main learning events, and 
subsequent responses. In its early start-up phase, the company’s R&D knowledge was 
held by its owner-manager/founder, who developed the identification software business 
during the 90s. His skills were to some extent self-taught, building on an unfinished 
university engineering degree and his professional training as an employee for large 
high-tech firms including IBM. Furthermore, since its inception the company also held 
a core R&D team, mostly unchanged over the years, and made up of qualified people, 
who had been recruited from local universities. More recently, the changes have been 
mainly in international sales and marketing, while R&D staff and the firm’s main 
technology remained almost unchanged. 
Learning triggers and responses 
Table 5.13 shows the firm’s principal learning events along its history and subsequent 
responses. The company internationalized early on, driven by its experience of domestic 
constraints, consolidating its business worldwide and diversifying by developing related 
products.  
                                                          
74
 TS ACTA - an integrative product that included identification, security software, and electronics. 
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Table 5.13 NFIVE Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced  Responses 
R&D knowledge; 
International 
networking since 
inception; Qualified 
and flexible R&D 
team (1997); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D capacity; 
Integrative 
approach; 
international 
business knowledge 
(2013)  
Business development of 
identification  security cards; 
Lack of  public support; 
Bureaucracy; 
Financial regulation; 
Lack of domestic knowledge 
transfer; 
Engaged in international partnerships(1996); 
Internationalized (1996); 
Searched clients’ needs (1997); 
Opened international offices,  first in US and then 
worldwide (1999); 
Global economic crisis; 
Shut down branches abroad (2008); 
Downsized businesses (2008); 
Restructured and externalized business functions 
(2009); 
Kept the core R&D team (2009); 
International competitive 
intensity and running out of 
traditional business niches;  
Diversified to a technology related ‘cloud product’ 
(2012); 
Diversified to a new integrative electronic 
platform (2012);  
Licensing distributors (2012); 
Franchised the business to others (2012); 
 
The company experienced the following constraints in relation to its domestic context 
(NFive, owner-manager):  
• Ineffective public support for firm internationalization, as when AICEP for 
instance presented Portuguese software in international fairs, in the Portuguese 
language;  
• Bureaucracy in accessing European funds and bank loans, in which the process 
was very time consuming and the regulations were constantly changing and bank 
loans were very demanding in terms of warrants; 
• Excessive regulation in terms of taxation that did not exempt R&D investment
75
; 
• A limited relevant knowledge transfer between universities and firms meant that 
they did not share common interests with regard to R&D projects (e.g. divergent 
time span of ROI).  
                                                          
75
 In Portugal, firms must pay a special tax in anticipating potential profits that is estimated upon the 
profits of last year. In this way, profits that could never occur in the future are taxed in advance. 
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The firm addressed the above mentioned barriers by internationalizing, adopting a close 
customized position with clients, and by networking through international 
partnerships
76
: “We share knowledge … listening to the client has been our winning 
strategy since the beginning … The simpler solution to the client the better – this is our 
main driving force” (NFive, owner-manager); “the owner-manager interacted 
informally with universities, in order to avoid bureaucracy” (Strike77).  
NFive also reduced costs (e.g. by externalizing functions). In 2008, the world economic 
crisis forced the company to reduce its size, and foreign branches, externalizing most of 
its commercial functions, but retaining its local R&D team and it also started working 
with large distributors that allowed greater access to clients: “There were substantial 
changes ... except in R&D … the added value is based on the operations and R&D, the 
main firm’s knowledge” (NFive, owner-manager); “There was a concern to keep the 
company small and manageable, with competences based on identification software ... 
as the firm has always been self-funded” (Strike, owner-manager).  
Furthermore, the world economic crisis caused the company’s traditional businesses of 
security cards to decrease, compelling business diversification to internet-related 
technology, in the ‘cloud’ and to an original electronic integrative platform of 
identification control. The firm’s core technology remained the same, although with 
related product and process improvements
78
. Combining the firm’s traditional software 
with a customised electronic device was a significant change towards an integrative 
solution that allowed the provision of further related products and ensured clients’ 
loyalty through licensing
79
: “The major drift in our business consisted of changing from 
the software to electronics” (NFive, owner-manager). In 2012, the company franchised 
its business to an American partner, in order to increase its level of self-funding and, in 
the meantime, it changed its business strategy.  
The responses to those constraints were much centred on the owner-manager. Since its 
beginning, the company has been organised around its single owner-manager, who has 
searched and networked internationally: “I was a self-made man owning my own 
                                                          
76
 In order to build trust, for instance, clients were invited to visit the firm and stay a couple of days. 
77
 A firm’s partner, Paulo Morais, Owner Manager, interviewed in February, 15st 2012. 
78
 E.g. it replaced the physical licensing USB device by an online subscription, in terms of license control 
and the operational processes of payments were simplified as clients get into the net, ‘buy and pay’. 
79
 The assistance to clients is ensured and the product could be upgraded electronically, which constitutes 
a service providing and increases loyalty and accuracy in fulfilling client demands. 
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enterprises that I built through blood, sweat, and tears, without any corporate 
characteristics but only by a one-man show” (NFive, owner-manager).  
5.6.3. Learning processes  
Table 5.14 summarises the main processes by which the firm has furthered its learning 
and development. Processes of learning by doing have particularly underpinned ongoing 
improvements to the firm any conducts, while networking with local distributors and 
searching and improvising new R&D solutions have played a key role in exploiting new 
opportunities. The firm adjusted operational changes to the turbulent institutional 
context ‘learning by doing’ for instance, via minor adjustments to current products. At 
the R&D level, learning was apparent through continuously improving technology to 
suit new client needs: “our experience is paramount to manage innovation ... sometimes 
we learn that a complementary product sells better than the original product itself ...  it 
is very difficult to avoid addiction to some routines that were previously created in the 
meanwhile; it is a learning continuum ... it is difficult to unlearn and start producing 
new products” (NFive, owner-manager).  
Networking, particularly with suppliers and clients and in order to build collaboration, 
was crucial
80
 as “we are connected to several producers of components, which provide 
us with important information … we have relevant information from distributors as well 
… we are almost a central unit of information processing … The knowledge is external 
but ends up being managed internally” (NFive, owner-manager). The constant 
searching for new client needs was carried out by the owner-manager, who was 
proactive in terms of anticipating new trends and the sensing and selection of new 
opportunities: “A new technology seems to be coming up now – UHF Gen2 – driven by 
the market ... We have searched market segments that were able to adapt to such 
‘fusion’ technology” (NFive, owner-manager).   
                                                          
80
 E.g. attending international meetings, listening to the clients, testing ideas and engaging on alliances. 
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Table 5.14 NFIVE Learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’  R&D, business Owner-manager, R&D team 
Networking  R&D, business Owner-manager and Partners 
Searching  R&D, business Owner-manager  
Planning  R&D, business Owner-manager and R&D team 
Improvisation  R&D, business Owner-manager and R&D team 
Learning to learn  R&D, business Owner-manager and R&D team 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
 
The company has occasionally changed its procedures, learning differently in order to 
innovate, when, for instance, it developed a new integrative technology or the new 
cloud computing software81: “the firm reinitialized and is now re-launching itself ... our 
last product is revolutionary, introducing the concept of gadget into industrial markets” 
(NFive, owner-manager). Both business and R&D knowledge were combined in these 
learning modes, through the occasional improvising of new product solutions
82
: “by 
intense meetings and ‘brainstorming’ sessions within the firm wherein ideas were easily 
discussed and implemented”83. The decision process occurred organizationally, 
although, in the end, the owner-manager had the last word in validating the new 
procedures. 
The company, being small and self-financed, planned collectively and informally, by 
collecting contributions from staff, although the owner-manager played a central role in 
synchronizing internal and external conditions and resources for the exploration 
(identification and creation) and exploitation of opportunities: “we plan marketing and 
operations at the same time ... it is intuitive ... I do the planning, I do the strategy and I 
am a technician … I do the business development ... I felt immense difficulty as a 
manager, in implementing change to more than, I would say, ten or eleven people” 
                                                          
81
 For instance, it shut down the international offices and reduced staff from 65 people in 2008 to 12 
people in 2011, including a salesman, a systems architect, a technician and a project developer. 
82
 E.g. through internal presentations of interesting ideas collected in trade fairs, discussed by partners and 
staff from marketing and R&D, to clarify both the software’s functionalities and market segments to 
target. Distributors are often invited to express opinions on the products. 
83
 A firm’s partner, Paulo Morais, Owner Manager, interviewed in February, 15st 2012. 
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(NFive, owner-manager). The development of new products by experimental trial and 
error or imitating competitors was not evident. The acquisition (‘grafting’) of external 
expertise or even resorting to external consultancy were not apparent, as well.  
5.6.4. Learning outcomes 
Table 5.15 summarizes the company’s principal learning outcomes. The firm attained 
new capabilities in networking and by developing new products based on the firm’s 
existing technical knowledge
84
. The firm’s networking and searching activities helped it 
to target at once different markets, products and technology (e.g. electronics and 
internet-related ‘in the cloud’ products). Also, it combined previous capabilities into a 
tailored product, suitable for diverse clients: “we produce a neutral platform, which 
works either with Linux, or Windows, or Macintosh” (NFive, owner-manager). 
Table 5.15 NFIVE Learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
New networking capabilities in franchising and 
licensing; 
 
New capabilities in electronic devices and ‘cloud’ 
technology; 
 
Combinative capabilities on integrative platforms  
Integrative tailored approach; 
 
Product / service ‘on the cloud’; 
 
A diverse portfolio of related businesses – e.g. 
electronic identification, accessing; 
 
Small size, flexibility, and self-financed. 
 
These capabilities provided some competitive advantages. The firm’s integrative 
entrepreneurial capability allowed the combination of know-how that led to new 
software and electronics products that responded to the need for flexibility in meeting 
different business demands. The firm’s success has resulted from a combination of 
factors: its small size, financial autonomy, prestigious partnerships, and the continuous 
improvement based on a stable core R&D team: “there are processes changing each 
three months, being simplified and improved ... the firm’s capacity to simplify and 
integrate processes constitutes a unique capability” (NFive, owner-manager). 
                                                          
84
 E.g. technology that synthesizes distinct firm’s technologies regarding identity, security and automation 
into a single product in allowing for example go to the supermarket and be charged with no need of debit 
/ credit card - a terminal point to automatically control access. 
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5.6.5. Summary  
The development of NFive illustrates the influence of critical incidents such as the 
world economic turmoil and competitive intensity that forced the firm to restructure all 
its functions other than R&D, and then to ‘restart’ with what was virtually a new 
business. The company developed its entrepreneurial capability around the exploration 
and exploitation of opportunities that it was able to synchronize and shape as internal 
and external emergent conditions impacted the firm. This allowed NFive to introduce a 
distinctive new product, suitable for clients’ technology and a new cloud computing 
business, always relying on its core R&D team and technology.  
The contextual constraints that the company faced compelled it to increasingly 
internationalize in its pursuit of collaboration and new funding sources. The company 
dealt with its critical issues by keeping the balance between its small size, high change 
rate and learning intensity. The role of the owner-manager in the identification, 
evaluation, and realization of such opportunities was paramount. In acting as the firm’s 
primary knowledge gatekeeper he was able to link his knowledge of targeted markets 
with the capabilities of the R&D team over time. He also played a wider role in terms of 
promoting organisational learning, particularly through numerous informal interactions 
with staff and joint decision-making with the management team. In sum, the 
entrepreneurial capability of being able to ‘learn how to learn differently’ has enabled 
NFive to restructure and diversify into successful new products and services. 
5.7. PELCOR 
5.7.1. Introduction  
Pelcor started up in 2003 in São Brás de Alportel, Algarve, Portugal, as a spin-out from 
Novacortiça, a firm that specializes in cork stoppers for the wine industry. The 
granddaughter of Novacortiça’s founder and current Pelcor owner-manager came up with 
the innovative idea of diversifying the applications of cork and making it more fashionable 
by creating accessories out of cork skin. The first manufactured accessory, a cork umbrella, 
was well received at an international fair where the new brand was launched. The company 
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subsequently developed a range of products based on innovative designs, from home and 
office furnishings to fashion accessories
85
. 
Following the early growth in demand for its products, the firm invested in new 
processes, hired qualified designers and established a design department headed by a 
well-known designer from the fashion industry. Other new products have followed, for 
example with newly added colours
86
, and the company has gradually internationalized 
its activity. At the time of writing, Pelcor had a presence in a number of niche markets 
worldwide and was aiming to establish its own stores while engaging with a number of 
local partnerships and franchising strategies.  
The company experienced the following important critical events: 
• The owner-manager was awarded the ‘Best European Entrepreneur’ and the 
company remerged with NovaCortiça (2011);  
• It developed an online store, presented its collection "Cork Your Style" at the 
New York museum MoMa (Museum of Modern Art) and recruited one 
additional employee and one Arts Director to reinforce its design team (2012);  
• It established new stores in the US and Dubai (2013), also investing in ongoing 
marketing efforts in these locations (e.g. in fairs and magazines).  
During its internationalization process, the company has received public aid from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MNE) and the Institute for Portuguese Foreign Trade 
(AICEP) in promoting Portuguese cork overseas (e.g. through fairs and support in 
exports). Also it has been partly funded through bank loans and European funds that 
targeted the cork industry.  It exported 80% of its products and has continued to target 
the fashion and luxury market, mostly in Sweden, France, and the US
87
. 
 
 
 
                                                          
85
 e.g. tablets, wallets, belts and parasols (Corporate information, 2013). 
86
 Men’s Health 04/01/2013; Time Out 2013/04/01. 
87
 Expresso Newspaper 15/06/2013. 
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5.7.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base 
Table 5.16 summarizes the firm’s knowledge base, the events which have triggered 
learning, and subsequent responses. The company’s knowledge base was principally 
built around its owner-manager’s previous experience that was rooted in the domestic 
cork industry as a bottle stoppers producer. She graduated in management, headed the 
cork family business, and started up her own company as an offshoot of this: “She was 
initially self-funded, headed the design management, established partnerships with 
local leatherwork producers and started supplying new design projects along with ‘cork 
skin’ aimed at new products” (Portuguese Cork Association - APCOR88).  
The company start-up relied heavily on the business knowledge acquired from the 
experience of the original family business. The growth of the new business has involved 
further knowledge acquisition, particularly in relation to marketing and the development 
of production capacity: “In the first years we focused on the marketing area trying to 
work out the brand waiting for distributors to approach us ... since then we felt the need 
to search for more markets by ourselves ... now we get more international contacts and 
high production demand” (Pelcor, owner-manager). 
Learning triggers and responses 
The company first started selling domestically (in 2003) and internationalized 
incrementally through marketing campaigns that started in product-related fairs and 
culminated in important international exhibitions
89
. The company benefited from public 
support for the cork sector early on and throughout its internationalization process, by 
successfully applying for QREN funds or receiving support from AICEP
90
. It was 
compelled to internationalize due to domestic constraints, principally in terms of 
intellectual property (IP) regulation, difficult partnerships, small market size and 
economic crisis (see Table 5.16).  
                                                          
88
 Associação Portuguesa da Cortiça (Portuguese Cork Association), Joaquim Lima, President, Interview 
in May, 8st 2013. 
89
 e.g. the Museum of Modern Art (2011). 
90
  E.g. ICEP (Portuguese Institute for External Trade) invited the company to important fairs and 
expositions such as in the MoMA museum in New York, as the Portuguese government was promoting 
internationally the Portuguese cork. 
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The Portuguese regime of intellectual property regulation was experienced as one 
subject to constant change while failing to protect the copyrights held on their products, 
meaning that domestic competitors were free to imitate without any legal 
consequence
91
. Imitating firms included some former partners: “some former partners 
learn about our products and start making and selling them on their own” (Pelcor, 
owner-manager). Also, the small size of the domestic market, the lack of purchasing 
power worsened by the economic crisis, and the increasing international demand for 
high standard cork products, contributing to Pelcor’s move towards internationalization. 
It is worth mentioning that the Portuguese cork sector has increasingly invested in other 
projects besides stoppers, in order to diversify to international, higher added-value 
markets like, for instance, projects with applications for aircraft, ground transportation 
and construction.  
Table 5.16 PELCOR Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced  Responses 
Owner-manager 
graduated in 
management and 
with business 
knowledge on the 
Portuguese 
traditional cork 
products (2003); 
 
 
 
Production and 
design capacity; 
Business knowledge 
on networking 
(2013) 
Lack of dimension of the 
domestic market; 
Ineffective partnerships with 
local distributors;  
Imitation from domestic 
competitors; 
Internationalized incrementally searching for clients 
through the internet and presence at fairs (2003); 
Increased flexibility and became a specialist in the 
accessories market niche (2003); 
Public support in 
internationalizing cork 
products; 
Marketing campaigns (e.g. MOMA) (2003-2013); 
Increasingly differentiated 
demand and competitive 
intensity;  
Global economic crisis;  
Change in product line towards high fashion (2009) 
Improved R&D and increased production 
capabilities by merging (2011); 
Expand  to other markets and geographic segments 
(2012); 
Diversify to bottle stoppers and products from 
grain cork (2012); 
Establish a store in the US and in Dubai (2013) 
 
The company’s path to internationalization was gradual, including initial virtual 
contacts followed by more direct, person to person networking with overseas 
distributors. Pelcor gradually widened the scope of its internationalization strategy, 
                                                          
91
 E.g. since the clasp of the apparel is different from the original it is not considered imitation and the 
competitor could sell it. 
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becoming specialized in high luxury quality markets and developing a more strategic 
and flexible approach: “Clients demand different products and we do it case-by-case.” 
(Pelcor, owner-manager). In addition, the global economic crisis and increasing 
competition forced the company first, to continue expanding its target markets, 
including by slight adjustments to better match products to particular market segments; 
and second, to diversify to other client industries (e.g. footwear) as its traditional 
markets became saturated
92
. Although there were difficulties experienced in relation to 
the domestic context, an important advantage was the ability to build on the reputation 
of cork and the company’s various products as being authentically Portuguese in origin. 
The firm’s product design and production capabilities were first centralized in-house, to 
better manage functions in an integrated way. However, there was a perceived need to 
improve these capabilities by acquiring external R&D and production capabilities, to 
build capacity, enter into different international businesses and meet increasing demand 
(e.g. wine corks)
93
. These goals were achieved by remerging with Novacortiça, the 
previous cork family business. 
5.7.3. Learning processes  
Table 5.17 summarises the company’s main learning modes, showing that it learnt 
principally by taking action (‘doing’), and trial and error procedures. It also learnt by 
seeking new clients, networking with partners and suppliers and occasionally 
improvising new products.  Learning appears to have been highly centred upon its 
owner-manager and her ability to sense and select new opportunities, mainly in terms of 
product adjustments (i.e. slight design changes to address market needs) and gaining 
new client businesses. This ability of the owner-manager mainly derived from her 
accumulated, experiential business knowledge. Less evident in this case were learning 
by formal planning, ‘grafting’ external expertise, imitating competitors’ practices and 
learning new ways of learning through restructuring.   
 
                                                          
92
 The business became more specialized and the firm diversified its businesses from fashion accessories 
to wine stoppers and other luxury industry targets. 
93
 In addition to products from ‘cork skin’ it developed products from granulated, or grain cork that 
implied a different technology. It held around 100 different products. 
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Table 5.17 PELCOR Learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’  R&D, business Owner-manager, team 
trial and error R&D, business Owner-manager, team 
Searching  Business  Owner-manager 
Networking  Business  Owner-manager, partners,  clients 
Improvisation  R&D, Business Owner-manager, team 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
 
The company improved products ‘by doing’, and attempted new ones by experimental 
trial and error, both at business and R&D levels. For instance, a partner requested a tent 
made of cork, Pelcor piloted this concept, but rapidly abandoned the project in light of 
the experience: “we learn a lot by trial and error and know by experience … Let us 
suppose the client or partner requires a new product for us … we have never made it so 
let us make it up and try it! If it is not right at first, we restart and do it again until we 
find the success formula … our experience is critical to warn the client that it could not 
work.”(Pelcor, owner-manager). Hence, the company has learnt by being proactive in 
addressing upcoming events: “when we started we didn’t have any idea of what would 
be the business and it has been a continuous learning … it takes us only one month 
instead of two months as it used to before, as we had learnt the accumulated experience 
in the meanwhile.” (Pelcor, owner-manager).  The linking and adaptation of the firm’s 
internal capabilities in response to external opportunities principally involved 
reconfiguring products in terms of design, and by achieving support and gaining new 
clients through the internationalization process.  
This manufacturing firm has learnt inter-organisationally through networking with 
partners at the business knowledge level, in which the owner-manager was central in 
identifying business trends and related opportunities by travelling and visiting clients in 
order to gain better understanding of their needs. This resulted, for instance, in a 
collaboration with a shoe producer in response to a client’s request for a composite 
product made of leather and cork, and also hiring of external international consultants: 
“We learnt the needed industry knowledge through our networking, partnerships, 
clients, consulting, fairs, and some specialists ... we have all the difficulties inherent in 
the export and implementation of a brand in a foreign market, with its culture and 
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rules”94 (Pelcor, owner-manager). Hence the owner-manager was central in shaping 
opportunities and supporting the processes by which the firm has created new products 
and markets. 
The company rarely engaged in production partnerships that could increase its 
international growth. Initially, Pelcor supplied the ‘cork skin’ to producers that 
fabricated the products (such as umbrellas, wallets and so on) and further it centralised 
the design and production except when it comes to composite products that needed to 
incorporate other materials. 
There is also evidence to suggest that learning by improvising new product solutions 
occurred through occasional ‘brainstorming’ sessions, allowing for the exchange of 
business and design knowledge: “we then rethink and adapt the options as the 
opportunities come up ... during the last year we have innovated through new products, 
new uses of cork materials.” (Pelcor, owner-manager); “It improvises a lot as the 
market demanded cork substitutes and the firm had to find out new products 
opportunely” (APCOR - Portuguese Cork Association). Informal meetings to deal with 
daily operational issues have been the favoured means to share knowledge across the 
organisation. In this respect the owner-manager also played a key role by directing the 
firm’s functions (e.g. design) and co-ordinating the organization-level capabilities that 
constituted the firm’s overall entrepreneurial capability.  This has resulted in continuous 
novelty generation within the company’s operations, including, for instance, 
diversification into new businesses beyond the firm’s existing strategic repertoire (e.g. 
grain cork). 
Formal planning and learning from this was less evident, as it is centred on the owner-
manager, who is the primary source of both R&D and business knowledge. However 
the owner-manager established ‘top down’ general objectives for a three year period, 
involving the goal of entering into the Brazilian market of fashion accessories, although 
it was only afterwards that the question of how to sell and promote the company’s 
products to this new market was developed through informal and simple planning. The 
company rarely acquired external knowledge as it merged with another company once 
in its history and only hired a single external expert (Art Director). Only occasionally it 
                                                          
94
 Maximum Premium, Pelcor: From Cork to the fashion world (January 31, 2013). 
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learnt new ways collectively by developing fresh strategies, as in the case of the recent 
merger with its former mother-company, which resulted in more production capacity.   
The owner-manager has played a key role in encouraging team learning within the 
organization: “A good manager should listen to their team and decide accordingly. 
They should never decide alone.”95 She has adopted a proactive approach in acquiring 
new R&D and business capabilities, for example through personal contacts (e.g. 
distributors), to gain market proximity and meet client needs: “In the end it’s me who 
travels and visits clients to sense business trends and thereby adapt our products to 
those needs”. (Pelcor, owner-manager); “The marketing efforts of Pelcor’s owner-
manager are notorious as she developed partnerships with designers and companies 
including Moda Lisboa and Lisboa Fashion Week,  to develop exclusive products.” 
(APCOR). 
5.7.4. Learning outcomes  
Table 5.18 summarizes the capabilities and competitive advantages that resulted from 
these learning processes. The main outcomes were the new business capabilities in 
international networking and the additional strategic flexibility. By inter-organizational 
learning, it improved its international business knowledge in terms of network, 
marketing and customer preferences. Conversely, by merging with Novacortiça, the 
company was able to acquiring (‘grafting’) further capabilities, while also maintaining 
its small/flexible core productive team.  
The company has also developed its capabilities ‘by doing’, for instance in improving in 
terms of taking advantage of public support
96
 and enhancing its design and production 
capabilities to reduce the risk of increasing imitation from competitors.  
 
 
 
                                                          
95
 Maximum Premium 10/25/2012 
96
 E.g. QREN funds, in order to internationalize further. 
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Table 5.18 PELCOR Learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
Business capabilities in international marketing / 
networking; 
 
New production and R&D capabilities through 
merging; 
Small, flexible and manageable structure; 
 
Diverse and specialized business portfolio; 
 
Increased reputation; 
 
These capabilities allowed the firm to respond rapidly to challenges and opportunities, 
including through continually adapting and innovating in its product range (e.g. 
perfumes, adornments and other lifestyle products)
97
. Secondly, it enabled it to enter 
into new businesses because, in the meantime, it mastered new R&D/design 
capabilities, acquired more production capacity, and gained a reputation. The firm’s 
entrepreneurial capability is therefore relied heavily on its owner-manager’s skill in 
sensing and selecting opportunities and synchronizing the firm’s overall response.  
5.7.5. Summary 
The Pelcor case study highlights the effects of domestic resources and entrepreneurial 
experience on the firm’s international performance. The company was a manufacturer 
that took advantage of its experience in a Portuguese traditional product and relevant 
public aid in order to internationalize, and became specialized in high quality consumer 
products. Additionally, internationalizing was also a way to overcome the domestic 
constraints of small market size and adverse regulation while taking advantage of 
significant international demand for luxury products. 
The owner-manager’s experience influenced positively the firm’s international 
performance by engaging in relevant learning, acquiring and disseminating business 
knowledge throughout the firm.  Pelcor internationalized gradually and emphasised the 
in-house design function and the informal project partnerships to better match the client 
needs.  
Over time, management functions that were fulfilled by the owner-manager have been 
distributed across a more professionalized organisation to better address the challenges 
                                                          
97
 The company was able to fulfil a client demand in no more than a year while in the past it could take up 
to three years. 
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of increasing internationalization. Nevertheless, the owner-manager remained central in 
terms of sensing, selecting and shaping opportunities and coordinating the separate 
functions and resources in order to achieve a unified response to reach markets. The 
dominant mode of learning was exploitative and efficiency driven, together with 
informal searching and networking.  
5.8. MOLDENE 
5.8.1. Introduction  
Moldene started up in 1983 as a supplier to a large toy manufacturer, located nearby. It 
produced metal moulds and manufactured moulds (up to 18 tons), through conception, 
3D projects, development and manufacturing (in plant). It manufactures moulds for 
plastic injection, to compression and other alloys (e.g. aluminium)
98
 and is part of a 
highly localised moulds cluster of companies in the centre of Portugal.
99
  
In 1990, it gained a large client from the packaging sector and an automotive client 
based in France. Currently, it principally supplies the automotive industry, but also 
other international sectors such as appliances, electronics/telecommunications, 
packaging and computers
100
.  
In 2000, the company started its activity of plastics injection moulding of small parts 
and has accumulated knowledge and experience in this specialist area. The firm also 
provides related services in design/engineering and rapid prototyping
101
. Moldene 
entered first the closer European and North African markets, with further 
internationalization worldwide only from 2012. Its business portfolio has remained 
largely unchanged, adding only occasionally some new automotive clients. In 2012, the 
firm obtained ISO certification and achieved a growth rate of 10% in employment and 
40% in sales, fuelled by its main automotive industry client.    
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 Moldene – Corporate information (2013). 
99
 The Portuguese moulds industry is centred on the town of Marinha Grande, 150 kilometres north of 
Lisbon. 
100
 It exports mostly to Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Brazil, US, United Kingdom and Morocco, 
having one single client based in Portugal. 
101
 Moldene – Corporate information (2013). 
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5.8.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base 
Table 5.19 summarizes the events which have triggered the learning within the 
company.  The company’s knowledge base was centred around the prior experiences of 
its three owner-managers. For instance, one of the owner-managers started as a trainee 
with the parent company and was subsequently promoted to manager. In the meantime, 
he attained linguistic training and was supervised by the founders, who already had 
substantial commercial experience. The owner-managers either worked in family 
businesses or were former employees of other firms: “I have always been linked to the 
mould industry due to family reasons … from that I am an owner-manager and I 
execute commercial tasks” (Moldene, owner-manager); “Most of these owner-managers 
lack management knowledge as they were former technicians” (Portuguese Association 
for the Mould Industry - CEFAMOL
102
).  
The early push to internationalize required the owner-managers to develop their 
linguistic skills and organize strategic business units internally. By 2012, the company 
had attained substantial business knowledge through international networking and while 
building its client portfolio. Investing in R&D development allowed greater production 
capacity, tailored products and timely deliverance: “Quality policy is based on 
customers’ satisfaction regarding lead time, services and product quality”103;“It 
consists of an integrated approach based on diverse competencies to different markets” 
(CEFAMOL). 
Learning triggers and responses 
Table 5.19 shows the main constraints experienced, namely the small domestic market 
size, competitive intensity, peripheral location and lack of domestic support, for 
example in terms of training. Moldene internationalized incrementally based on its core 
mould technology, diversifying into related businesses and in response to industry 
changes and successive client demands. It has remained loyal to its geographically close 
long-time clients. 
                                                          
102
 Portuguese Association for the Mould Industry, Manuel Oliveira, President, Interview in January, 24st 
2013. 
103
 Moldene – Corporate Information (2013). 
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The company’s internal R&D capabilities and stable team, specifically at the design 
level, has been central to ensuring the quality of its finished moulds. Significantly, due 
to familiar ties among employees (e.g. the son took over his father’s place in the 
company) “the company’s employees had lifetime employment and hardly changed, 
which is also true of other firms in the mould industry, in the region” (Moldene, owner-
manager). Moldene was able to respond to client needs, through different client project 
files in several formats and sizes, which were important to target specific clients, 
notably in the automotive industry
104
. It is worth mentioning that the Portuguese mould 
sector, in the midst of the recent downturn in the Portuguese economy and its slow 
recovery, presents a limited domestic market, compelling Moldene to internationalise 
since its start-up. Also influential has been an increasingly competitive demand for 
accuracy and more services (see section 3.5.3). 
Table 5.19 MOLDENE Knowledge base, learning triggers, and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced  Responses 
Entrepreneurial 
industry experience 
and education in 
languages of 
Owner-managers 
(1983) 
 
 
International 
business 
networking; 
strategic flexibility 
(2012) 
 
Delocalization of large client toy 
manufacturer to China; 
Enter other more demanding and proximal 
client industries (1990); 
Invest in a design capacity (1990); 
Demand from a large new client; 
Established a long-range and loyal 
partnership (1991); 
Difficulty in having local 
partnerships; 
Centralize production capacity internally 
(1991) 
More demanding businesses; 
Peripheral domestic location; 
Production of mould injection internally 
(2000);   
Recruitment of qualified employees (2000); 
Little international visibility of 
Portuguese mould industry 
Increased the firm’s marketing efforts (2000) 
Lack of institutional support for 
training  
Held funded training sessions (2011) 
 
Create an additional commercial unit for 
plastic moulds (2012) 
 
The interviews indicated that the company has been relatively conservative in terms of 
its strategy, seeking to maintain the same clients, reinforcing trust by close contact and 
adding related services to its portfolio. It had diversified principally to near European 
markets, within the automotive sector: “we keep our business with that big enterprise 
                                                          
104
 Moldene – Corporate information (2013). 
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both through the production of new moulds and by repairing the existing ones … being 
focused almost exclusively on the automotive client makes us very dependent on one 
single client” (Moldene, owner-manager).  
Nevertheless, in 2011 it attempted to attain new clients in overseas regions: “We are 
now starting to present proposals and budgets to Brazil and North America” (Moldene, 
owner-manager). The highly demanding nature of the business in terms of product 
accuracy plus its peripheral location and distance from the complementary injection and 
mounting units, compelled the company to adopt a new mould injection technology and 
recruit qualified manpower
105
.  
Moldene has experienced the need to engage in domestic partnerships to achieve more 
production capacity, but it had to centralize all production capacity because: “although 
the company often engages in informal partnerships by project, formal partnerships are 
extremely difficult to obtain with competitors as everyone is afraid of losing clients” 
(Moldene, owner-manager). The firm was granted some European QREN funds to train 
its employees in the new injection technology, although the domestically available 
support was  experienced as excessively bureaucratic and slow to access, thus limiting 
its contribution
106
: “public funds target industries other than the mould industry and 
miss business opportunities due to time-consuming bureaucracy while regulation 
constantly changes; the ineffective aid from ICEP in promoting the domestic industry 
(e.g. outdated firms’ database); and also the credit shortage, force the companies to 
self-fund” (Moldene, owner-manager).  
These domestic constraints compelled the company to increase its marketing efforts to 
meet new clients: “No client places an order without knowing us before … the main 
difficulty consists in bringing the clients to our enterprise” (Moldene, owner-manager). 
It has increasingly internationalized its strategic business areas and in 2012 created a 
strategic business unit for the plastic moulds. Moldene, in order to break away from the 
dependence on automotive clients, attempted to enter into the new client sectors of 
                                                          
105
 E.g. Portugal is distant from emergent markets and at the domestic level there is one single plant to 
build cars. The automotive industry delocalised to east, to countries such as Slovakia, becoming difficult 
to show directly the piece and the mould to the client. 
106
 E.g. European funds from QREN (National Strategic Reference Frame) related to innovation support 
were expected to be available in 2011 but were still unavailable one year later, as the company needed to 
expand its operations. Moldene allocated one employee to address the external aid programmes in full 
time, due to its complexity and bureaucracy, while liquidity is little, bank credit is non-existent either, 
irrespective of how well-rated the enterprise is, and the interest rates are high. 
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electric industry and pharmacy, in which the moulds need to be injected in very special 
conditions of temperature and with specific machinery. It was unsuccessful with regard 
to the pharmacy market as it demanded new and expensive technology to produce 
smaller mould parts. In this way, the firm’s procedures and equipment were principally 
oriented around continuous improvement. 
5.8.3. Learning processes  
The evidence shows that the company’s experience can be represented as a 
configuration of learning modes based principally on the accumulated business 
experience of its top management and the product development skills of its team (Table 
5.20). Interviews provide evidence that the company learnt principally at an exploitative 
level (‘by doing’) and also by searching external opportunities, networking with clients, 
planning at a business level, and occasionally training its staff. The management team 
were central to sensing new opportunities, this being particularly facilitated by 
members’ good command of foreign languages and practical knowledge of the firm’s 
functions (e.g. design). 
In addition, and due to the technological complexity of the sector that requires internal 
collaboration, the management team, together with the design and operations teams, 
were also central in terms of selecting and shaping those opportunities. Hence, Moldene 
learnt by being proactive at the business and R&D levels, when improving two-way 
organisational learning between operations and design sections and continuously 
reviewing its procedures. For instance, the mould production starts at the commercial 
area, flows to project, to engineering and lastly to production. The business is based on 
potential projects supplied by the own client in partnership: “We have been a certified 
firm since 2001 ... therefore our internal procedures are continuously reviewed ... we 
tried to do all the R&D tasks internally only outsourcing once in a while ... the core 
tasks are done inside the firm to assure a high quality to clients ... the new processes 
are mainly production and efficiency related … design and conception are paramount 
when we talk of innovation” (Moldene, owner-manager).  
At the inter-organizational level, the company has learnt principally through the 
searching and networking activity of its senior management. Its owner-managers 
searched for business opportunities at industry fairs and client meetings. For instance, 
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the owner-managers prospected and visited clients and the close face to face contact 
was considered as paramount as 70-80% of such contacts resulted in increased business. 
The evidence suggested that the management team played an important role in 
synchronising the temporal and spatial correspondence between the firm’s and clients’ 
capabilities i.e. in programming operations, being thus crucial in the development of the 
firm’s EC. 
Moldene networked with clients through partnerships to further disseminate external 
knowledge internally through meetings and training
107
 thus connecting internal 
capabilities for opportunity realization: “The networking has to do with the exchange of 
information with our clients” (Moldene, owner-manager). However, Moldene did not 
seek to engage in R&D related partnerships and kept such core capability confined 
within the firm’s boundaries. Similarly, the firm’s business knowledge was limited to its 
core management team which did not resort to external consultancy advice as: “we do 
not choose external consultants as we are the main consultants who do the prospective 
work abroad” (Moldene, owner-manager). The firm was therefore conservative in terms 
of protecting its internal and external resources, retaining close oversight of its technical 
network and avoiding joint project working and the risk of sharing intellectual property 
and know-how (e.g. design related) with partners who are also potential competitors.  
Table 5.20 MOLDENE learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’  R&D, Business Owner-managers and team 
Searching Business Owner-managers 
Networking  Business Owner-managers, team, partners, clients 
Planning  R&D, business  Owner-managers  
Training  R&D Owner-managers and team 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
Moldene has also learnt by planning through prioritising R&D planning and top 
management level involvement in this in order to anticipate demand; and by training in 
implementing new R&D knowledge (e.g. plastic moulding). The knowledge collected 
                                                          
107
 The clients follow the process and keep up with its phases, visiting the firm or at distance through 
photos and reports detailing how things were done. Also, the company provided different training actions 
to different firm functions to ensure some polyvalence of its employees, turning out more flexible the 
productive processes in terms of tasks programming - e.g. in the case of mould injection. 
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externally was set down in plans: “We have both business and corporate planning made 
by owner-managers who coordinate all those needs and put them into an investment 
plan” (Moldene, owner-manager).    
The company has relied mostly on efficiency adjustments. “Business and R&D 
knowledge were often combined” (CEFAMOL) through organisational learning by 
which: “the exchange of information is constant” (Moldene, owner-manager). Yet, the 
company rarely learned new ways as a result of its experiences of implementing change, 
as for instance when a new technology unit of mould injection was adopted: “We never 
abruptly change the rules of the game; it is not possible … Only some processes are 
changed along the manufacturing chain” (Moldene, owner-manager). The need to be 
accurate left little scope for learning experimentally by trial and error or improvising 
new products and processes, and the trust-based established relationships with long-
term clients did not allow for imitation. Moldene was very judicious in providing a 
product aiming at fulfil a precise client need (e.g. part accuracy). 
5.8.4. Learning outcomes  
Table 5.21 shows the firm’s principal learning outcomes in terms of design and 
international business capabilities and net contribution to the firm’s reputation/track 
record that resulted in accuracy and a flexible business portfolio as key competitive 
advantages.  
Through its ongoing involvement in R&D, continuously improving, and learning intra-
organizationally, the company was able to achieve flexible core capabilities at the 
production and R&D levels, which enabled the fast production of complex moulds to 
clients with different needs
108
. Those capabilities led to process certification (e.g. ISO) 
and subsequent gains in reputation and client loyalty. The company has been able to 
increase its production capacity through the acquisition of heavy machinery (e.g. 
milling and adjustment capacity). It also achieved a quality control process that allowed 
it to allocate a machine to produce and test the mould accuracy immediately, whenever 
demanded.  
                                                          
108
 Moldene was a specialist in complex moulds to the automotive industry. Each mould is a distinct piece 
to fulfil distinct demands and the company was able to rapidly fulfil distinct client needs in producing and 
testing a mould of different and several parts - E.g. there were clients that order the part through an email 
file and further receive it in Morocco, France or UK. 
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Table 5.21 MOLDENE Learning Outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
Flexible core productive and R&D capabilities 
(e.g. design), which enables complex moulds; 
 
 
Mastering of R&D at mould injection and new 
international business related knowledge. 
Certification, reputation and client loyalty; 
 
Increased productive capacity and control; 
 
A diverse business portfolio of complex moulds; 
 
Integrative accurate product / service and close 
market approach. 
 
The new mould injection technology and the corresponding new business knowledge in 
its different client industries led to a more integrated and efficient approach, through 
more flexible design software and better quality control over the entire process: ”the 
interaction with the client before, during and after purchase is paramount … the market 
has just selected the best performers … which present the best service level … the client 
arrives at the enterprise and knows that we control all the production process up to the 
end” (Moldene, owner-manager). To summarize, Moldene has therefore built high 
levels of trust with clients and improved its product/service quality to meet exacting 
client demands.  
5.8.5. Summary   
The Moldene case study highlights the effects of firm’s learning processes which have 
been largely centred on the characteristics of its internally-based R&D capability and 
also the owner-managers’ entrepreneurial experience on the company’s learning path. 
The firm’s learning has been largely incremental in character, internationalized step-by-
step and rarely engaged in complex change. Its decision-making was largely centred on 
the top management team, although it has become more collective following the firm’s 
more recent restructuring, which has seen the design function being accorded a greater 
priority and influence.  
The company has principally responded to competitive events and constraints resulting 
from its peripheral location (such as client delocalization to distant regions, the firm’s 
limited international visibility, distance from European markets and dependence on a 
few long-term clients) by engaging in long-term partnerships, investing in its design 
function, centralizing production, and investing in new technology. Moldene achieved 
its flexible core capabilities by integrating and learning from the different views of 
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external clients and internal business and R&D functions. This has enhanced its 
entrepreneurial capability to pursue opportunities and achieve competitive advantage. 
However, it remains dependent on its foreign automotive clients. For instance, Moldene 
tried to enter into the pharmaceutical market to break away from this dependence but 
was unsuccessful, as it demanded new and expensive technology to produce the smaller 
moulds needed. Organisational learning occurred through a combination of external and 
internal learning modes in which the owner-managers played a collective role in 
coordinating the internal team’s R&D and business knowledge by networking inter-
organisationally, searching for opportunities and settling goals for ‘top-down’ 
implementation. This company co-developed its products with clients, although it has 
not openly shared its design capabilities, nor engaged in formal strategic alliances.  
5.9. SOMARQUES 
5.9.1. Introduction  
This company is a manufacturer and designer of high standard and customized ladies 
footwear located in Oliveira de Azemeis, an important footwear cluster 50 miles from 
Oporto.
109
 It was founded in 1973 and developed exports of around 75% of overall 
sales, mainly to markets in the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Ireland. SOMarques 
was established by the three current owner-managers, who were initially a former 
employee, a bakery owner, and an employee of another shoe producer.   
The challenges faced by the firm included:  
• The loss of major clients as they switched to cheaper suppliers in the East in the 
1990s, with most well-known brands moving to China with its lower production 
costs, thus causing many Portuguese suppliers to shut down.  
• Increasingly global competition and an inability to compete on the basis of low 
prices compelled SOMarques to restructure and incorporate the additional design 
capability needed to produce small series of quality, customised shoes for high-
end export markets.  
                                                          
109
 The footwear industry is highly concentrated in the north of Portugal in two main clusters: Felgueiras 
in the east and Barcelos in the west, representing half of the industry's employment at a national level. 
Another hub is located on the southern boundary of the northern region, centered on Oliveira de Azemeis 
and Santa Maria da Feira, accounting for 42% of employment. 
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• The company experienced a particularly difficult year in 2011 due to excessively 
hot weather that lowered the demand for winter shoes.  
• In 2012, its owner-manager was considering a restructuring of the enterprise and 
significantly reducing the workforce from its then 50 employees. The firm 
forecasted zero sales growth (by the end of 2011), compared with 30% growth in 
2010 and 35% a few years earlier.  
5.9.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base 
Table 5.22 shows that at the start the company principally held industry knowledge, 
mostly based on the prior experience of its founding owner-managers with almost no 
engagement in collaborative partnerships. The: “owner-managers have good 
management knowledge and are aware of marketing trends” (Atlanta, sales 
manager
110
). This core business experience has been supplemented by additional R&D 
capabilities, namely at the design level: “design is a core capability ...  that allowed 
being flexible and selling in quality and small series ... it is done internally” (President 
of the Portuguese Footwear, Components, Leather Goods Manufacturers Association - 
APICCAPS
111
). By 2012, the company had increased its product development 
capability to meet a tailored small series demand from high quality markets, developing 
and producing, simultaneously, different shoe models. 
Learning triggers and responses 
Table 5.22 summarises how SOMarques has responded in the face of domestic 
constraints, mostly to the small size of its domestic market, in which nearly 90% of the 
overall footwear production of the Portuguese sector was exported (APICCAPS). There 
was a deficit of public support specifically designed for the footwear sector since most 
interventions did not target this specific sector, whereas the European aid programmes 
(e.g. QREN funds) either targeted other industries (e.g. cork) or were experienced as 
very time-consuming to apply for and access, often missing the moment for a business 
opportunity. The company experienced permissive import laws regarding cheap eastern 
                                                          
110
 A firm’s supplier of soles, José Luis, Sales Manager, interview in January, 7st, 2013. 
111
 APICCAPS, interview in July, 22st, 2013. 
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products that did little to protect national products and rigid labour regulation in terms 
of hiring personnel that limited its flexibility to recruit and dismiss staff.  
Table 5.22 SOMARQUES Knowledge base, learning triggers, and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced  Responses 
Owner-managers 
with domestic firm 
and industry 
experience (1998); 
 
 
 
R&D on design; 
production 
flexibility and 
market knowledge 
(2012) 
 
Small market size; 
Lack of public support;  
Bureaucracy in European funds; 
Shortage of manpower and 
training; 
Internationalized to near markets (1990); 
Resorted to experience (1990);  
Self-financed (1990); 
Recruited (1990); 
Competitors’ delocalization to 
East; 
Intense competition from low cost 
Asian products; 
Adopted quality tailored products (1991); 
Offered better payment conditions to 
European clients (1991); 
Increased service level (1992); 
Lack of production capacity;  Outsourced production capacity (1973-2012) 
Global economic turmoil;  
Seasonal variability of demand for 
products (i.e. abnormal Oct. 2011); 
Restructuring and reduced staff (2012); 
 
Significant difficulty was experienced around the recruitment of competent staff, 
because the industry was considered ‘dirty’ and less attractive particularly by young 
people, and because vocational training specifically for the footwear industry was rare 
in Portugal. This problem compelled the company to recruit and train staff from further 
afield rather than from the immediate locality. 
The domestic VAT regulation and unfavourable payment conditions were deemed 
major constraints and a problem for the firm’s financial position. The Portuguese tax 
policy (VAT) required payments irrespective of a firms’ profit, often resulting in over 
taxation. As the international crisis deepened, prices fell and payment conditions 
worsened.
112
 Significantly, however, the Portuguese economic crisis has not 
substantially harmed the industry: “As in 2012 Portuguese firms are 90% 
internationalized and exports are growing 5%,; the credit shortage ended up favouring 
the Portuguese firms which sell small series with attractive payment conditions to near 
                                                          
112
 Some important clients were paying within 60 days instead of 30 days as they used to before. 
However, if the client ordered from China it had to be a substantial product quantity, 6 or 7 months in 
advance and with payment bu credit card, which increased costs and risk. 
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European clients, who became short of credit to buy from distant East suppliers.” 
(APICCAPS). 
 
Interviews with the owner-manager provided evidence that the firm addressed these 
barriers by self-financing, relying on previous business experience and building closer 
relationships with clients: “we could always export to Spain for instance while today the 
crisis is systemic and the lessons learned are of little help” (SOMarques, owner-
manager); “certification and financial capacity (e.g. credit insurance) were mandatory 
conditions to do business” (Atlanta, sales manager).  
Additionally, the generalized European crisis compelled Portuguese firms to 
internationalize to emerging markets (e.g. Brazil) and attain greater closeness to clients, 
in order to develop rapidly tailored shoes and to improve payment conditions
113
. In this 
way, SOMarques was able to customise the product to fulfil specific client demands: 
“we bet on shoes entirely in leather and suitable for different groups of customers.” 
(SOMarques, owner-manager).  
The low-cost competition forced SOMarques to adopt a quality strategy, investing in 
design machinery
114
and becoming specialized in high quality tailored shoes
115
: “the 
previous investment in capacity allowed Portuguese firms to be flexible and sell in 
quality and small series” (APICCAPS). The company became a specialist in certain 
nearby markets (e.g. fashion retail), while maintaining loyal, long-term clients
116
: 
“First, we try to keep the existing clients, improving the corresponding service level 
and second, we try to obtain new ones.” (SOMarques, owner-manager). As previously 
discussed (section 3.5.4), Portuguese footwear exports have targeted high value‐added 
niches in order to counter the aggressive pricing of Chinese competitors. There has been 
an increasing focus on R&D projects, both in process and product technologies that 
enabled the rapid production of small series and more flexible responses to customer 
orders within a Portuguese competitive edge based on proximity to European markets 
and the corresponding high service level expectations of customers.   
                                                          
113
 Clients who worked with rapid orders have the prototype within 1-2 weeks, after an initial personal 
approach and sample production, and obtain the final product within 1month. The company presented a 
good service level because it responds fast to demands. 
114
 E.g. acquisition of a new drawing machine CAD CAM, to better and more quickly design products. 
115
 The company adapts little details of conception and the shoe molds differ through different clients. 
There are clients who prefer a softer shoe, others want it more comfortable or with a taller caper. 
116
 Some clients had been with the firm for 25 years. 
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Although the company was equipped with flexible production and design equipment, it 
addressed the demand peaks by contracting external production capacity
117
: “We have 
smaller factories to which we supply manpower and raw materials and have people 
supervising the process” (SOMarques, owner-manager); “many firms do fix unexpected 
problems by recourse to occasional partnerships” (APICCAPS).  
Lastly, due to an unexpectedly hot October 2011 which caused a significant decrease in 
sales, the firm responded by adjusting its programming and reducing staff. Such 
measures proved insufficient to transform the business performance.2012.    
5.9.3. Learning processes  
Table 5.23 summarizes the firm’s key learning processes. The company learnt 
principally by improving on its current procedures (i.e. ‘by doing’) and also by 
searching for client needs, networking occasionally during demand peaks, imitating the 
competition and improvising rapidly new products, in which the role of the owner-
manager was central, both in terms of developing and limiting the firm’s entrepreneurial 
capability. The firm has seldom learned how to master radically new procedures as a 
result of its failure to engage in more significant and complex changes.  
The evidence indicates that SOMarques learnt by taking action, through routine 
procedures, at the business level in which both internal and external knowledge were 
shared by the management team: “We communicate on a daily basis … we are not as 
formal as in the big enterprises ... We identify opportunities and we implement our 
decision without the need for constant meetings and memorandums” (SOMarques, 
owner-manager). Incremental exploitative learning occurred constantly, notably in 
response to client demands, setting operational plans, and resorting to past successful 
solutions: “the firm adapts to the trend rather than changing in a revolutionary way” 
(Atlanta, sales manager); “the procedures are always the same” (SOMarques, owner-
manager).  Such learning occurred principally at senior management level: “the 
business knowledge was confined to the top management team and goals flow top-down 
(APICCAPS)”; “the owner-manager centralizes all the business competencies and 
managerial skills, the senior management team interacts through occasional meetings” 
(Atlanta, sales manager).  
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 The company had the capacity to produce 400-500 shoe pairs per day, maximum, which made it 
difficult to respond to more demanding and distant regions. 
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Table 5.23 SOMARQUES learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’  R&D, business Owner-manager and team 
Searching  Business Owner-manager 
Networking  Business  Owner-manager, partners and clients 
Imitation  Business Owner-manager 
Improvisation  R&D, Business Owner-manager and team 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
The firm networks occasionally at the business level. The process was highly centred on 
the owner-manager, who had cultivated close relations with clients. For instance, the 
owner-manager had spent a lot of time sending samples to potential clients, going to 
fairs, to centres of fashion such as Italy, visiting the clients personally to gather ideas 
with respect to a new product. He met other competitors and clients informally at trade 
fairs and distributed the information internally into the firm. The company often 
outsourced non-core functions such as the dressmaking to partners in India or Northern 
Africa: “We did not used to engage in partnerships but sometimes we talk, and realize 
we could make some improvements” (SOMarques, owner-manager); “good partners, 
either clients or suppliers, are key to keep up with the business” (APICCAPS); “there 
exists networking in terms of production” (Atlanta, sales manager). 
Networking has been combined with searching activities, but with the associated 
learning and selection of opportunities confined to the management team. The search 
for potential new clients was conducted remotely, using email and telephone contact, 
with shoe samples then being exchanged by mail. Ongoing interactions with 
prospective, new and long standing clients have been constant and ongoing, with the 
owner-manager often  visiting clients directly : “The owner-managers are proactive in 
searching for new markets ... firms need to be proactive in searching for alternative 
markets to Europe that is not going to grow soon” (Atlanta, sales manager). The 
resulting external knowledge was further introduced at the top management team’s 
level: “Firstly, the decisions are always taken by our three owner-managers together 
and secondly each one manages his expertise area the best he can” (SOMarques, 
owner-manager). 
 174 
The company has also learned by imitating the competition, again largely through the 
owner-managers who occasionally collected relevant benchmarked knowledge (e.g. the 
identification of fashion trends), adjusting designs to meet different clients’ needs: “We 
do not have brands here - we copy a little from each brand” (SOMarques, owner-
manager)”; “it imitates by following some successful competitor initiatives and the 
fashion trends” (Atlanta, sales manager). Occasionally, in the face of unexpected 
changes, the management team also improvised a new shoe, based on sporadic client 
demands, rapidly and conjointly with the design section: “it improvises when it needs to 
develop a new product in the short time in which the design function is paramount” 
(Atlanta, sales manager).  
To summarize, the main responses to various external challenges and constraints have 
been incremental, taking action experientially, with top management being largely 
responsible for orchestrating internal (e.g. design) and external (e.g. production 
partnerships) resources, but with occasional input from R&D and production levels: 
“our orders are to be filled within two months and we can only plan within this time 
span; from this point on things come up repeatedly” (SOMarques, owner-manager). The 
company did not plan business goals in the long-term due to the seasonal characteristics 
of the business.  
5.9.4. Learning outcomes 
Table 5.24 summarizes the new capabilities and subsequent competitive advantages 
achieved. The firm has invested in new technological capacity to better meet client 
demands through a tailored design function, thus augmenting its ability to respond to 
varied demands
118
 and has also shifted to a more consensual decision-making process 
that has also proven to be more flexible in responding to opportunities. Specifically, the 
company has attained greater proximity to clients and increased the quality and 
responsiveness of its service level, speeding up its completion of orders. SOMarques 
has retained long-standing traditional clients over time and became specialized in 
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 The company created a new mould each new season in order to accomplish distinct demands. For 
instance, one person could boot size 37 but he / she may have a more or less elevated foot, which 
demanded a specific product. 
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certain markets, allowing it to better address the needs of large international 
distributors
119
.      
Table 5.24 SOMARQUES Learning Outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
More flexibility in design, production, and decision 
level; 
 
More specialization in market niches; 
 
New capabilities in networking with large distributors; 
Diverse and flexible portfolio of customized 
quality products; 
 
Certification; 
 
Improved service level; 
 
Client loyalty; 
 
Somarques’ entrepreneurial capability, primarily based on production flexibility and 
specialization in high standard markets, enabled the business to supply a fully custom-
made product and build loyalty because of the improvements gained in timely product 
delivery and clients’ payment conditions: “Clients who work with rapid orders demand 
the product today” (SOMarques, owner-manager). Lastly, continuous improvement in 
specialized markets led to certification of its processes and products, enhancing its 
reputation and contributing to its competitive advantage.  
5.9.5. Summary  
This case study highlights the positive effects of the owner-managers’ previously 
acquired industry orientation on the firm’s response to the competitive challenges faced 
and subsequent learning processes and performance.  
The owner-managers have followed successful past strategies through a decision-
making process confined to the top management team, which had set goals and gathered 
knowledge to be implemented ‘top-down’, throughout the firm. This role of knowledge 
gatekeeper was important, demonstrating a very market-driven positioning. However, 
their past experience did not include up to date international business knowledge to deal 
with current, new constraints.  
The approach to knowledge management has been informal, rather than professional 
and systematised. Learning has largely been experiential in nature and through 
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 The company affiliated with three other firms that produced either the whole shoe or only part of it. It 
also outsourced galoshes in China and India and further finished them internally, adding the sole. 
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continuously improving existing procedures (i.e. ‘by doing’), within team and intra-firm 
scopes. However, the company has, from time to time, engaged in more open modes of 
learning, through business searching, networking and inter-organisational production 
partnerships. Such incremental behaviour was shown in the face of the current 
economic crisis, by carrying out a restructuring that sought to produce more of the same 
and cut back on staff. The investments in new technology and capabilities were not 
sufficient to overcome the difficulties of its highly competitive context and in 2012, the 
firm was suffering falling sales and was on the verge of shutting down.  
The company’s learning outcomes concentrated on a certified, customized, and flexible 
product/service, and on subsequent client loyalty. It was able to develop enhanced 
capabilities relating to flexible design, marketing awareness, and dealing with large 
international distributors. Increased flexibility and speed in decision-making within the 
top management team, partly because of informal knowledge sharing, became apparent.  
The firm’s core production, design and management capabilities were, therefore, 
complemented with external marketing knowledge, which was essential to maintain a 
high service level and closeness to clients. The owner-managers were essential in 
promoting this strong market focus and openness to innovation.  
Moreover, the management team was central to building and limiting the firm’s 
entrepreneurial capability. It sought and experimented (e.g. by improvising) with new 
design possibilities but mainly within the confines of the firm and its traditional 
industry. It selected and chose, based on prior experience, which products to select for 
which markets and in relation to the firm’s existing design capability. It further 
connected internal and external elements by networking informally or by imitating 
competitors. This process tended to be exploitative, always led by the owner-managers, 
although with occasional important input from the design team.  
5.10. ACSMV 
5.10.1. Introduction 
Adega Cooperativa de São Mamede da Ventosa (ACSMV) is located in Ventosa, Torres 
Vedras, 80 miles north of Lisbon. It produces liqueur and fortified wine from grapes 
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from the vineyards of its associates
120
and was founded in 1956.  In 2011, it was ranked 
1
st
 in Portugal in terms of its wine productive capacity and the 12
th
 in terms of 
exports,
121
 employed 38 people and exported 95% of its production. 
Up to 1990, the company sold bulk wine to storekeepers and other wholesalers within 
Portugal. However, as global competition intensified and tariffs fell, other brands 
entered into the Portuguese market and domestic clients started buying wine from the 
border region of Spanish Estremadura. In 1996, facing a shrinking domestic market, the 
company realized it needed to produce bottled wine and search for international clients.  
Since 2000, in order to assist the international repositioning of the business, the firm has 
had four investment projects, plus two successful applications to the European 
Agricultural Funding Programme (PROAGRI). In 2001, the firm invested in equipment 
capacity, ended up bottling and putting all the production into packs, instead of 
exporting it in bulk. It gradually built up its export markets and internationalized 
incrementally, first to Angola and Mozambique, building on its domestic experience, 
productive capacity and the advantage of its low prices.  In 2011, ACSMV attempted to 
enter other countries, such as Brazil and China, but faced protectionism as well as 
limitations to its ability to cope with large scale production and associated logistic. In 
2011 its sales fell sharply in respond to the global economic crisis. 
5.10.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses  
Knowledge base 
The company has accumulated considerable industry knowledge, with its owner-
managers having many years of experience in the wine industry
122
. Further learning and 
development has been focused on searching for new clients and improving productive 
efficiency in response to its competitive difficulties (Table 5.25). As the owner-manager 
explained: “anr important issue is the years of experience we acquired in this business 
along with some contacts … and we were lucky in having a core client who had 
businesses in Angola and contacted us … there aren’t any ruptures with the past. We 
                                                          
120
 More than 2000 members in 2012 with vineyards covering a total area of 4885 acres. 
121
 It processes up to 16,500 tons of grapes yearly and holds a storage capacity of 39 million litres. 
122
 The owner managers held in average only secondary studies. One of them was the president of 
Federation of National Collective Cellars (FENADEGAS) during four years and its paymaster during six 
years, which provided deep knowledge about the industry. 
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simply are improving continuously” (ACSMV, owner-manager). By 2012, as a result of 
its business overseas, the company had absorbed important knowledge related to quality 
control and international business.  
Learning triggers and responses 
Table 5.25 shows the main domestic constraints experienced and subsequent responses. 
Specifically, ACSMV faced domestic constraints in terms of the small market size, 
unfavourable payment conditions, difficult partnerships, and the regulations and legal 
framework affecting the sector. As discussed previously, (section 3.5.5), the Portuguese 
wine sector tends to be characterised by a conservative approach, particularly with 
respect to innovation (e.g. in terms of developing new packaging, new formats and 
products) and small wineries that avoid moves towards greater concentration through 
collaborative partnerships with learning tending to be incremental and centred on 
owner-managers. 
The small domestic market is characterised by intense competition from foreign brands. 
Like other Portuguese wineries, ACSMV encountered difficulties in collecting 
payments which threatened the financial sustainability of the firm
123
. It also struggled to 
develop cooperative local partnerships with other similar enterprises.  Contributory 
factors here included the lack of a culture of inter-organisational cooperation within the 
sector, as well as concerns that potential partners were unable to meet the minimum 
quality criteria
124
. The company had attempted to develop such cooperation as a means 
to expanding productive capacity in response to occasional demand peaks and to 
accommodate large scale international demand: “Wineries have their own structures 
and although they may be idle, they avoid association with other wineries … every 
competitor conceals information.” (ACSMV, owner-manager).   
Since 2000, the domestic regulatory and legal framework has been in a state of constant 
change, becoming more bureaucratic regarding licences, certification and environmental 
issues. These processes have become more time-consuming and expensive for 
                                                          
123
 The internal market represented only 5-6% of the firm’s total revenue because there were plenty of 
brands, an enormous number of bottlers and many low cost competitors from countries such as Bolivia 
and Chile. 
124
 For instance, some wineries presented out dated technology that deteriorates the wine quality. 
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businesses
125
: “You simply cannot imagine the time the new licensing process took us to 
meet the new rules that are always changing and the investments we were obliged to 
make” (ACSMV, owner-manager). Access to European funding programmes (e.g. 
PROAGRI) was also experienced as increasingly difficult and prolonged, although the 
company, taking advantage of its owner-manager’s experience, was successful in its 
application to the PROAGRI fund.  This enabled it to obtain significant investment 
funds that were applied to improving production capacity and also improved the 
possibilities of being successful in further applications as it developed familiarity with 
these funding procedures.  
Table 5.25 ACSMV Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses 
Knowledge base Constraints experienced Responses 
Previous industry 
experience (1956);  
 
 
 
 
 
 
High quality control 
processes; 
international 
network business 
knowledge; (2012); 
Difficulty in selling domestically due 
to local competition; bad payment 
conditions; difficult domestic 
partnerships; increasing regulations 
and legal burdens. 
Internationalize (1996); 
Lack of international business 
knowledge; 
Good image of Portuguese wine; 
Internationalize to Portuguese speaking and 
culturally similar countries (1996); 
Resort to  local distributors and  
international partnerships (1996); 
Need of capacity and marketing 
efforts; 
Aid of European funds; 
Old age of the associates; 
Investment in production and storage 
capacity (2000);  
Use of customized product (2001);   
Internationalize further (2011) 
Recruit and train qualified younger people 
(2011); 
 
ACSMV was compelled to turn to new markets overseas. It entered first into culturally 
similar Portuguese-speaking markets, taking advantage of the image of Portuguese wine 
as a traditional product, and then entered into European and more distant markets, such 
as China. ACSMV internationalized through attempting to strengthen its approach to 
marketing, building on its past domestic experience with local distributors: “our 
contacts are mostly local, with wineries from the vicinity” (ACSMV, owner-manager). 
                                                          
125
 The owner manager complained that the EU requirements became excessively restrictive once 
transposed to the national law and were constantly changing (e.g. the company had a previous licensing 
for wastewater, but needed to apply for a new licensing because a new decree came out, which forced it 
to build a new plant to treat wastewater). 
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However, the company’s internationalization process was hindered by a lack of 
understanding of international markets and related issues, as well as the absence of any 
‘new blood’ in its management team and the firm’s limited production capacity. The 
changes made tended to be slight modifications in the product and packaging (e.g. 
product labels) including the introduction of tetra pack technology to better serve some 
international markets: “while, in Brazil we sent high quality wines, in Angola they more 
likely can only afford low quality wines, mostly in Tetra Pack containers” (ACSMV, 
owner-manager). The firm also required an expanded production capacity, in terms of 
storage and bottle filling capacity, as the absence of this delayed the completion of 
international orders
126
: “At this point we have reached our limit regarding productive 
capacity ... we can only sell more if we resell wine” (ACSMV, owner-manager). At the 
time of writing, the company was in the process of recruiting qualified younger 
managers and operational staff, in order to replace its aging workforce and improve its 
international competitiveness.  
5.10.3. Learning processes  
The focus of learning and development in ACSMV has been on incremental 
improvements to existing procedures (‘by doing’), attempts to target new potential 
clients by experimental trial and error. More occasionally it also sought new business 
opportunities, through networking with distributors, and investing in training for 
operational staff (Table 5.26). The company provided little evidence of seeking new 
products and processes and favoured the exploitation of immediate opportunities 
through incremental change. Improvements in routine procedures were achieved 
through ‘learning by doing’, with regard to both R&D and business practice, with the 
aim of realising economies of scale: “there aren’t any ruptures with the past ... we 
simply are improving continuously, for example in the process of freighting the 
containers, or in the use of pallets” (ACSMV, owner-manager).  
The firm demonstrated a relatively unsystematic and unplanned process of learning by 
experimental trial and error, and of selecting, approaching and shaping internal 
capabilities towards international markets. For example initially the owner-manager 
sent wine samples to potential clients and then waited to be approached: “In the 
                                                          
126
 The company successfully applied for QREN funds and did three investment rounds in terms of 
production capacity. 
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meanwhile a contact with Mozambique came up and things started going well, then let 
us see Angola … we launched the new wine that could succeed or not … I don’t know 
how things will roll with Brazil” (ACSMV, owner-manager). This strategy has been 
principally confined to the top management team, with little evidence of learning from 
external viewpoints to address business issues: “I, another colleague of mine, and 
another member of the board constitute the backbone of people that have driven this 
winery ... we have constant monthly meetings with several cellars ... the skills to 
product/business development are much centred on the management team ... the 
leadership is not participative, rather ‘top down’” (ACSMV, owner-manager).  
Occasionally, the owner-manager undertook limited research in order to anticipated 
market trends via the internet, trade fairs, and meetings: “We are aware of the news and 
we have the concern to verify if we could accomplish them or not ... we are always 
adapting, according to market needs” (ACSMV, owner-manager).  Sporadically, the 
firm networked at an inter-organisational level, with external distributors
127
, whose 
feedback was used in updating the firm’s business purposes: “We listen to the 
distributors, about what goes well or wrong” (ACSMV, owner-manager). Sometimes, 
the firm carried out training sessions for its operational staff (at the R&D level
128
)  
Table 5.26 ACSMV learning processes 
Learning modes Knowledge Learning scope 
‘by doing’  R&D and Business  Owner-managers   
Trial and error Business  Owner-managers 
Searching Business Owner-managers 
Networking  Business Owner-managers and distributors 
Training  R&D  Owner-manager and team 
Frequently occurring (bold) and occasional learning processes 
The firm’s long term strategic planning has been limited to its financial plan and 
operations, with opportunity realisation centred on its management team. This lacked 
any formal strategic approach: “we programme operations according to needs, to avoid 
                                                          
127
 The contacts with distributors are very informal and carried out by the owner manager, who 
occasionally goes to wine fairs and meetings and travel to Angola and Mozambique to personally meet 
clients.   
128
 The company took advantage of QREN funds to training, either in hygiene and safety at work, or 
industrial equipment. 
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excessive stocks and financial shortfall” (ACSMV, owner-manager). The company 
rarely engaged in more radical re-thinking of its established practices and the basic 
assumptions underpinning these. The two occasions where it did do this comprised 
changing its strategy and structure towards internationalization (1996), and the renewal 
of its management team (2012). Overall the firm displayed considerable conservativism 
in approaching opportunities and rarely sought novelty. 
5.10.4. Learning outcomes  
Table 5.27 summarizes the principal capabilities and competitive advantages achieved.  
ACSMV attained business capabilities at an international level, and operational 
capabilities in terms of quality control, production capacity and certification. It 
internationalized late and by 2012 was more market-oriented and focused on 
customized products. This adjustment to serving international markets compelled it to 
attain additional capabilities in tailoring products to these different markets
129
, increase 
its dealings with international distributors, and master new processes (e.g. the tetra pack 
technology).  
Additional investments strengthened the business asset base, which together with new 
knowledge through applying for European funding, made it easier to apply for further 
funding programmes.  For instance in 2011, the company successfully submitted two 
applications to PROAGRI and one application to PRODER (Program for Rural 
Development), enabling investments aimed at improving the quality of bottling, quality 
control and storage. The firm bought a new bottling and filling machine, a machine that 
grades the quality of the grapes, forklifts and a new production line: “Once we 
understand how the project’s approval works and its mechanisms, it gets easier to 
move.” (ACSMV, owner-manager). These new capabilities in applying for funding have 
enabled it to strengthen its productive capacity and its ability to respond to the demands 
of international markets
130
.  
                                                          
129
 E.g. during 2011, the company changed the labels of all its wines, created the wine ‘Terras de 
Agostinho’ (Lands of Agostinho) and applied for the registration of the new brand ‘Adega de São 
Mamede’ (São Mamede Cellars). 
130
 E.g. in 2011, the company acquire six additional tanks of 264 000 litres of wine each and another one 
with the capacity for 1 000 000 litres. 
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Table 5.27 ACSMV Learning Outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
Business knowledge on dealing with international markets; 
 
Business knowledge on networking with international 
partnerships; 
 
New productive, R&D, and marketing processes;  
 
Knowledge on dealing with European funding aids; 
Close market approach;  
 
Certification; 
 
Tailored product;  
 
Productive capacity; 
 
Because of these additional investments, the company became certified, created new 
wine brands and increased its reputation. Despite these efforts, in 2011, results fell short 
of expectations. Sales growth rate fell from 27% to 4%, illustrating the firm’s limited 
success in addressing the challenges posed by a difficult and highly competitive 
international environment: “Well, it isn´t easy, because this is a global market with 
many people making wines and it is not easy to gain, from night to day, new markets”. 
(ACSMV, owner-manager). 
5.10.5. Summary  
This case study highlights the firm’s late entry into international markets; a trait 
common to many smaller Portuguese wineries. The firm’s experience was production-
centred and confined to the top management team. The drive to internationalise the 
business has involved networking and searching for new business opportunities, albeit 
unsystematically, through trial and error, and with only a limited positive impact on the 
firm’s performance. In this way, the firm exported first toward culturally similar 
countries, through local distributors, which had limited success. The competition issues 
faced at international level and the lack of production capacity, business knowledge and 
potential domestic partnerships, resulted in serious barriers to the firm’s growth.  
The firm’s learning process was principally based on exploiting previous domestic 
experience and improving the efficiency of existing practices in response to the most 
immediately recognisable existing opportunities. The firm’s networking and searching 
activities (at the business level) was centred on the owner-manager and relied upon the 
clients’ and distributors’ commercial feedback. This constituted an important input to 
innovation and helped to update the company’s entrepreneurial capability. Two-way 
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learning was mostly at the top management and business levels, but occurred only 
rarely at the organisational and inter-organisational levels.  
The management team was central to the firm’s entrepreneurial capability. It centralized 
all the firm’s business tasks as it sought new clients, distributors and overall 
opportunities; once the opportunities were seized, existent resources and capabilities 
were shaped (e.g. extended production capacity) and internal capabilities (e.g. 
knowledge of the domestic market) were connected to external elements (e.g. culturally 
close markets). In the end, the top management team led the organising of firm’s EC 
with little or no contribution from the firm’s remaining units. 
In 2011 the firm’s sales fell abruptly, despite its investment in additional capabilities in 
new processes, new knowledge on how to deal with public aid, international clients, and 
partnerships. These poor results led to the top management team being replaced. 
However, it had achieved an improved competitive position in terms of productive 
capacity, certification and international marketing. The firm’s ‘openness’ in terms of 
innovation was limited to the acquisition of state of the art equipment and external 
commercial knowledge, principally from distant distributors. Conversely, the company 
rarely interacted with other similar enterprises with a view to developing co-operative 
efforts and capacity at business and production levels.  
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5.11. Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the role played by previous knowledge, whether R&D or 
business driven, and environmental constraints in shaping firms’ responses and 
subsequent learning processes and outcomes. It shows that the owner-managers played 
a central role to varying degrees in terms of organizational learning and the shaping of 
the firms’ entrepreneurial capabilities. Evidence showed that owner-managers nurture, 
and sustain the overall firm’s EC rather than simply motivating particular individuals or 
sections to innovate. Hence they are crucial in both external and internal learning 
modes, based on R&D and accumulated business knowledge.  
 
The chapter contributes key insights on the constraints that face Portuguese growth-
oriented SMEs and how they have sought to address them. Increasing 
internationalization was repeated throughout the nine case studies as a central theme, 
while some developed through engaging in change of a more strategic nature, others 
responded with more limited operational adjustments. Many of the cases presented 
outcomes in terms of higher quality and more differentiated products/services that 
targeted specific markets (in which R&D and design played a role), instead of a low 
priced, undifferentiated product.   
The varied responses to the challenges and opportunities faced can be understood in 
terms of a complex interplay of contextual and firm-level factors, including the nature 
of technological development within the sector and the markets involved, the resources 
and capabilities of the enterprise and availability of investment sources and other 
support, qualified staff, and partnerships.  
It was found that learning was more effective in those cases that combined different 
modes of learning, which was also reflected in the different levels of ‘openness’ in 
terms of innovation and the nature of entrepreneurial capabilities. Searching and 
networking activities at an entrepreneurial level was key to the absorption of relevant 
external knowledge and updating of firms’ entrepreneurial capabilities, while 
experiential learning ‘by doing’, was also a recurrent theme in exploiting opportunities. 
The owner-manager/CEO was often key in linking new external and internal, efficiency 
related knowledge for opportunity realisation, thus determining the firm’s degree of 
openness with respect to how it approached innovation. Other learning modes, carried 
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out principally by the senior management teams (e.g. imitation), took place to varying 
degrees across different sectors. High tech companies in general were characterised by 
entrepreneurial capabilities that were wider in scope and more integrated, particularly 
emphasising  systematic and explorative approaches (e.g. planning), whereas traditional 
firms tended to be less professional and systematic, relying more on exploitative 
learning modes (e.g. ‘learning by doing’) and at the top management level. The high 
tech cases, involving higher technological complexity, were also characterised by 
higher rates of change and learning, often involving a more dynamic approach to 
combining and synchronising resources and capabilities and being able to switch 
between both explorative high level and exploitative low level learning.  
This first analysis was made case-by-case and the next chapter focuses on developing a 
cross-case analysis.  
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6. Chapter Six: Understanding learning in growth-oriented firms: 
cross-case analysis 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter builds on chapter 5 by developing a cross-case analysis to compare and 
contrast the characteristics, processes and outcomes across the firms. The findings are 
presented according to the three key themes earlier identified: 
a) Knowledge base, learning triggers, and responses;  
b) Learning processes 
c) Learning outcomes  
These three themes are explored separately for the two main groupings of traditional 
and high-tech firms. Then, a cross-case section analyses the principal findings across all 
cases and finally a conclusion section synthesises the main patterns to have emerged.  
6.2. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses analysis of high-
tech firms – cross-case analysis 
Introduction 
A number of key findings emerged from the previous analysis. First, these companies 
faced barriers which were mostly related to their peripheral location and which have 
played an important role in driving them to internationalize from an early stage. Thus, 
as they developed their businesses, they tended to search for R&D-related knowledge 
and to engage in networking with international actors relevant to their sector.  
Second, the role of the domestic environment in providing highly educated human 
resources has also been a key supporting key factor in the growth process of these 
companies, particularly with respect to their R&D activities. However, all cases also 
experienced constraints arising from their domestic context, including limited 
opportunities for collaboration. As discussed in section 3.4, both ICT and biotechnology 
sectors exhibit highly institutionalised and goal-oriented R&D systems, with a generic 
nature to their underlying technologies, making them applicable to varied applications. 
At the same time, there were some significant differences between sectors in terms of 
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technological opportunities. While the biotechnology sector has a close reliance on 
scientific research and related breakthroughs, often emanating from universities, the 
ICT sector depends more on technological developments than on science per se, and on 
collaboration with downstream client industries. An important characteristic of the ICT 
sector is also the fact that firms benefit from network externalities. Innovation and the 
performance of firms essentially depend on how well they manage to integrate their 
products with clients’ products. Thus innovation is highly systemic by nature and new 
markets are often created by firms themselves through platform technologies and 
critical interfaces between them (e.g. the case of Altitude). 
Conversely, in biotechnology new innovative products tend not to be stand-alone rather 
than systemic, sometimes with a need a need to nurture new markets for the new 
innovative product (e.g. Bioalvo’s natural extract library). Furthermore, the product 
approval process in biotechnology is more heavily regulated and lead times in   
application areas such as drugs tend to be very long (10–15 years). The two sectors are 
therefore in different phases of techno-economic development, with the ICT industry 
being in the deployment period of its technology, whilst biotechnology is much less 
mature
131
. Third, these companies addressed these sector-related characteristics by 
building core R&D capabilities and internationalizing their markets and investment 
sources. The high-tech companies, in particular, dealt with increasing competitive 
constraints by developing a flexible approach to different business demands, developing 
tailored solutions to different clients and customising their core R&D that embraced 
complementary clients’ technology.  
Initial Knowledge base 
All the high tech companies were dependent on the strength of their R&D activities, as 
reflected by their yearly rate of introduction of new products. This strong R&D focus 
was also reflected in the backgrounds of their lead entrepreneurs/managers,  educated to 
PhD level or having other relevant academic backgrounds. Bioalvo, for example, was 
strongly reliant on its previous owner-manager’s informal networks, attained while 
studying abroad.  
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 A growth cycle that can range from an early irruption phase, when the new products and technologies 
are showing their future potential. to a turbulent phase with an intensive build-up of new infrastructure 
and new technologies and, lastly, a phase in which the new technologies are deployed broadly in the 
system, e.g. synergies between information and telecommunications, leading to a maturity phase, with 
different financial needs (Greiner, 1998). 
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The R&D teams were a central resource to these companies and had been recruited 
from the best graduates of domestic universities, namely engineers (in the software 
industry) and biologists (in the biotech industry). These companies continuously 
searched for external knowledge to complement their own R&D based knowledge, 
reflecting their openness innovation approach. YDreams, for instance, developed an 
alliance that became a spin-out for the entertainment industry (Audience 
Entertainment). 
Final knowledge base  
These initial R&D knowledge foundations evolved through the continuous 
improvement of core capabilities towards product customization and certification. R&D 
knowledge was patented and applied to various client sectors through custom-made 
solutions (e.g. software platforms) and deficiencies relating to  lack of international 
business knowledge (most of the owner-managers were technologists) were addressed 
by recruiting external expertise and developing new client relationships and 
partnerships
132
.  
Learning triggers and responses 
Table 6.1 summarises the constraints experienced by the high tech companies and how 
they responded, showing that all had internationalized early on while continuing to 
encounter various domestic barriers that hindered their development to varying degrees. 
Their owner-managers, however, showed a proactive posture, principally through being 
able to respond strategically to the critical challenges they faced. Biotecnol, for 
example, moved its headquarters abroad in order to achieve closeness to its key 
markets, affluent partners and financing sources.   
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 E.g. helping to access new sources of investment in the case of biotech. 
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Table 6.1 Learning triggers and responses at high-tech companies 
Constraints experienced Responses 
Lack of business knowledge, including international 
marketing; 
Shortfall of local partnerships, including universities;  
Lack of domestic long term venture capital; 
Experiences of inefficient regulation and lack of public 
support for internationalization.  
Acquire expertise through recruitment and 
firms’ acquisition, and training of existing staff; 
Engage in international partnerships; 
Selling services, franchising, licensing; 
Raise international funding; 
Enhance corporate marketing efforts, 
externalize commercial activities and establish 
headquarters abroad. 
 
Lack of international business knowledge 
Some of these high-tech companies (YDreams, Bioalvo) had their origins in research 
projects that were initiated within academia and supported by the public sector, and 
were led by technologists with little commercial experience. However, their limited 
capitalization (both in terms of public shareholding and venture capital) was not 
compatible with the requirements of the software and biotechnology sectors for huge 
amounts of investment and long term ROI. Moreover, owner-managers, with their lack 
of business experience and knowledge, were ill-suited to meet the challenges of a highly 
demanding international environment. In order to address these deficiencies, and  given 
the lack of  domestic support, the business knowledge needed to operate internationally 
was acquired in a number of ways, including by hiring international managers, 
acquiring firms, holding training sessions, resorting to consultancy advice and 
mentoring and, in some cases, moving the firms’ headquarters nearer to key markets.  
The better resourced and more affluent companies (e.g. Altitude) were able to afford to 
move facilities near to important markets or acquired firms, in order to rapidly access 
key knowledge, whereas other companies could only afford to hire international experts, 
and only for a short period due to its high costs. Altitude, for example, acquired a 
Swedish company to better master its internet-related cloud technology whilst hiring an 
internationally experienced manager who successfully restructured the company. 
YDreams and Biotecnol also recruited international managers, although in both cases 
these appointments proved inadequate to the challenge of international networking and 
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relationship building with international clients, contributing to the decision of both to 
move their headquarters closer to primary markets in the USA. 
The need to rapidly acquire external knowledge in support of rapid internationalization 
was a theme common to all the high-tech cases, with the rapid pace of change in the 
product markets involved
133
 being a particular driver of the establishment and nurturing 
of close relationships with distant clients and partners.   
Experiences of local partnerships  
At start-up, all the high tech companies were restricted by the small domestic market 
and customers’ limited purchasing power following the global economic crisis.  
Portugal had no ICT or biotech clusters by the nineties, or significant domestic markets 
for high-tech products. YDreams and Altitude for example, experienced particular 
difficulties in their experiences of partnership with knowledge centres, such as 
universities, due to divergent expectations in relation to goals such as return of 
investment (ROI) and a lack of effective institutional coordination in common projects. 
Also, Bioalvo had to first develop partnerships and gain reputation at an international 
level before it could access local partners.   
The difficulties experienced in finding domestic partners and establishing effective 
relationships spurred efforts to seek such relationships at an international level and 
selectively target specific business niches and clients. The selected products developed 
in-house (e.g. basic integrative biotech ingredients) were nurtured in the light of close 
understanding of client needs and technology. Furthermore, the examined high-tech 
firms chose to go into partnership with large and wealthy companies to better access the 
needed capital, knowledge and clients.  
The peripheral location of Portugal was experienced as a constraint in terms of 
developing relationships with international actors. Altitude, for example, complained 
about being distant from the principal telecommunication industry, located in northern 
Europe, which influenced its decision to acquire a Swedish venture.  Although within a 
digital/networked economy, the importance of geographical proximity to partners and 
clients was emphasised by interviewees in these cases. 
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 E.g. in terms of the short life cycles of technology and products in the ICT sectors 
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Investment needs and accessing long-term venture capital  
High-tech firms are generally very demanding in terms of long term ‘patient’ 
investment due to the R&D intensive nature of their products and the long lead times 
involved.  Of the Portuguese cases examined here only NFive, a software developer, 
was self-funded. As they internationalized and competition intensified, all companies 
experienced difficulty in accessing funding suitable to the prolonged ROI of ICT and 
biotech activities.  Domestic sources of venture capital are scarce, and the few venture 
capitalists that there are prefer to invest in traditional and less risky businesses, such as 
cork and wine. 
Some domestic investors were inclined to support high-tech businesses but were 
unwilling to wait 20 years or more to recover their investment, as can be the case for 
biotech products, or to invest large amounts of initial capital in risky ICT products. 
Although European strategic reference framework funds (QREN) are aimed at 
supporting high-tech sectors, the application process was experienced as highly 
bureaucratic in its requirements and unconducive to business-opportunity time frames. 
The traditional bank loans were also unsympathetic and unable to respond to firms’ 
long-term R&D planning and ROI expectations.  
As a result, high tech companies were hampered by inadequate domestic funding 
sources and opportunities for shareholding. Most therefore opted to reduce what 
domestic shareholding they had and shift towards international funding sources. 
Biotecnol, for example, chose foreign shareholders that were able to provide appropriate 
amounts of long term capital and were better suited to the firm’s strategic plan to enter 
new markets. 
Financial constraints were also addressed by developing new services, licensing 
technology through international partnerships and reducing the costs associated with 
non-R&D personnel. The biotech companies, for example, provided services (e.g. 
consultancy, testing) in order to achieve additional revenues, while developing their 
own products in the meantime. ICT firms were able to outsource expensive sales and 
marketing efforts to local partners.  
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Experiences of public support  
As previously noted, all of the cases had sought public support, principally European 
QREN funds, with only the biotech companies (notably Bioalvo) experiencing success 
in this respect. Indeed, only Bioalvo had benefited from public investment and QREN 
European funds since its inception, also experiencing success as part of an R&D project 
consortium targeting other less bureaucratic European financing (from the European 
Commission). Biotecnol, in contrast, although partly benefiting from public 
shareholding, rapidly turned to other international sources of investment that better 
matched its needs.  
All of the cases also reported experiences of excessive and unsympathetic public 
bureaucracy, notably when applying for European funding programmes, institutional aid 
that principally targeted traditional sectors and regions (e.g. the cork and wine sectors), 
regulation that was constantly changing and perceived as unfair (e.g. taxation that did 
not allow exemptions for R&D investments) and public shareholders that were very 
focused in reducing costs, and unwilling to make long-term investments. The biotech 
firms in particular faced a legislative framework for regulating patents that was 
experienced as excessively bureaucratic (e.g. the pay out on patents being classified as 
costs, instead of investment). 
There was also a lack of government support in relation to the process of 
internationalisation (e.g. from AICEP) – a key challenge for all of the cases. There was 
therefore a need to rely heavily on internal knowledge and capabilities, supplemented 
by external knowledge gathered through collaborative partnerships. Only NFive 
evidenced a total reliance on its owner-manager, disregarding the available public aid 
because of their perception of its ineffectiveness and requirements that were felt to be 
unreasonable (e.g. the stipulation to present their software at an international fair in the 
Portuguese language). These issues relating to the availability and effectiveness of 
public support further compelled the examined companies to look further afield for 
much needed resources and support.    
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Summary  
The analysis supports the conclusions of other studies (e.g. Capaldo and Fontes, 2001) 
which have highlighted the weaknesses of the Portuguese context and the limited ability 
of its institutions to promote economic developments through supportive innovation 
policies, appropriate to breed growth-oriented ventures. More positively, there is also 
evidence of the importance of skilled R&D staff and knowledge transfer from academia. 
The firms did demonstrate entrepreneurial capability, irrespective of the lack of spatial 
economic concentration and the institutional and cultural characteristics seen as 
constituting an effective ‘innovation milieu’.  Hence innovation and growth has been 
dependent on firms’ abilities to learn how to transcend the limitations of their domestic 
context. The learning processes involved are further examined below.  
6.3. Learning processes in high-tech firms – cross case analysis 
Introduction  
All the firms examined took the strategic decision to internationalize early on, in 
response to domestic constraints and in order to achieve proximity to crucial markets. 
They predominantly learned through interactions with external actors and sources of 
knowledge, with their owner-managers often playing a central role.   
The owner-managers, because of their strategic importance in triggering new changes, 
were also pivotal on occasions when there was a need to address fresh challenges and 
opportunities. Planning was central in high-tech companies, irrespective of their size 
and age, given the biotech industry dependence on long-term investment and the ICT 
industry reliance on long-term partnerships. 
A major early challenge for most of the high-tech cases was their lack of understanding 
of key international markets.  They approached this problem in a sporadic fashion, often 
recruiting external expertise or consultancy firms. With regard to the generation of new 
products and processes through improvisation, there were only two cases of this, both 
ICT companies.  Significantly, the Portuguese government was an early funder in the 
biotech companies (e.g. 28% in the Biotecnol start-up phase), given the shortage of 
private sources willing to finance projects with highly uncertain returns and to be 
realized over long time horizons. 
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Explorative learning was mostly led by owner-managers to gain business knowledge 
and to inform strategic changes at a wide inter-organisational scope. In addition, the 
skills of their R&D were improved on an ongoing basis through learning by doing 
rather than formal training initiatives.  
In many of the cases the owner-managers played a leading role in directing the R&D 
process but with little involvement in other aspects of the business, except in smaller 
companies such as Biotecnol or NFive where owner-managers were more directly 
involved in other main functions as well as R&D. Although they were key knowledge 
absorbers, the companies’ responses were also based on firms’ R&D knowledge. In the 
ICT companies, the owner-managers and R&D teams were highly externally oriented. 
Conversely, in the biotech firms, the owner-managers appeared to be less externally-
oriented and more internally focused. These companies absorbed external knowledge 
relevant to the application of their core capabilities, but without risking the R&D 
investment by revealing internal core capabilities to be licensed. Differing industry 
environments therefore tended to trigger different learning configurations in support of 
different entrepreneurial capabilities and degrees of ‘openness’ in terms of innovation.  
High-tech firms – Learning processes 
Table 6.2 shows the key learning processes of the high-tech companies, as identified 
from the interview evidence, and the scope or different scales of these processes – i.e. 
the learning scope. The rationale for the division between frequent and occasional 
learning modes is based on the observed frequency of such learning modes. These firms 
rarely combined vocational training (only evidenced in Bioalvo), acquisition of external 
expertise, the improvising of new products and processes, the imitation of competitors 
(only evidenced in YDreams), and the learning of new methods of learning with their 
recurrent learning processes. Learning processes that only occurred occasionally (in just 
two ICT companies - YDreams and NFive) were improvisation, acquisition of expertise,  
and learning new ways of learning by occasional strategic restructuring.  
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Table 6.2 High-tech firms – learning processes and their relative importance (frequent and 
occasional) 
* Relative 
importance 
Learning 
modes 
Knowledge Learning scope 
Frequent 
‘By doing’; 
R&D and 
Business 
Internal team; 
management team 
Networking; 
R&D (ICT), 
Business 
Internal team; 
management team; 
partners; clients; 
Searching; 
R&D, 
Business 
Management team 
Planning  
R&D, 
Business 
Internal team; 
management team, 
partners (ICT)  
Occasional 
‘Grafting’  R&D, Business 
Management team, partners, 
clients 
Improvisation R&D, Business 
Internal team; management 
team 
Learning to learn R&D, Business 
Internal team; management 
team 
Imitation  R&D, Business Management team 
Training  R&D, Business 
Internal team; management 
team 
* Frequent (bold) and occasional learning processes – relative importance based on evidence from five high tech 
cases  
Exploitative learning (‘by doing’) and exploratory and external interaction (by 
networking and searching) were particularly central to these companies; as also was 
planning activity in order to set business goals. On the other hand, exploratory activities 
in terms of the acquisition of external expertise (‘grafting’), improvising new products 
and learning fresh ways to approach change, was more intermittent and usually 
prompted by unexpected challenges and the need for a new approach.  
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Most firms combined internal experiential learning, with modes of acquiring external 
and complementary knowledge (e.g. by networking). ICT companies exhibited, 
however, greater learning intensity than did the biotech companies, as reflected in 
partnerships to co-develop global products and consequent more intense inter-
organizational learning and regular R&D networking. The biotech firms, on the other 
hand, tended to focus on the in-house development of specific products for client 
applications. YDreams, for example, spun out a related firm, Audience Entertainment, 
which emerged from an initial alliance with a US partner, following close inter-
organizational planning and great ‘openness’ in terms of innovation procedures.  
Conversely, Biotecnol started up as a service provider and later focused on the 
development of its core patented microbial technology and only later (in 2005) engaged 
in collaborative R&D with other partners.  
Learning ‘by doing’  
These companies learnt experientially, exploiting existing routine knowledge, both at 
the R&D and business knowledge levels (e.g. with the latter including regulatory and 
tax related issues).  These firms were founded and owned by technologists that searched 
for related R&D knowledge, and were based around longstanding teams and patented 
knowledge. Their core capabilities were therefore R&D related in nature; whereas other 
organisational functions (e.g. marketing) were often outsourced (e.g. NFive and 
Altitude outsourced marketing and sales to local agents). Innovation activity in all of the 
high-tech cases was focused on developing applications of their core technology for 
highly specialised market niches. YDreams developed a strategic business unit (YLabs) 
that represented its innovation division, continuously creating new software (some 
never reached the market), based on the firm’s core technology (augmented reality).  
Similarly, biotech companies made continuous improvements to match their basic 
technology to different client applications downstream.  
Networking and partnerships 
All high-tech companies were focused on developing products targeted at global 
markets and involving rapid technological change. ICT and biotech sectors both relied 
heavily on networking and firms’ ability to develop partnerships with clients and other 
key global actors within sectors evolving towards increasing vertical integration, often 
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in the form of acquisitions and alliances. Networking at an international level was 
paramount for these firms to gain proximity to important markets and potential partners. 
All companies had been engaged since their start-up in collaborative relationships, often 
on a long-term basis and involving trusted international partners, and which had been 
established as a result of their searching and networking activity. In a number of cases 
(e.g. YDreams, Altitude) project consortiums had involved close collaboration in R&D, 
often over a number of years, with conjoint planning of R&D and commercial 
functions. YDreams, for example, created a collaborative network for developing 
innovative products with the AR Consortium, resulting in various new  partner 
companies being spun out in order to more fully exploit the resulting R&D outputs and 
the commercial opportunities involved (e.g. Audience Entertainment). The company 
participated in several long-term and highly demanding projects, involving a high level 
of inter-organizational planning and frequent meetings with a range of partners, 
mentors, and clients (e.g. including such high profile organisation as Dell and 
Microsoft).  
Similarly, the biotech companies were particularly reliant on their ability to build links 
with resources that were relatively ‘distant’, including in geographic terms. Distant 
networking was carried out to address their main problems, and principally to attract 
international investment and to license their intellectual property. Biotecnol, for 
example, attracted US investment from JP Morgan, while Bioalvo collaborated with 
large pharmaceuticals groups and engaged in international university networks (e.g. 
UTEN) in order to help commercialize its products. All high-tech companies were 
engaged in high levels of networking activity and partnership working in order to access 
and take advantage of distant resources and to inform their strategic planning. 
Searching  
Searching for new clients, investment sources and partners became a constant among 
these firms with their increasing internationalization. The task of searching for new 
opportunities was almost entirely carried out by the owner-managers i.e. by personally 
approaching potential investors / partners, and recruiting new international staff with the 
international business expertise needed to complement their technological strengths. In 
addition, they had to deal with daily operational issues, either business, or R&D-related, 
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including applying for project investment and dealing with the direct effects of the 
economic crisis. NFive’s owner-manager, for example, stated that he had to deal with a 
considerable number of operational issues (e.g. frequent change of tax regulation).  
A common theme to emerge from the interviews was the need for owner-managers to 
be constantly aware and to proactively sense and select information on new 
developments and opportunities in order to keep abreast of a rapidly evolving context. 
In Altitude, for example, the owner-manager searched hundreds of potential clients and 
held regular meetings with clients and commercial partners. Bioalvo’s owner-manager 
observed partners’ best practices and met with clients to discover how to fulfil market 
demands. The importance attached to the need to absorb knowledge from external 
sources is also reflected in the frequency with which managers with international 
experience were recruited (e.g. in YDreams, Altitude and the biotech cases). 
Planning 
Formal planning of business goals was a crucial activity to these firms, in order to 
address the changing demands of growth and increasing internationalization. The 
complexities associated with spin-outs, attaining and supervising distant partnerships, 
and acquiring investment and external expertise, required the  setting of detailed 
business goals in order to realise opportunities and synchronise resources over time. 
Formal planning was the norm in high-tech companies and was often informed by the 
inter-organizational learning and high levels of interaction with clients, consultants and 
(less often) universities. YDreams, for example, planned for the long-term following the 
advice of its larger partners (e.g. Dell) and consultants (e.g. Netscape, Lloyds, and 
Apple).  
Formal planning was found to be a collective and inter-organizational process in high-
tech companies, which depended strongly on R&D staff and on external shareholding. 
In this way, high tech firms nurture and integrate their entrepreneurial capability from 
different and complementary views, other than the top management team. In Altitude, 
for example, the process sought to include the views of staff at lower levels and was 
supported by a well-systematized knowledge management system. Likewise, the 
biotech companies attached great importance to careful planning, given that there was 
no room for error in accomplishing partners’ requirements in terms of long-term ROI 
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and licensing of its core technology. Biotecnol for example, planned to anticipate the 
increasing needs of its market, establish the right financing schedule, and ensure 
strategic control.  
 Acquisition of new knowledge / expertise by recruitment (‘grafting’) 
Most high-tech companies, being highly systematized and heavily reliant on 
international networking, drew upon external expertise in order to obtain closeness to 
international markets.  Significantly, the biotech companies were less willing to commit 
resources to the acquisition of external ‘grafted’ knowledge, which may be a reflection 
of their being more financially constrained than the ICT firms and, as a relatively young 
Portuguese industry, a lack of consultants able to deal with the specialised products 
involved. 
The acquisition of external expertise was combined with firms’ searching and 
networking activities to realise opportunities and nurture the capabilities needed in order 
to be able to respond in time. In general, the high-tech firms tended to acquire external 
expertise after their previous approaches to searching and networking for relevant 
knowledge (e.g. marketing and sales capabilities) were found to be inadequate to keep 
up with the rapid pace of change in product markets. YDreams, for example, while 
networking worldwide, hired a Finnish manager from Nokia to address its lack of 
international marketing capacity and, at the same time, recruited US managers to work 
on its behalf (e.g. Nation Cinemedia). Such new acquisitions enabled the company to 
rapidly access business knowledge and proximity to important markets that were very 
demanding in terms of technical sophistication. Similarly, Altitude recruited a new 
manager, who restructured the company and successfully recruited local commercial 
staff that allowed greater responsiveness to better fulfilling clients’ needs.  However, 
such appointments often proved insufficient to manage international activities from a 
peripheral location and some companies therefore chose to establish headquarters 
abroad in order to achieve this.  
Improvisation 
The evidence suggests that high-tech companies, while assimilating external knowledge 
from different views and further planning and integrating it internally into a distinctive 
entrepreneurial capability, seldom created new products in real time, extemporaneously 
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(Moorman and Miner, 1998). The huge amounts of investment involved in new 
products and the accurate planning and highly demanding shareholders/clients left little 
room for improvising new products and processes at the R&D level. In the biotech 
sector, for example, exacting plans are followed in terms of investment and R&D 
testing and protocol.  
Nevertheless, there were some occasional instances where owner-managers and R&D 
teams had rapidly improvised new product solutions  through brainstorming sessions, in 
which acquired business knowledge and internal R&D capabilities were combined. 
YDreams for example, improvised new processes by collectively changing contracts 
already formed that were found unfeasible and had to be stopped, whereas NFive, 
improvised through ‘brainstorming’ sessions on interesting ideas about software’s 
functionalities externally acquired by the owner-manager.  
Learning new ways of learning 
Changes of a strategic and structural nature can require transformative capabilities and 
new ways of learning. The concept of ‘learning how to learn’ captures the notion of a 
transformative process in which basic assumptions (e.g. what product to what markets) 
are reconstructed, often in response to a crisis (Argyris and Schon, 1978). The ICT 
companies, due to their regular structural and strategic changes, exhibited such 
explorative behaviour more often in pursuing novelty. Indeed, most of the ICT firms 
were found to have implemented major strategic changes and initiatives with some 
degree of frequency, resulting in the diversification of their businesses,  restructuring 
the organisation (i.e. in terms of function/design  and staff roles), developing 
collaborative products in partnership, acquiring  other companies (e.g. Altitude) and 
creating spin-outs. NFive, for example, started up as a result of an international 
partnership, opened international offices, downsized businesses, developed new 
products, and franchised the business to others. The generation of novelty was often 
dependent on new ways of learning - e.g. how to share knowledge within international 
partnerships, interact with major distributors, or integrate existing technology into 
innovative products.  
Conversely, the interviews with biotech owner-managers revealed less of a propensity 
to engage in radical change. When there was evidence of learning new ways of learning 
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this it appeared to have been triggered principally by their long term investment needs. 
Unlike the ICT cases, there were few examples of biotech firms diversifying, and 
creating spin-outs. Biotecnol, for instance, restructured its strategy only on one occasion 
(by changing its shareholding) and created only one spin-out (a Portuguese subsidiary), 
whereas YDreams span out five new companies. The distinct techno-economic life 
cycles involved (see section 6.2) and dependence on scarce long term investment 
sources (‘patient capital’) help to explain why biotech companies exhibit greater 
continuity and stability in their strategies and growth patterns, rarely engaging in more 
radical change involving  new paths to opportunity realisation.  
The accounts of the high-tech owner-managers indicate that they played a key role in 
promoting firms’ entrepreneurial capabilities, i.e. by promoting knowledge exchange 
and learning both within their organizations and through interactions with external 
stakeholders, searching for opportunities and acquiring new knowledge and expertise. 
They also took actions following routine procedures, formally planning and improvising 
new products and processes, therefore bridging external and internal knowledge in order 
to shape opportunities and the various capabilities needed.  
The owner-managers were highly engaged, at inter-organizational level, with partners, 
consultants, clients, as well as internal actors, thus establishing a key dimension of 
firms’ entrepreneurial capabilities. Altitude’s owner-manager, for example, brought 
international experience and related networking capacity to the firm. As a result, new 
clients were attained and new procedures in terms of knowledge management were 
introduced, contributing to the firm’s high service level, reputation and ISO 
certifications. Biotecnol’s owner-manager had particular competencies in addressing 
regulatory requirements and issues related to access to finance, including international 
sources.  
Summary  
The high-tech companies demonstrated high levels of variety and  intensity in their 
learning processes, combining both explorative behaviours (i.e. learning by networking 
with stakeholders, searching for new clients/partners and formal planning of business 
goals) and also exploitative behaviours (i.e. learning ‘by doing’ focused on existing 
routines, technology and the efficiency of their core and longstanding R&D teams). The 
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knowledge-intensive and globalised nature of their products and related markets 
compelled them to engage in explorative high level learning leading towards the 
generation of novelty and to transcend their established organizational routines and 
‘theory in use’ (Argyris and Schon, 1978).  
For most of these cases, internationalization has been an ongoing process since their 
start-up, including the nurturing of international partnerships, co-development of 
products in the long-term, and the frequent introduction of products/services with a 
short life cycle. In this way, they tend to regularly coordinate the daily exploitation of 
efficiency-related action, ‘by doing’, with intermittent exploratory action, involving 
external actors, and the acquisition of new business knowledge, thus demonstrating a 
wide innovation scope and entrepreneurial capability. These firms networked constantly 
to maintain closeness to important markets, searched for new opportunities and market 
trends, and planned inter-organizationally with partners, clients and shareholders in 
order to ensure an effective ROI. Planning activity was also important in terms of 
combining external business knowledge with internal R&D knowledge - a key 
entrepreneurial capability of these firms. 
All of the high-tech cases were found to have made significant changes involving their 
organisational structures and/or strategy at least once in their lifetimes.  However, the 
ICT companies were found to have most frequently engaged in new learning 
approaches and structural/organisational change, as particularly driven by the high rate 
of change and innovation in their product markets.   
Forms of learning that were less evident included ‘grafting’ (i.e. the recruitment of new 
external expertise), improvising new products/processes, training staff and imitation of 
competitors. Imitation procedures, for instance, were hardly evidenced as both ICT and 
biotech products had proprietary rights. Also, there was little evidence of trial and error 
experimentation, which may be related to the high risk and investment-demanding 
nature of both ICT and biotech sectors.   
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6.4. Learning outcomes in high-tech firms – cross-case analysis 
Introduction  
The evidenced outcomes were principally related to the effective re-combination of core 
capabilities in ways that enabled growth through diversification of products and 
business streams (e.g. through combining different technologies), the achievement of a 
scientific reputation from universities and prestigious partnerships, and the increasing 
specialization, thereby improving efficiency. Also, the ability to secure new strategic 
investment sources constituted an important capability.  
Different learning configurations led to different outcomes. Networking with (potential) 
clients and other external innovation actors led to new capabilities in nurturing and 
maintaining partnerships, and enabled firms to apply and integrate upstream R&D 
capabilities in diverse client sectors. Networking was also important in relation to 
international business communication and identifying new opportunities and knowledge 
resources. Simultaneously, increased experience in international partnerships 
contributed to the growing reputation of many of these cases, ensuing spin-outs, and 
customized approaches that, overall, constituted important competitive advantages.   
Finally, incremental improvements, driven by efficiency considerations and learning by 
doing within R&D led to increased capabilities and specialization, with ensuing 
reputation and certification. The concept of learning new ways of better learning, 
particularly in dealing with strategic change related with the development of new 
products/services. 
Learning outcomes  
Table 6.3 shows the principal capabilities and competitive advantages resulting from the 
identified learning processes. As previously argued, different learning outcomes and 
capability sets emerge as a result of the interplay between firms’ knowledge bases, 
entrepreneurial initiatives and organisational learning in response to varied contextual 
challenges and learning triggers. 
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Table 6.3 High-tech firms – principal learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage  
Integrative product / solutions; 
Strategic flexibility; 
Improved international networking and business 
knowledge; 
Improved R&D processes; 
New integrative platforms able to integrate distinct 
functions / technologies; 
Specialized spin outs / strategic diversity;; 
Enhanced reputation and brand awareness; 
Proximity to important US markets. 
Investment capacity;  
Continuously improved R&D capacity, quality control 
and certification; 
Organisational improvement; 
 
Integrative product / solutions  
The examined companies were able, through inter-organizational learning (e.g. 
planning, searching, networking), to build integrative solutions by combining internal 
capabilities with complementary client technology and thus, to fulfil different needs. In 
the biotech companies, for instance, common bio ingredients were customised for 
diverse client applications whilst in the ICTs general platforms were adjusted to match 
different client technologies.  
Strategic flexibility 
External inter-organizational learning led to business diversification and varied spin-
outs. In Biotecnol, for example, acquiring external expertise was crucial to regain 
strategic flexibility and to attain new international investment sources.   
Improved international networking and business knowledge 
Attaining the business knowledge needed to operate in international contexts was a 
major outcome and addition to the firms’ knowledge base in many cases. Specifically, 
the activities of selling services (biotech), developing products in partnership (ICT), 
participating in industry seminars and conferences, and recruiting external expertise, 
added important international business knowledge that became crucial to mitigate the 
firms’ peripheral context and improve access to investment sources. These companies 
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were able to enhance their reputation at an international level and increase brand 
awareness worldwide. 
Improved R&D processes 
These firms’ R&D teams became specialized in distinct processes, with ensuing quality 
control and inherent certifications. The biotech companies for example, due to their 
experience in services provision (e.g. testing), attained increasing control whilst 
Altitude became ISO certified with regard to organisational processes such as its 
knowledge management system. 
Summary 
The outcomes identified in the high-tech cases were often of a structural nature 
involving significant strategic changes, as demonstrated through firms’ acquisitions, 
spin-outs and locating headquarters near important foreign markets.  These outcomes 
support that successful high-tech firms exhibit a high degree of integration between 
various capabilities that constitute their overall entrepreneurial capability.  
6.5. Knowledge base, learning triggers and responses at traditional 
manufacturing firms – cross-case analysis 
Introduction  
The traditional manufacturing firms examined were from the Portuguese cork, moulds, 
footwear and wine industries, each of which faced different threats and opportunities. 
The analysis here seeks to distinguish the knowledge bases, different learning triggers 
and subsequent responses within this group of firms. Table 6.4 summarises the main 
findings. 
As with the hi-tech cases, the traditional firms experienced a number of shortcomings in 
relation to their domestic and industrial contexts, notably inefficient bureaucracy with 
regard to accessing public support, a persistent credit shortage, and other regulatory 
barriers. All of the companies studied were able to internationalize and until recently 
were viable growth-oriented firms, succeeding, despite the limitations and barriers 
posed by their domestic contexts. 
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Other industry-related constraints experienced related to the domestic difficulty in 
engaging in partnerships and a related lack of trust between competitors. The traditional 
cases tended to prioritise investments in support of improving and expanding 
production, while also seeking public aid in support of their efforts to internationalise. 
These traditional firms were found to be strongly reliant on their in-house production 
capacities and on the prior industry experience and entrepreneurial learning of their 
owner-managers.   
These firms tended to be production and marketing-oriented and managed at an intra-
firm, intra-top management scale. The firms responded principally to competitive 
triggers rather than taking a more strategic perspective. The concern to keep the firm 
small and manageable and to maintain their core management team and operational 
staff were evident. Some were family owned (e.g. Pelcor and Moldene), which partly 
explains the continuity of their owner-managers within senior management teams. Other 
companies were embedded within their local sector clusters of moulds and footwear 
(Moldene and SOMarques respectively). 
In general, the firms studied did not seek to acquire relevant international business 
knowledge which they clearly needed, preferring instead to rely on their existing 
knowledge and capabilities. They also tended to rely on the association between their 
products and Portugal’s traditional image and location rather than moving abroad.  
Initial knowledge base  
In contrast to the high tech cases, the traditional firms were often late to 
internationalize. The firms’ core knowledge base was largely built on the prior 
experience of their management teams in their domestic industries. Pelcor’s owner-
manager, for example, had in-depth industry and firm knowledge derived from previous 
experience of wine stoppers, while ACSMV’s owner-manager also had a considerable 
entrepreneurial track record in the industry. Such previous business knowledge was 
paramount to tackling domestic barriers and entering new international markets e.g. in 
dealing with the application procedure for public funding (experienced by many 
businesses as difficult and excessively bureaucratic) in Pelcor and ACSMV, or in 
establishing important new partnerships with local distributors in culturally similar 
overseas markets.  
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Final knowledge base 
Over the period of study, all of these companies exhibited changes in their initial 
knowledge base as they internationalized and restructured to target new businesses. 
Specifically, they improved their knowledge base in design (R&D) in response to 
international demand, and enhanced their international business knowledge as they 
attained more distant international clients and engaged in new partnerships. Indeed by 
2013 Pelcor, for example, had gained a number of reputable fashion clients, recruited a 
well-known designer, merged to gain production capacity and intensified its presence 
overseas. Similarly, Moldene had improved its design capability in order to be more 
responsive to the needs of its automotive clients and had diversified into plastic 
moulding technology.  
Learning triggers and responses  
The evidence shows how firms’ responses to challenges and constraints were strongly 
shaped by their prior experiences. With the exception of Pelcor, which had a significant 
presence in the domestic market (and has increasingly internationalized), most 
companies pursued internationalisation in order to survive and overcome the limitations 
of domestic markets and other constraints related to the economic crisis and/or the lack 
of a sufficiently supportive local context.  
Table 6.4 Learning triggers and responses at traditional companies 
Constraints experienced Responses 
Economic crisis; 
Small market size and competitive 
intensity; 
Difficult domestic partnerships; 
Difficulty in accessing funding,  
Lack of public support in terms of 
internationalization; 
Geographic peripheral location. 
Internationalize to market niches; 
Domestic partnership only at non-core production level and 
international commercial partnerships with distributors; 
Self-funding and apply for European funding programmes; 
Rely on internal business and R&D resources; 
Invest on design functions, attractive payment conditions and 
small tailored product series; 
Augment marketing efforts and resort to public aid in 
internationalizing (only available in some sectors). 
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Limited domestic markets 
Interviewees highlighted the small size of their domestic markets as a significant 
restriction on growth, being characterised by little purchasing power for quality/high 
standard products, intense price competition, and the increasing penetration of cheaper 
foreign goods (principally from the Far East). This was a key issue that compelled these 
firms to internationalize. Pelcor sought high standard markets that could afford its 
quality luxury product, whereas the other companies internationalised simply in order to 
survive. Moldene, for example, although part of an important Portuguese mould cluster, 
had only one domestic client and became increasingly internationalised during the 
period of this study. The same happened with SOMarques that exported most of its 
production to European markets, and ACSMV that was seeking new clients overseas at 
the time of the last interview (28 December 2011).  
Public support and regulation  
The lack of effective public support and experiences of excessive bureaucracy and 
inefficient regulation were also contributory factors in growth-oriented traditional 
companies’ drive to internationalize. In SOMarques, the bureaucracy experienced in 
accessing QREN funds that required numerous authorizations, the excessive regulation 
regarding taxing (e.g. VAT) and frequent changes to the legal framework (i.e. in terms 
of labour issues) were described as posing serious difficulties for this business. 
Moreover, the lack of public support specifically designed for distinct sectors, 
compelled these firms to rely exclusively on their owner-managers’ experience and 
efforts. Conversely, in two favoured sectors, the cork and wine cases, public aid proved 
to be decisive in the decision to internationalize, by exporting under the assistance of a 
trading institution (AICEP) and QREN funds.  
Finance  
Most companies relied principally on their self-funding capacity and, therefore, access 
to finance was not considered a critical issue. There has been a general credit shortage 
within Portugal, with some firms experiencing trouble in recovering payments from 
large customers and in maintaining their working capital level (e.g. as in the case of 
ACSMV).  In response to this, firms have been relying more heavily on self-funding 
and/or the pursuit of international markets and more reliable customers in order to 
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achieve better payment conditions.  Moreover, as late internationalizers, the traditional 
cases were constrained in terms of resource endowments which could be committed to 
much-needed investment in R&D and new productive capacity. Moldene and 
SOMarques, for example, experienced shortfalls in the production capacity needed to 
meet mass market demands early on and therefore chose to focus on customised 
products for small market niches.  
Domestic partnerships  
The traditional companies exhibited a general reluctance to engage in collaborative 
partnerships with other companies, which increased their difficulties in finding 
appropriate market partners, or accessing a suitable distribution channel abroad. They 
relied heavily on their in-house capabilities in terms of design, management and 
production capacity and only occasionally engaged in informal production and 
commercial partnerships in order to respond to peaks of increased demand.   
The unwillingness to participate in collaborative partnerships appeared to be due to a 
combination of factors, including the lack of trust between firms, with their focus on 
maintaining their existing clients, protecting their core capabilities and competitive 
advantage. Pelcor’s owner-manager, for example, expressed his concern about the risk 
of being imitated by competitors; Moldene were reluctant to risk divulging their 
particular core capabilities in terms of mould accuracy; SOMarques and ACSMV were 
concerned about losing clients to competitors. At the same time, the ‘structural’ drivers 
of collaborative R&D found in the high-tech cases – i.e. including rapidly evolving 
technology/ product markets, the more hybrid and ‘open’ nature of the firm cultures 
involved - were much less apparent in the traditional cases.  Significantly, both Moldene 
and SOMarques, although part of the Portuguese clusters of moulds and footwear, only 
contracted production capacity intermittently, through sporadic projects.        
Competitive intensity  
Increased competition constituted a substantial impetus that forced these companies to 
improve their performance in terms of productivity, quality, costs, operations, and 
delivery time. The delocalization of industries to the East, in pursuit of cheaper labour, 
also triggered changes in the mould and shoe industries, which had previously been 
extremely reliant on low prices. For instance, the increasing domestic competition faced 
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by ACSMV compelled it to augment its productive capacity and marketing efforts, 
while the growing imitation of Pelcor’s products forced it to differentiate in terms of 
quality and internationalize to niche markets.  
The competitive issue worsened with the increasing economic crisis that further 
compelled firms to internationalize in order to gain larger markets and customers with 
greater purchasing power. SOMarques, for example, targeted large and wealthy 
distributors (e.g. in the UK), while Pelcor targeted fashion and luxury client sectors that 
were very limited within Portugal. The economic crisis also worsened the difficulties 
experienced in collecting payments as formally contracted with customers; hence 
internationalisation was motivated in part by the quest for more reliable customers and 
better payment conditions.  
Peripheral location 
The difficulty in promoting the companies abroad, due to their geographic location, was 
mentioned as another major barrier to international development. Moldene, for example, 
had few Portuguese partners and preferred to restrict its development of new 
technologies to in-house R&D activity. ACSMV exported principally to Portuguese-
speaking countries because different cultures and languages in particular were 
experienced as significant constraints on their ability to internationalize.   
Summary  
These companies operated within industries characterised by little public support, a 
tendency to be self-reliant in terms of finance, and a heavy reliance on the experience of 
owner-managers. The existence of a common environment (e.g. institutional, legal and 
competitive) affecting many aspects of firms’ learning behaviour, reinforced a tendency 
for firms to adopt similar approaches and products. They may try to change 
continuously, but, the aggregate effect of firm’s individual change is to reduce the 
extent of diversity among them through a process of homogenization or isomorphism. 
Thus a particular firm is pushed to resemble others that face the same set of 
environmental constraints, in which imitation of competition plays a role. In fact, the 
uncertainty about international markets and ambiguous business goals in the absence of 
long term planning encouraged most of these owner-managers (e.g. Pelcor, SOMarques, 
ACSMV) to seek models from other successful competitors, increasing firms’ 
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homogeneity. Pelcor and SOMarques, for example, emphasized the need to build on 
fashionable models whilst ACSMV underlined the great homogeneity between wines 
from competitors, in which only marketing efforts made a difference. These isomorphic 
pressures and the nature of product markets reduce likelihood of firms engaging in 
radical innovation. In this way, they responded to competitive triggers principally 
through incremental and tactical market moves rather than by abrupt strategic shifts. 
Design and occasional production enhancement through partnership were considered 
key to differentiate products and target different market needs, and particularly so given 
firms’ limited resources.  
Peripheral location and domestic markets that were saturated and highly competitive 
were therefore crucial learning triggers that compelled firms to target distinct 
international markets.  High service levels in terms of design accuracy, payment 
conditions and on-time delivery was paramount to meeting the demands of the targeted 
European markets.   
6.6. Learning processes in traditional manufacturing firms – cross case 
analysis  
Introduction   
All four of the traditional manufacturing cases were characterised by their close client 
relations – a factor identified in previous studies as associated with SME growth. The 
approach to clients was found to be particularly dependent on the experience of owner-
managers’, with this being centred in the top management team.  
Learning processes in these firms were shown to be mostly focused on incremental 
improvements to their existing products and processes. The owner-managers also 
mentioned that imitation of their competitors was an important activity in order to 
benchmark fashion trends and adapt firms’ products. Formal partnerships were found to 
be rare and these companies therefore exhibited little evidence of learning by interacting 
with external actors.  
The formal planning of business strategic goals was also rare in these cases, with 
experiential and reactive approaches tending to dominate, and with short-term goals 
being set at top management level, with few inputs from other corporate functions, apart 
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from design. The corporate goals were mostly focused on objectives related to 
production, marketing, and incremental product development, rather than involving 
significant organisational/structural change. These findings are consistent with previous 
literature on high-growth firms which posits that such firms grow organically (BERR, 
2008).  
The learning processes of the traditional cases therefore needs to be understood in 
relation to the dominant role of their founding owner-managers, their relatively 
hierarchical and reactive organisational cultures and their mature and less knowledge 
intensive (compared to the high-tech cases) products. The owner-managers’ experience, 
at the domestic level, was reported by the interviewees to be a core capability, with little 
need for external expertise. Vocational training occurred only in some companies and in 
response to the availability of public funds (i.e. QREN). In general, these companies, 
operating in relatively stable sectors and focused on short-term efficiency, were rarely 
compelled to instigate significant change, for instance in terms of strategic 
repositioning.     
Traditional firms – Learning processes 
This section seeks to explain traditional firms’ learning processes in terms of their scope 
and the different types of knowledge involved.  Table 6.5 summarises the learning 
modes, type of knowledge and scope, dividing these into frequent and occasional 
categories of relative importance for this subset of firms, as derived from the case study 
evidence.  
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Table 6.5 Traditional companies - learning processes and their relative importance 
(frequent and occasional) 
* Relative 
importance 
Learning 
modes 
Knowledge Learning scope 
Frequent 
‘By doing’ 
R&D (production / design), 
Business 
Internal team, 
management team; 
Trial and 
error 
R&D, Business 
Internal team, 
management team; 
Searching Business Management team. 
Occasional 
Networking; 
R&D (production / design) , 
Business 
Management team, partners, 
distributors, clients; 
Imitation; R&D (design), Business Management team; 
Improvisation R&D, Business 
Internal team, management 
team; 
Training  R&D Internal Team. 
* Frequent (bold) and occasional learning processes – relative importance based on evidence from four traditional 
cases  
Learning by doing 
These companies exhibited successive continuous production and design improvements 
in order to better fulfil client demands. Learning processes tended to be limited to the 
core management team, with little evidence of wider organisational learning or creative 
input from the production workforce. They tended not to seek external technical advice 
and preferred to rely on their internal teams, principally at the design level.  Both 
SOMarques and ACSMV’ owner-managers felt that the available consultancy services 
were too expensive and difficult to afford. Moreover, SOMarques’s owner-manager 
claimed that such consultancy services were of little value as they relied on generic 
sectoral knowledge. Such views, although underlining the strong reliance upon internal 
knowledge and relatively ‘closed’ innovation scope, also suggests the potential 
isomorphic influence of  consultancy services that produce similar reports for different 
businesses based on generic knowledge. 
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Product and process developments therefore tended to involve ongoing incremental 
change and the exploitation of existing opportunities, with product development being 
heavily reliant on the experience of longstanding teams. There was little in the way of 
planned formal learning, such as vocational training, and where there had been such 
initiatives these were largely driven by the availability of publicly funded support (e.g. 
Moldene).    
Trial and error 
Business development in three of the four traditional companies (i.e. excepting 
Moldene, a more knowledge intensive company) was found to occur in a relatively 
unsystematic fashion, often in reaction to successive issues relating to competition and 
other challenges. Being largely self-financing further reinforced the tendency for major 
issues to be addressed with little external input. Relatedly, there was little recourse to 
strategic planning and a preference on the part of owner-managers to learn by 
attempting new business opportunities, relying on their previous experience (e.g. in 
prospecting for new clients). Sometimes they succeeded, while on other occasions such 
unplanned business management went wrong. SOMarques, for instance, was faced with 
an unanticipated downturn in sales due to a sudden change in the economic climate, 
whereas Pelcor only discovered new cork skin applications accidentally and has 
experienced frequent failures in its attempts to develop new composite products. 
ACSMV appeared to have based many of its business decisions upon intuitive 
judgments which sometimes resulted in success in gaining new clients in culturally near 
markets, while on other occasions it was unable to address markets with very different 
business practices and cultural traditions, such as China. 
Searching  
The traditional companies tended to acquire external business knowledge through   
search activities that were primarily undertaken by owner-managers, were targeted at 
geographically nearby markets, and involving a decision process that was both less 
professionalized and more top-down compared to the high-tech cases. Clients’ needs 
and preferences were identified through trust-based personal contacts, while offering 
high level services and R&D/design capabilities. SOMarques’s and Pelcor’s owner-
managers, for example, visited clients personally and apprehended fashion trends at 
trade fairs, whereas ACSMV’s travelled overseas to learn about its distributors’ needs. 
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The constant sensing and selection of opportunities also enabled the achievement and 
maintenance of trust-based relationships, notably in the case of Moldene.  
Networking  
These companies needed to network at the business level to achieve stable partnerships 
and enhance their business specialization in a context of peripherality and the related 
difficulty of communicating abroad. However, such networking tended to be 
intermittent and resulted in only a few instances of partnerships that were restricted to 
the business level. They only engaged in networking with respect to product distribution 
and marketing, and also to develop occasional projects conjointly with clients and to 
increase production capacity in response to peaks of demand. For instance, Pelcor’s 
networking activity was focused on marketing, with product development remaining an 
internal process, although it did merge with another business in order to achieve 
additional production capacity. Likewise, product development at SOMarques and 
ACSMV was also an entirely in-house activity as was production, except when 
occasional demand peaks were experienced, with informal production partnerships 
being established to meet these. These companies therefore exhibited relatively closed 
and internalised decision-making process, rarely engaging in joint product development 
with other organisations and only engaging in occasional partnerships. Moldene, the 
most knowledge intensive of the traditional cases, was the exception, being constantly 
engaged in networking to ensure the exact required product and to be able to respond to 
clients’ needs.   
Imitation  
Although some companies emphasised the uniqueness of their products, they also 
engaged in imitation of the products of their competitors on occasion. Such imitation 
usually involved slight product changes to better meet market needs and trends - e.g. a 
tailored shoe, or a specific wine label design. For example, SOMarques’s owner-
manager, conjointly with the company’s designer, adapted the leading fashion trends 
that he observed in Milan or Paris, to create a distinct product.  Pelcor’s owner-manager 
benchmarked fashion trends to inform the development of its exclusive cork 
accessories. These procedures were not identified in the case of Moldene because the 
company provided an inimitable mould, aiming to accomplish a very precise client 
demand, involving a knowledge-intensive process. 
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Improvisation  
The external knowledge collected by the owner-manager tended to be further 
incorporated into organisational R&D and productive knowledge through rapidly 
improvising new products and processes. SOMarques, for instance, in order to respond 
to an emerging trend identified at trade fairs by the owner-manager, rapidly improvised 
a new shoe model conjointly with the design team which incorporated the new features 
into their traditional shoe. Pelcor’s designer, at the owner-manager’s suggestion, 
improvised cork products from accessories from other sectors (e.g. footwear). Design 
teams were therefore central in the process of improvising new products, whereby 
business knowledge was combined with technical expertise in order to succeed in 
highly demanding markets (e.g. fashion). Conversely, Moldene did not engage in such 
improvisation, largely because its products and processes were highly knowledge 
intensive, involving longer lead times and clients’ exacting technical requirements.  
Learning new ways of learning 
The traditional cases rarely engaged in strategic restructuring unless their existence was 
at risk in facing a critical event – a highly infrequent occurrence. For instance, 
Moldene’s investment in a new plastic moulding technology compelled it to reorganise 
and transform its business whilst Pelcor merged to acquire extra production capacity 
which also required changes to its organizational structure. ACSMV, an old company, 
was compelled to internationalize and more recently to acquire additional production 
capacity and improve the qualifications of their team.  Structural changes occurred 
rarely because manufacturing companies operated in relatively stable environments, 
relying principally on efficiency-related learning processes.  
 
Planning  
There was little evidence of formal planning of business goals, with planning in most of 
the cases tending to be short-term and addressing operational issues (e.g. production 
programing). These companies followed a functional structure, in which decision-
making was largely confined to the top management team and implemented in a top 
down fashion. There was little evidence of attempts to promote organizational learning 
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by informing or seeking input from the workforce in relation to the decision-making 
process. SOMarques’s owner-managers for instance, programmed the operations within 
a monthly budget, or within a three month time span, whereas ACSMV’s planned their 
operations annually in order to ensure production capacity and maintain long-term 
clients. Moldene prioritised the detailed planning of its mould parts at the production 
level, in order to fulfil the demands of its existing clients. The dominant management 
approach of these companies was therefore highly marketing-centred and reactive.  
The owner-manager 
The owner-managers of the traditional cases were found to play a key role in terms of 
setting goals and embedding new routines. All of these companies were small (i.e. 
ranging from 5 to 55 employees) and with their learning processes tending to be 
confined to the top management teams and, as previously noted, with little involvement 
of employees in decision making. The owner-manager tended to be the favoured link 
between the business knowledge searched and networked and the firms’ internal 
knowledge. In this way, the entrepreneurial learning of owner-managers was at the 
centre of the learning processes that constituted firms’ entrepreneurial capabilities, 
although the extent of wider organizational learning was much more limited than in the 
high-tech cases. Specifically, owner-managers appeared to be highly participative in 
relation to their design teams (e.g. in creating a new cork accessory, a mould part, or a 
shoe) but played a more individual/hierarchical role when setting business objectives 
with input from other managers, and little external input (e.g. there was no 
shareholding). Although there was some evidence of collective learning, for instance 
when improvising a new product, there was little evidence of more significant and 
transformative organisational change in response to critical learning events.  
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Summary  
The analysis of the traditional cases shows relatively consistent pattern in terms of the 
learning processes involved and the distinctive interplay of internal and external 
influences. The external triggers identified largely related to the increasingly 
competitive nature of their markets, which led to reactive and incremental behaviour, 
notably through incrementally adjusting routine procedures and product design, often 
following the business intuition of owner-managers. On the other hand, inter-
organizational interactions were crucial to gaining external business knowledge (e.g. 
competitive and institutional information), principally through searching (sensing and 
selecting) new opportunities. Newly acquired knowledge (e.g. on fashion trends) was 
occasionally merged with firms’ internal knowledge resulting in a capability based on 
rapidly improvised new products (e.g. a new wine or shoe).  
Finally, networking activity was limited except with respect to the need to keep abreast 
of market and fashion trends, with some sporadic imitation of competitors (e.g. a new 
shoe design) and little formality or inclusivity with respect to planning strategic goals.  
The owner-managers were found to be the key actors in terms of absorbing and 
combining business and technical knowledge to build the firm’s entrepreneurial 
capabilities. 
6.7. Learning outcomes in traditional manufacturing firms – cross case 
analysis 
Introduction  
Traditional companies exhibited much less evidence of outcomes involving significant 
strategic change compared to the high-tech firms, which can be related to their heavy 
reliance on the experience of owner-managers and focus on firms’ in-house 
productive/design capabilities. Most (three out of four) of the traditional cases were 
family owned, with decision making being highly centred on the senior management 
team and favouring  efficiency-driven learning, resulting in incremental product 
changes. 
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Despite the relatively narrow scope of their learning, during the course of this study 
these companies were found to have accumulated important new business knowledge 
and capabilities needed to deal with the international business environment.  
Internal efficiency-related learning enabled continuous product and processes 
improvement while maintaining their established client base, which brought competitive 
advantages. These companies also demonstrated an ability to rapidly improvise new 
products.  
Learning outcomes  
Table 6.6 shows the capabilities and competitive advantages derived from the learning 
processes identified.  
Table 6.6 Traditional firms - Principal learning outcomes 
New capabilities Competitive advantage 
Business capabilities in international marketing / 
networking; 
New production and R&D capabilities;  
Flexible core productive and design capabilities; 
Flexible decision process; 
Small, flexible and manageable structure; 
Diverse and specialized business niches (cork, 
moulds); 
Increased reputation; 
Service level, close market approach and tailored 
products; 
Certification, reputation and client loyalty; 
Increased production capacity and control; 
 
Business capabilities in international marketing and networking  
These companies were initially domestic-oriented and since having internationalized 
following their owner-managers’ searching efforts, have continued to prioritise flexible 
organisational structures, prioritising their design expertise, in order to facilitate their 
ability to respond quickly to different market demands and trends (e.g. Pelcor, 
Moldene). By learning interactively, the companies entered into the more demanding 
international markets. Pelcor’s strong reputation was attained through its marketing 
efforts, including participation at prestigious trade fairs and art museums. Moldene was 
internationally known for its mould precision and responsiveness to different clients in 
the highly demanding automotive sector.   
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Production and R&D capabilities  
These firms developed proximity to the markets and built new design capabilities and 
customized products on the basis their close understanding of evolving clients’ needs. 
Efficiency-related learning allowed for continuous improvement and quality control, 
leading to certification and enhanced production capacities. Pelcor, for example, 
achieved mastery of the production of cork-based accessories and merged with another 
business to further extend its control of the entire quality process. Moldene internalized 
the process of plastic moulding technology in order to control its quality process, 
whereas SOMarques and ACSMV supervised the entire quality process, entering into 
occasional partnerships only when there was a need to augment their productive 
capacity.  
Flexible productive and design capabilities 
Newly achieved capabilities, i.e. in terms of production, customised product designs, 
and complementary technologies, made possible flexible responses to variable demand 
from diverse markets, thus constituting a key competitive advantage. Moldene, for 
example, although a specialist in the automotive sector, had skills to supply the 
aeronautic and domestic client sectors. Pelcor supplied diverse client sectors with 
varying quality requirements, whereas SOMarques was able to address both mid- and 
high-range footwear sectors. These companies generally lacked the production capacity 
needed to operate on a large scale and at an international level, targeting instead 
specialized niche markets.     
Flexible decision-making process  
These firms evidenced greater informality in their approach to management compared 
to the high-tech cases which placed greater reliance on professionalised functions and 
knowledge management systems. The traditional owner-managers met informally and 
frequently shared the gathered knowledge and set goals. In SOMarques, for instance, 
frequent management team meetings were often spontaneously convened to respond to 
emergent needs, opportunities and challenges. Pelcor’s decision-making process was 
more centred on its single owner-manager, supported by a small team. Only Moldene 
demonstrated a more formal organizational structure comprising a number of teams 
focused on different cultural/linguistic markets. Informality allowed for faster and more 
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flexible responses to client needs in sectors such as moulds or footwear, where business 
conditions in terms of fast response and payment make a significant difference.   
Summary  
Learning and capability development in traditional companies has been focused on the 
achievement of competitive advantages principally in terms of international marketing 
and enhanced product design. They were compelled to internationalise and also had to 
improve their efficiency and production capacity, either making additional investments 
or occasionally resorting to partnerships. The nature of their mature markets has 
particularly reinforced a tendency towards reactive, efficiency-driven behaviour and 
gradualistic outcomes. In this way, they were able to attain new capabilities in 
international marketing and networking, although exporting principally to near markets. 
On their way, they improved their design skills to better fulfil these client needs, 
become certified, reputable, augmented their product portfolio and reinforced their 
flexible and informal decision-making process.  
6.8.  Discussion  
This section discusses the learning processes across the two sets of firms, highlighting 
the patterns and variations between them in order to deepen the analysis. This 
discussion relies upon the organisational learning framework; the learning issues faced 
and corresponding responses; and the learning outcomes. The study contributes to 
previous understanding and theory relating to growth-oriented SMEs and their contexts 
(e.g. Katz and Green, 2008) by examining in-depth the characteristics, learning 
behaviours, adaptations and outcomes of a sample of GOFs within Portugal. Figure 6.1 
presents a model of the learning process in in growth-oriented SMEs in 
peripheral/intermediate contexts. 
 
  
Figure 6.1 The learning process and ‘openness’ in terms innovation of growth-oriented SMEs in peripheral/intermediate contexts 
Context: distinct opportunities, markets and partners; limited domestic environment in 
terms of financing, educational level, institutional support, innovation system and 
cooperative culture 
    Organisational learning: 
    Internal core R&D / design  
    capabilities, continuously  
    improved; varying learning  
                intensity dependent  
    on  the  dissemination of  
    entrepreneurial   
    learning.   
•     Level of EC embeddedness 
•     Decentralization 
Entrepreneurial learning: 
Explorative learning (e.g. by searching,  
networking, imitation and 'grafting') -  
mediating firm's openness;  reliant on  
owner managers' teams, key knowledge  
gatekeepers and contributing actors to firms'  
absorptive capacity and openness; distinct role of 
owner manager role in performing and building  
entrepreneurial capabilities 
EC configuration; impact and novelty  
in terms of realization of exploration /  
exploitation of opportunities; level of  
radical change; internationalizing to distant 
 clients;  changing firms’ openness, growth,  
  modes  and learning outcomes (either  
        more formal  and strategic, or more  
           informal and  related with marketing) 
                according to contextual 
                    turbulence and  
                      explorative learning 
 
      Varying intensity of learning processes 
(mode and scope) according to sectoral 
knowledge intensity and complexity;  
diverse interactive learning   between owner 
managers and context in  acquiring  
complementary knowledge  
 
Varying absorptive 
capacities, Entrepreneurial 
Capability and degrees of 
openness according to 
contextual turbulence   
 
Altering depth and frequency of 
external knowledge dissemination 
(e.g. by planning business goals) into 
organisational learning; tension 
between openness and protection of 
firm’s IP and core capabilities; 
Altering depth of Entrepreneurial 
Capability integration,  
 
 
 
 
Contextual triggers – 
opportunities and 
challenges 
 
 
Dissemination of  entrepreneurial capability / knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms’ growth, 
‘openness’ and 
level of change 
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Previous research identifies the firm’s knowledge base as a key resource in driving 
growth,  with the R&D function in particular both creating new knowledge in-house and 
augmenting the absorption and exploitation of external knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1991).Yet, many studies consider the firms’ growth process as a ‘black box’ 
(McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010) and there is still a need to understand the idiosyncratic 
processes by which firms apply new knowledge to achieve their goals in different 
contexts (Sadler-Smith et al., 2001). This research identifies the knowledge bases, 
learning processes and types of knowledge underlying firm growth processes in 
different sector contexts in Portugal. The success of Portuguese high-tech firms is 
shown to be particularly dependent on their R&D capabilities in relation to their 
knowledge-intensive niche products and the international nature of their product 
markets, whereas traditional companies exhibit a stronger domestic industry orientation 
(Table 6.7). Furthermore, high-tech companies were generally founded by and reliant 
on highly qualified individuals with strong academic backgrounds gained at Portuguese 
universities. On the other hand, owner-managers of traditional manufacturers tended to 
be less qualified and more reliant on their prior business experience at the domestic 
level.  
Because of such different histories, the owner-managers of traditional companies had 
different entrepreneurial knowledge and tended to be more focused on operational 
issues than with strategy. Thus, in the absence of high R&D capabilities, their 
entrepreneurial experience appeared to play a significant role in terms of limiting the 
growth potential of these firms. Moreover, all of the firms experienced significant gaps 
in their business knowledge, constituting a major learning constraint. Evidence was 
found in support of the importance of R&D in inducing new knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1991), and of how firms’ knowledge bases have changed over time, often in 
response to increasing internationalisation, with high-tech firms evolving towards more 
complex and ‘open’ R&D approaches whilst manufacturing firms have particularly 
enhanced their international business knowledge (Table 6.7).  
This study has identified the importance and processes of ‘open innovation’ 
(Chesbrough, 2003) in different sectors in a peripheral context. It is important to note, 
however, that innovation processes are generally less open than is suggested by the 
‘open innovation’ concept, given firms’ need to conceal and protect their knowledge 
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from competitors as well as absorbing external knowledge (e.g. Oakey, 2013).  All of 
the companies examined here sought and applied external knowledge that contributed to 
increasing their absorptive capacities, although exhibiting different inter-organisational 
learning scopes and degrees of ‘openness’ in terms of innovation. The cumulative 
acquisition of international knowledge by high tech companies, for instance through 
networking or ‘grafting’ external expertise, augmented their openness in terms of 
innovation by extending the scope of their inter-organisational learning, and sometimes 
boundaries, through spin-outs (YDreams, Biotecnol), important partnerships (Bioalvo, 
Altitude) and new investment sources (Biotecnol).  
In the traditional companies, new international knowledge, attained principally from 
clients and distributors and within a narrower learning scope, contributed to new design 
capabilities and enhanced understanding of their markets
134
 (Table 6.7). Additionally, 
this study evidenced the motivation and actions by which firms sought to protect their 
core capabilities - R&D in high tech and design in the case of manufacturers. All 
companies were very zealous with regard to their core teams and struggled to retain 
their key staff, particularly at the R&D and design level, due to Portugal’s peripheral 
location and remoteness from the key industry actors, as well as the difficulty of 
recruiting a workforce domestically.  
 
 
                                                          
134
 E.g. Pelcor hired an Art Director to address the increasingly important design issues, aiming at also 
increasingly more demanding international clients. 
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Table 6.7 Cross-case knowledge base, learning triggers and firms’ responses 
Firms’ responses 
Learning triggers 
Internal External 
High Tech companies Traditional companies High Tech Traditional High Tech Traditional 
R&D oriented responses; Internationalize 
since start-up by partnerships; ‘graft’ external 
knowledge; development of knowledge 
management systems; Plan at wide scope; 
Diversify to key international markets / 
clients; 
Industry and design oriented; 
Internationalize incrementally by 
exporting; heavy reliance on had hoc / 
informal learning; 
Planning at short range, ‘top down’, at 
teams’ level; Expand products to 
geographically and culturally near markets; 
Lack of 
international 
business 
knowledge (INF); 
Lack of international 
business knowledge 
(INF); 
Domestic regulation (L); 
Excessive rules and 
regulations (L); 
Poor knowledge transfer 
between firms and 
universities (L); Small 
market size (I); 
Global competition (I); Poor domestic 
payment conditions (L); High 
transportation costs (L); Cultural 
differences overseas (L); Small market size 
(I); 
Resort to international investment sources;  
Services selling; Licensing; Franchising; 
Reliance on self-funding; 
Seize institutional support (shoes and 
cork industries); 
Lack of financing 
capacity in the  
long-term (S); 
Financial balancing (O); 
Trouble in getting long-term  
financing (S); High interest 
rates (L); Credit shortage 
(L); 
Lack of public support (I); High interest 
rates (L); Preference for some industries 
(I); Credit shortage (L); 
Move headquarters abroad, Spin out;  
Externalize non-core R&D capabilities; 
develop consulting functions; Integrate 
accumulated R&D capabilities into integrative 
approaches;  
Improve the design function; production 
and marketing changes; Improve 
operations and delivery time; Outsource 
capacity (shoes); Merge (cork); Internalize 
outsourced functions (moulds); Obtain 
reliable foreign representation (wine); 
Capitalize the Portuguese image; 
Need to innovate 
continuously to 
face competition 
(S); 
Lack of formal 
knowledge workflow 
(INF); Difficulties in 
contacting customers 
(INF); Lack of capacity 
to export (O); Lack of 
technology (S); 
Trouble in promoting the 
firm abroad (L); 
Lack of public support (I); 
Lack of regional network 
(L); 
Poor domestic  
Infrastructures (L); 
Difficulty in engaging in collaborative 
partnerships (L); Distant from markets 
(Shoes) (L) Lack of regional network 
(Moulds) (L); Complexity of international 
markets (L); 
Network internationally to attain a high 
standard diverse portfolio; 
Keep firm small with the same R&D team; 
Strategic repositioning; 
Target customized market niches; 
Maintain traditional clients; Keep the firm 
small and with the same top management 
team; Cost control; 
Owner-managers’ 
proactive posture 
(S); 
Owner-managers’ 
reactive posture (S); 
R&D labour availability (L); 
Deteriorating economic 
environment (L); 
Production labour availability (L) 
Deteriorating economic environment (I) 
Learning triggers: INF – Informational; S – Strategic; O – Operational; I – Industry specific; L – Location specific
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Domestic constraints  
Previous research has emphasised the importance of context, i.e. in terms of business 
networking and milieu (Etienne et al., 2008) and the need for learning processes to be 
understood in terms of contextual factors as well as firms’ internal characteristics 
(Macpherson and Holt, 2007). This study showed the main constraints and 
corresponding responses experienced by firms in the context of Portugal. It supports the 
view suggested by some recent research that the current economic crisis, lack of 
finance, qualified labour, and poor access to information and advice continue to  hinder 
Portuguese firms’ innovation and growth processes (e.g. Santos, 2000). This study 
shows in particular how both high-tech and traditional firms have been able to 
internationalize to overcome domestic constraints and to develop new markets in order 
to survive and grow (Table 6.7). In this respect, domestic clients represented only a 
residual share of the case study companies business
135
. 
Different sectors, however, pose different challenges. High tech companies overcame 
the domestic constraints faced through their strong collaboration with international 
partnerships whilst traditional companies were able to establish occasional production 
partnerships in response to sporadic increased demand. In addition, traditional 
companies were generally reliant on their ability to self-finance and therefore, did not 
face the investment needs of high-tech industries, nor were they forced to sell services 
to survive.  
In general, the evidence indicates that high-tech companies experienced less difficulty 
in dealing with the international environment than did traditional manufacturers. They 
were more reliant on international networking (and shareholding), while their owner-
managers were more educated. They therefore exhibited greater flexibility and strategic 
responsiveness than did the traditional companies which responded to challenges and 
new market knowledge in a more incremental fashion.    
Peripheral location  
Previous research has tended to focus on contexts that are well-favoured in terms of the 
sort of infrastructure and support needed to facilitate high growth businesses (e.g. 
Boekema and Rutten, 2007). Few studies have explored firms’ learning within 
                                                          
135
 Only Pelcor held a significant domestic market share of 30% in 2012. 
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peripheral contexts (e.g. Fontes, 2007), with their varied differences in terms of 
regulation, taxation, and access to finance (Bartelsman et al., 2005). Other research on 
Portuguese businesses confirms a context of poor productivity and weaknesses in the 
education of human capital and in innovation capability (Teixeira and Fortuna, 2004); a 
relatively closed approach to innovation (Lopes and Teixeira, 2009), and weak 
networking competencies (Teixeira et al., 2013). Furthermore, the research corroborates 
the weak linkages between Portuguese SMEs and local universities, attributed to 
cultural differences and a lack of entrepreneurially-minded staff within universities 
(Varum and Rocha, 2013). 
This research provides further evidence of the nature of the domestic constraints 
experienced by Portuguese firms, notably, limited engagement with international 
networks and markets, a lack of international business knowledge, lack of effective 
location-based resources (such as public support with regard to internationalizing), lack 
of appropriate bank or venture capital finance, poor infrastructure and facilities to 
support innovation (e.g. science parks) and lack of effective and collaborative 
partnerships with universities and other firms. Traditional companies experienced more 
intensely the effect of such a limited regional system of innovation due to their owner-
managers’ lack of international knowledge, narrow experience base, and lack of 
purposive regional networks.   
Nonetheless, domestic institutional support in terms of internationalizing was effective 
and important in two of the traditional cases at least (Pelcor and ACSMV). These 
findings are congruent with other recent research confirming that financial assistance is 
concentrated on certain favoured sectors (e.g. cork, wine) (Pinho and Martins, 2010), 
and also that internal equity was the primary funding source for most companies 
(Bartholdy et al., 2012; Serrasqueiro et al., 2011).  
The study evidenced that all companies faced financial, knowledge and location-related 
constraints due to their peripheral location and lack of effective regional innovation 
strategy. It supports recent research in a Portuguese context of overly-centralised 
decision-making that has hampered local initiatives in terms of investment (Cabral, 
2007). Specifically, it corroborates recent studies on the largely incipient nature of the 
Portuguese venture capital market (Teixeira and Grande, 2013). The biotech firms in 
particular, were negatively affected by the lack of public funding and shortage of long 
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term investment, pushing them to dependence on their service provision to larger 
partners. High-tech companies faced constraints in terms of lack of collaboration 
opportunities at the domestic level. There was no evidence of ICT and biotech clusters 
at the domestic level, which, together with the small market size and inadequate 
infrastructures forced the companies to turn towards international markets, including by 
moving plants abroad (e.g. Biotecnol).   The sporadic recruitment of external expertise 
also played a role in firms’ efforts to transcend their peripheral context, expanding their 
inter-organisational learning scope and contributing to their adoption of ‘open 
innovation’ practices.  
The high-tech companies were shown to have largely addressed the major informational 
and funding requirements needed to develop their complex products (e.g. combined 
technologies) and attain closeness to key distant markets. These companies, in general, 
were able to diversify to different Business-to-Business (B2B) sectors, through conjoint 
product development and numerous inter-organisational interactions (e.g. licensing).  
Traditional manufacturing companies, in contrast, experienced greater difficulty in 
dealing with their context and engaging with an international business environment. 
They were more heavily impacted by the effects of the economic crisis being  
principally Business-to-Client (B2C) sectors, in which customers tended to disregard 
secondary goods (e.g. accessories, shoes and wine) in the middle of a financial shortfall.  
Furthermore, they approached internationalization incrementally while seeking to 
maintain their domestic market share, and competing through customised rather than 
low price products. Additionally, although some companies were part of some local 
clusters (e.g. moulds), due to the less collaborative environment, they hardly engaged in 
domestic partnerships, other than informal and sporadic production partnerships. 
The Portuguese context and ‘innovation system’ was therefore shown to pose a number 
of challenges and limitations for GOFs that strongly influenced their learning processes 
and ensuing growth trajectories.  
Firms’ responses  
Prior research posited that the growth and success of firms depends on how they deal 
with events and crises (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005).  This study contributes with insights into 
the different forms of ‘openness’ in terms of innovation practices and how this group of 
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GOFs responded to contextual challenges. Traditional firms were found to rely 
principally on their relatively less formal approaches to R&D, and related design 
capabilities, their productive efficiency and the considerable entrepreneurial experience 
and business networking activities of their owner-managers. These companies were 
found to be production and marketing-oriented and rarely sought advice or decision 
making support outside of the firms’ boundaries, whereas high-tech firms were much 
more network-oriented on a worldwide scale. Moreover, traditional manufacturers, due 
to their inward-looking tendencies and lesser degree of openness in terms of innovation, 
chose to contract additional capacity intermittently.  High-tech firms, on the other hand, 
engaged in formal production and licensing partnerships with large international 
companies.  
Previous research, conducted in favoured regions, suggests that high-tech companies 
tend to grow by spinning out or acquiring other firms, evolving towards localized 
industry agglomerations (Schreyer, 2000). This study has revealed that the Portuguese 
context falls considerably short of the ideal national innovation system suggested as 
being necessary to support GOFs (e.g. Delmar et al., 2003). Portuguese SMEs, although 
experiencing sales growth, neither experienced much growth in terms of employment 
over time (as reflected in Portugal’s below average share of employment in science and 
technology within the EU - see section 3.4), nor were they part of localised clusters 
(Teixeira and Grande, 2013). The lack of localised networking, economic cooperation, 
or effectively governed support compelled Portuguese GOFs to rely heavily upon the 
development of their internal core capabilities, while widening their learning scope and 
openness to relatively distant sources of knowledge and resources. This occurred 
through diverse interactive learning processes (e.g. networking, searching) that varied 
according to the nature of the sectors and product markets involved (see Figure 6.1).  
 Learning processes  
Previous research contended that there is a need to explore how firms’ learning enables 
SMEs to respond differently to varied external constraints, whilst maintaining their 
growth (Smallbone et al., 1995; Zahra et al., 2006; Theyel, 2012). This research 
identifies the different learning configurations of two groups of high-tech and 
manufacturing companies.  
 231 
The analysis has revealed the various processes by which Portuguese high-tech and 
traditional companies have been able to access and apply new knowledge when 
responding to opportunities and challenges (Table 6.8). The high-tech companies 
revealed greater ‘openness’ in terms of innovation practices and higher learning 
intensities, as evidenced by their larger range of learning modes (e.g. YDreams).  
Learning interactively through procedures of searching new external opportunities, 
imitating the competitors and networking with distant partners, suppliers and clients 
were shown to be key to the acquisition of complementary external knowledge (e.g. in 
sensing and selecting business opportunities). Also important was a relatively inclusive 
approach to integrating the views of staff at different levels through procedures for 
planning business goals, improvising new products/processes and adopting fresh 
approaches and new routines/practices, thus strengthening firms’ overall entrepreneurial 
capability.  
Learning by doing 
Recent research suggests that learning by doing and reliance on the firm’s tacit and 
idiosyncratic knowledge is a largely adaptive learning mode characteristic of SMEs of a 
reactive orientation (Zahra et al., 2006). This study demonstrates that all the companies 
prioritized efficiency considerations, taking action to improve their routine procedures. 
Specifically, the owner-managers, R&D, design and production teams shared daily 
routines, repetitive tasks, exploiting their ‘theory in use’ (Argyris and Schon, 1978). 
Occasionally, other more explorative learning was prompted in the face of 
environmental events. This was more common in high-tech companies and particularly 
the ICT companies with their shorter-life products and turbulent markets, which 
compelled the need for other, more exploratory learning processes (e.g. acquiring 
external expertise).  
Having examined the interchange between exploration and exploitation in different 
sectors, Table 6.8 summarises the different learning processes that were identified 
across the examined firms at R&D and business (B) knowledge levels. 
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Table 6.8 Principal learning processes 
 
Learning mode ‘By doing’ 
Trial and 
error 
Networking Imitation Planning Searching Improvisation 
Learn to 
learn 
Training ‘Grafting’ 
Knowledge type R&D B R&D B R&D B R&D B R&D B R&D B R&D B R&D B R&D B R&D B 
CASES 
YDREAMS × x   × × x x × × × × × × × ×    × 
BIOTECNOL × x   × ×   × × × ×   × ×    x 
BIOALVO × x   × ×   × ×  × x x × × x x  × 
ALTITUDE × ×   × ×   × × × ×   × ×   x × 
NFIVE × x   × ×   x x × × x x × ×     
PELCOR × × × ×  ×      × × ×       
MOLDENE × ×    x   × ×  ×     x    
SOMARQUES × ×    ×  ×    × × ×       
ACSMV × ×  ×        ×     x    
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Trial and error 
Recent research posits that by trial and error, tentative learning actions, utilizing part of 
the firm’s ‘bag of tricks’, take enterprises beyond their normal routines and principally at 
the early development stage of the firm (Zahra et al., 2006). This study shows that 
learning in the traditional manufacturers needs to be understood in terms of their 
relatively unsystematic and less formal approach to management and innovation, 
focused on incremental improvements to existing products that strongly relied on their 
owner-managers. High-tech companies exhibited a wider learning scope and more 
methodical learning processes than traditional companies, apparently to avoid errors 
related to the planning of business/production goals and to assure shareholders and 
encourage further investment.  
Networking  
Networking through regular social interaction is an important mechanism by which new 
knowledge is identified and absorbed within enterprises (Zhang et al., 2006).  Previous 
studies (Vale, 2004) have shown that Portuguese GOFs tend to build entrepreneurial 
capability through informal and distance networking. This study demonstrates how 
high-tech companies in particular are able to learn by networking and collaboration 
(including at R&D level) during the process of internationalization, and in order to 
promote their products and services globally.  Conversely, traditional companies did not 
network much, nor did they exhibit much ‘openness’ in terms of exchanging 
organisational knowledge (e.g. at design level).  
Imitation  
Previous research has found imitation to be positively related to growth (e.g. Autio et 
al., 2000), whereas other studies contend that GOFs are market oriented and they 
innovate rather than imitate (Etienne et al., 2008), or are ‘creative imitators’ (Fontes 
2007). This study has found that sector characteristics compelled firms to imitate their 
competitors to varying degrees. Thus, high-tech companies hardly ever imitated others’ 
products or processes because these companies, some with proprietary rights, were 
specialists positioned mostly in markets based on inimitable core capabilities that 
distinguished them from competitors. ICT companies, as well, tended to search only for 
related and external knowledge from clients and partners that complemented their 
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existing core capabilities in terms of software platforms. Conversely, traditional 
companies imitated competitors more frequently.   
Planning  
Formal planning is generally accepted to be more prevalent amongst large, old and well-
established companies (Zhang et al., 2006). This study of SMEs showed that the 
adoption of formal planning is sector specific. High-tech companies, operating within 
knowledge-intensive sectors, planned their business goals to set product development 
objectives and allocate long-term investment accordingly. As they operated within 
global and highly demanding investment sectors, strategic planning was necessary to 
anticipate potential radical changes (e.g. the need to spin-out or move abroad). 
Conversely, planning in manufacturing companies, reliant on self-funding and 
occasional public aid in some cases, tended to be relatively short-term and limited to the 
operational level.  
Searching  
It has previously been argued that GOFs adopt an active learning posture, retaining a 
willingness to review existing routines through constant searching (Sadler-Smith et al., 
2001) and that the owner-manager is key in terms of identifying and selecting potential 
opportunities (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). In this study all the examined companies 
searched for new opportunities, through a process of searching for new clients and 
responding to new client needs (e.g. product specifications and functionalities). The 
traditional companies in particular, less reliant on wide networking and partnership and 
more based on their owner-manager searching efforts, tended to search frequently for 
external knowledge related to potential business opportunities or fashion tendencies.  
‘Grafting’ 
Prior research posited that firms can learn through acquisition, or ‘grafting’, whereby 
they acquire another business or new expertise to gain ‘second-hand’ access to new 
resources and capabilities (Huber, 1991). This research found that all companies were 
short of international business knowledge, partly because of their peripheral location 
and their R&D focused knowledge base. The solution in more affluent high-tech 
companies was to acquire external business expertise, or other specialized firms to 
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rapidly obtain the knowledge needed (e.g. Altitude). Acquiring (or ‘grafting’) external 
expertise was therefore key to high-tech companies that operated within a more 
complex, intense and demanding environment. Conversely, traditional companies 
tended to rely on their owner's managers’ industry knowledge base and were sceptical 
of the value of external expertise and/or lacked the means to afford it.  
Improvising  
Previous research has identified improvisation as a distinct type of learning in fast-
moving competitive settings where unplanned experience influences action as it occurs 
(Moorman and Miner, 1998). This research found some instances where externally-
gathered knowledge was applied by improvising, particularly in the traditional 
companies where new products and processes were improvised in order to respond to 
immediate client demand.  ICT companies, on the other hand, tended to rely on more 
methodical and trustable processes (e.g. planning) and rarely, if ever, engaged in 
improvisation.  
New ways of learning  
Prior research has sought to advance understanding of how firms ‘learn how to learn’ in 
response to radical challenges to their existence and sustainability (Argyris and Schon, 
1978; Liao et al., 2003). This study identifies how different propensities in this respect 
vary according to sector and knowledge intensity, with the high-tech companies 
achieving their outcomes through a greater propensity to engage in strategic planning 
and innovation practices that were more open, inclusive and reflective compared to the 
traditional companies.   
Training  
Prior research has posited that established companies are likely to be more deliberative 
in their approach to learning, as managers have more resources to explore the potential 
of existing approaches (Zollo and Winter, 2002). This research has evidenced that 
learning was principally based on action, rather than planning. The examined firms 
exhibited little prearranged, formal learning such as vocational or ‘on the job’ training. 
Learning processes in high tech companies, operating within more complex and 
knowledge intensive sectors, exhibited greater variety compared to the traditional cases, 
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with internal experiential learning ‘by doing’ routine procedures being complemented 
with systematic searching, formal and complex networking arrangements and the 
acquisition of external knowledge and other companies.  
In high tech companies, complementary external knowledge tended to be disseminated 
by more systematic business planning or, occasionally, by learning new methods 
through restructuring. In contrast, traditional owner-managers acquired external 
knowledge mainly through informal searching of opportunities, but also by imitating the 
competition with regard to product features and through informal networking with local 
distributors. This complementary external knowledge tended to be further integrated by 
less systematic experimentation with new products by trial and error and rapidly 
improvising in order to fulfil unexpected demand (see intersections of Figure 6.1).  
The findings therefore show that high-tech firms were more dynamic in terms of their 
ability to combine external and internal learning modes. Although exploiting 
experientially their existing knowledge, they also carried out more exploratory learning 
behaviours - searching and networking with external stakeholders and planning detailed 
business goals. Occasionally they also acquired external firms and expertise, improvised 
new products and processes and changed the way they usually learn. 
Traditional companies, on the other hand, were more efficiency-driven, less systematic 
in their learning, which was principally through experiential action on routine 
procedures and attempting new business solutions by trial and error. They also 
combined these processes with other more exploratory learning which includes 
searching new business opportunities, imitating competitors’ processes and products, 
improvising occasionally new products and networking with distributors.  
In traditional companies the learning scope was also narrower, and mostly confined to 
the management team. Significantly, traditional companies rarely learnt by systematic 
and methodical means, such as formal planning of business goals, recruiting external 
knowledge or by reinventing their learning methods during structural change. Internal 
experiential learning and external more exploratory behaviour (e.g. searching) was 
revealed to be prevalent across all companies.  
The study shows that only the high tech companies could be characterised as proactive, 
fast and intense learners, whilst their traditional counterparts learnt more incrementally, 
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innovating through learning processes that were relatively ‘closed’ and narrow in scope. 
High tech companies were more demanding in terms of R&D cooperation that was 
critical to co-develop complex global products. In contrast, traditional companies 
(except Moldene), produced less complex and demanding products for which there was 
less of an imperative to engage in cooperative R&D (see Figure 6.1).  
The owner-manager  
This study has a particular focus on the idiosyncratic learning issues experienced by 
different owner-managers from different sectors. Prior research posited that in facing 
critical events, learning in SMEs is situated (Harrison and Leitch, 2005) and dependent 
on entrepreneurial learning (Cope, 2003). Moreover, learning modes may be differently 
combined over time (Colbert, 2005), with the role of the entrepreneur being key to 
developing the firm’s entrepreneurial capability by sensing, selecting and shaping 
opportunities and synchronising capabilities accordingly (Abdelgawad et al., 2013).  
The study supports that owner-managers are crucial in determining and mediating 
firms’ openness with respect to innovation. Owner-managers were key knowledge 
gatekeepers, gathering and incorporating complementary external R&D and business 
knowledge in high-tech companies; and networking principally at the business level in 
traditional companies (e.g. with regard to client needs or fashion trends).  
The study evidenced that entrepreneurial learning, focused on organisational leaders and 
their core teams, was also key to improving the firms’ business knowledge and 
absorptive capacity, instigating and leading strategic change. The lead entrepreneurs of 
high tech companies were shown to sense and select opportunities in terms of business 
and R&D through interactive learning, driving their firms’ openness towards external 
new knowledge and resources and moderating organisational tendencies towards 
closeness and protectiveness while shaping opportunities.  
The results highlight that entrepreneurial capability is crucial in determining an 
appropriate balance between openness – needed to reap the advantages of collaborative 
innovation, with closedness – needed to protect intellectual property and core 
capabilities; and also in terms of balancing explorative with exploitative learning 
modes. The suggested ideal for a competitive enterprise - the central intersection of the 
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circles in Figure 6.1 - combines the collective development of new capabilities and 
increased absorptive capacities, while also protecting core knowledge and capabilities.  
This study has identified the central role of the entrepreneur in maintaining and 
integrating firms’ entrepreneurial capabilities through distinct combinations of learning 
modes. Indeed, owner-manager roles were diverse and varied across sectors in terms of 
knowledge intensity and learning processes, ranging from a more limited, individual 
searching and informal business-related role in traditional companies, to a more 
collective and formal role and exploratory learning modes, in the high tech companies. 
Owner-managers were therefore key in terms of explaining the varied entrepreneurial 
capabilities. In high tech companies, the owner-managers integrated diverse views 
facilitating organizational novelty (e.g. brainstorming sessions), whilst in the 
manufacturing firms the decision-making process tends to be confined to the top 
management team. Similarly, while the entrepreneurial capabilities of high tech 
companies were more dynamic in encouraging the creation of new capabilities (e.g. 
combining different R&D core capabilities and diversifying into new international 
businesses), the capabilities of manufacturing companies were focused on incremental 
improvements to design, production and marketing (see Figure 6.1).  
The findings are consistent with other recent studies positing that Portuguese owner-
managers often lack business knowledge (i.e. in terms of marketing, sales and customer 
service) and experience difficulties in dealing with business uncertainty and issues 
related to international markets (Pinho, and Martins, 2010; Teixeira and Grande, 2013). 
This study shows how GOF owner-managers’ address their lack of international 
business knowledge by engaging in international business networks, partnerships and 
exports, with the owner-managers of high-tech companies exhibiting a more proactive 
stance and those of manufacturing companies being  more reactive.  
This research shows how owner-managers’ entrepreneurial learning was often situation 
specific and played a key role in terms of how firms built their entrepreneurial 
capability, responding to particular external and internal constraints, mediating  firms’ 
‘openness’ in terms of innovation practices through specific learning processes and 
strategies, with varying outcomes (Figure 6.1).  
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High tech companies, operating within more turbulent, highly knowledge-intensive 
environments, and with their more educated owner-managers, responded to contextual 
constraints (e.g. lack of long term venture capital) through more formal and cooperative 
learning processes (e.g. involving partnerships and consortia) and more strategic 
outcomes (e.g. the creation of spin outs).  
Conversely, traditional companies within more stable, less knowledge intensive sectors 
and with less educated owner-managers, engaged in more informal and simple learning 
processes (e.g. searching), in facing competitive issues and exhibited less significant 
entrepreneurial capability (confined to the management team) (Figure 6.1).   
Learning outcomes 
Prior research posited that entrepreneurial capability and innovation play a key role in 
the firm’s growth process (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). Indeed, the firm’s learning 
outcome, in terms of combination of knowledge resources and capabilities, can 
constitute a key competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2001). This study found that, 
although most companies improved their competitive advantages as a result of their 
learning process, entrepreneurial capability varied according to sector and the 
underlying learning configurations, with high tech companies exhibiting greater 
dynamism and proactivity. The attained entrepreneurial capabilities and competitive 
advantages are summarized in Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.9 Learning outcomes 
 High tech companies Traditional manufacturer companies  
Entrepreneurial 
Capabilities  
 To combine different R&D 
core capabilities into unique 
technologies / products (e.g. 
electronic devices and ‘cloud’ 
technology); 
 To enter into new 
international businesses; 
 To ‘graft’ new knowledge 
internationally (e.g. acquisition, 
hiring); 
 Strategic control and 
flexibility; 
 International networking 
capacity (e.g. sources of 
investment, franchising and 
licensing); 
 Continuous R&D 
improvement. 
 Business capabilities in 
international marketing, searching 
and networking (e.g. 
distributors); 
 Flexible production, R&D, and 
decision making (e.g. design, top 
management); 
 Continuous production and 
marketing improvement;  
 Knowledge on dealing with 
European funding aids. 
Competitive 
advantages  
 Integrative approaches; 
 Spin outs; 
 Reputation; 
 Strategic business diversity 
(e.g. identification, accessing); 
 Business specialization; 
 Market proximity; 
 Prestigious partnerships; 
 Quality control; 
 Certification; 
 Investment capacity; 
 R&D capacity;  
 High service level; 
 Small size and self-financed. 
 Market specialization approach; 
 Market diversity and proximity; 
 Small, flexible, and self-funded; 
 Reputation; 
 High service level; 
 Certification; 
 Client loyalty; 
 Production and design capacity; 
 Quality control. 
 
Traditional companies operated in less complex and changing sectors and were found to 
have less intense learning processes, less engagement with ‘open innovation’ practices 
and were generally more reactive in dealing with learning issues. In this way, their 
learning outcomes were also different (Table 6.9.).  
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The companies evidenced distinct results from their process of sensing, selecting and 
shaping opportunities and coordinating resources accordingly (Abdelgawad et al., 
2013).  In high-tech firms, the entrepreneurial capabilities gained were reflected in 
terms of new skills in new technology to enter into different businesses, which resulted 
in, for example, customised software platforms or biotech ingredients. Conversely, in 
the traditional companies the entrepreneurial capabilities achieved were in terms of 
minor design and marketing adjustments, in order to target new markets and 
competences in international business. However, all companies shared a key point in 
gaining entrepreneurial capabilities for a customized approach in different markets and 
to diverse client needs.  
To summarise, the study shows the varying degrees to which Portuguese GOFs were 
open to and able to access external knowledge and support, and the extent to which this 
involved learning at an international level in order to overcome domestic constraints. It 
contributes additional insights relating to the combination of learning processes that 
support GOFs’ ‘openness’ in terms of innovation practices and the configuration of 
entrepreneurial capabilities. It emphasizes how these learning processes underlie the 
relationship between owner-manager, external knowledge acquisition, intra-firm 
knowledge dissemination and SMEs’ responsiveness in the context of a 
peripheral/intermediate region. 
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7. Chapter seven: Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the case of Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs and, in so 
doing, contributes an improved conceptual understanding of their learning processes. 
Growth-oriented SMEs are considered crucial to economic growth and, as such, have 
become an increasing focus of academic and policy attention. Previous evidence and 
theory has identified the importance of organisational learning in applying knowledge 
resources, as well as entrepreneurs’ experience and ability with respect to opportunity 
identification.  There is only a limited understanding, however, of the interplay between 
learning processes and contextual factors over time (e.g. Zhang et al., 2006), 
particularly with regard to intermediate and peripheral economic contexts such as that 
provided by the case of Portugal.  
The research framework adopted for this study combines insights from three different 
academic perspectives, namely organisational, entrepreneurial and regional theories of 
learning and how these relate to growth. This final chapter draws conclusions about the 
findings in relation to the specific research questions addressed and identifies the 
contribution to academic knowledge. It also considers some implications for 
management practice, reflects on the methodology adopted and its limitations, and 
identifies directions for future research.     
7.2 Discussion of research questions 
This section draws conclusions from the findings of the study and discusses them in 
relation to the research questions: (1) What is the nature of the learning process in 
Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs?; (2) What is the influence of context upon learning 
processes?; (3) What is the role (and relationship between) entrepreneurial and 
organisational learning in responding to critical contextual events and challenges in 
Portuguese growth-oriented SMEs?; (4) How do we best conceptualize the learning 
processes of growth-oriented SMEs?  
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7.2.1 What is the nature of the learning process in Portuguese growth-
oriented SMEs? 
The study has explored the learning processes of Portuguese growth-oriented firms 
(GOFs) within a setting characterised by significant weaknesses in terms of the 
national/regional institutions and the supportive relationships often seen as necessary 
for an effective innovation system. Although Portuguese GOFs were found to share 
many of the characteristics identified in the international literature on GOFs (e.g. as 
summarised in Table 2.1), there are also some important differences. The case study 
organisations were principally SMEs, their owner-managers were in general highly 
educated (particularly in high tech companies) and entrepreneurially experienced 
(particularly in traditional companies). High tech companies exhibited high learning 
intensity and varied learning processes, helping them to access and apply complex 
sector-specific external knowledge. 
However, although growing in terms of sales, they exhibited little job growth and rarely 
sought to acquire external expertise. Traditional GOFs, operating within less complex 
contexts, showed sales growth while being driven by the growth dynamics of their 
sector (e.g. Moldene), without necessarily being very entrepreneurial or fast learners. In 
particular, the traditional companies showed little openness in terms of their innovation 
procedures or proactivity towards change, and low learning intensities in terms of their 
ability to explore and combine different learning modes.  
The research has revealed the sector-specific nature of GOFs behaviours, including in 
terms of engagement with R&D partnerships, reliance on accumulated industry 
experience and the knowledge searching efforts of owner-managers. Firms’ 
organizational characteristics also varied with sectors, whether top down/hierarchical in 
terms of structure and with innovation procedures and related interactions largely 
confined within firms’ boundaries (as in the manufacturing cases); or more horizontal 
structures and encouragement of wider staff participation, as well as a greater openness 
to various forms of  partnership working with external actors and the creation of new 
spin out businesses (as more often found in the high tech cases).  
Although the literature indicates that SMEs’ growth is strongly related to contextual 
variables (e.g. Wynarczyk et al., 2013), little research has addressed the learning and 
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growth modes by which firms adjust to their particular contexts (e.g. Macpherson and 
Holt, 2007). This study shows how the constraints posed by the Portuguese context 
prompted different responses. For instance, biotech firms’ need of long term investment 
triggered greater networking effort and associated learning to identify alternative 
sources at an international level, whilst the demand for custom-made products drove 
improvements to their design skills, underpinned by experiential ‘learning by doing’. 
Thus, learning processes and behaviour were found to have sector-specific 
characteristics. 
The general economic crisis and lack of a coherent and supportive innovation system in 
Portugal (see section 3.4) also compelled the search for alternative means of supporting 
firms’ growth and innovation efforts i.e. foreign shareholding / joint innovation projects 
in the high tech cases and reliance on their internal equity in traditional companies. 
Such diverse behaviours in a constrained economic/institutional context have received 
little attention in the literature, which has tended to focus on GOFs within better 
developed economic contexts.  
By responding to this research question, this study contributes to knowledge in four 
main ways.  First, due to the constraints of the domestic economy, all companies 
internationalised whilst relying heavily on their in-house capabilities.  The lack of a 
cooperative regional culture and venture capital drove searches for alternative 
international investment sources (notably in the biotech cases), complementary 
partnerships (high tech firms) and self-funding (traditional firms).  
Second, high-tech companies demonstrated more varied learning processes compared to 
their traditional counterparts, involving complex R&D knowledge, and more interactive 
learning with innovation partners leading to co-developed products.  For the traditional 
manufacturers, on the other hand, internationalisation was limited to the export of 
products developed in-house, relying on their internal R&D and product design 
capabilities and imitation of competitors in responding to near and culturally familiar 
markets. 
Significant innovation is often dependent on  collaboration and sharing with external 
agents, although there can be tension insofar as firms are also motivated to protect their 
innovations and related intellectual property in order to remain competitive (Oakey, 
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2013). This study found that high tech companies, notably in the ICT sector, were more 
engaged in innovation partnerships leading to radical and co-developed new products. 
Both ICT and biotech companies tended to select trusted partners from whom they 
could gain complementary R&D knowledge, while also adopting measures to protect 
their internal core technologies. Conversely, traditional companies, with their less 
intensive R&D, tended not to engage in R&D partnerships – a contributory factor here 
being their concern to protect their design skills/registrations and trademarks (e.g. 
ACSMV). At the same time, innovation in traditional companies was restricted to 
incremental product changes and related improvements to their design and production 
capacities. Different configurations of learning processes and willingness to engage in 
co-operative partnerships in support of innovation therefore gives rise to varied 
outcomes.   
Third, the owner-managers were found to be the principal knowledge gatekeepers, 
absorbing and disseminating external complementary knowledge via varied learning 
modes. Their role in moderating firms’ openness in terms of innovation and building 
entrepreneurial capability over time has received little previous attention. Relevant and 
complementary external knowledge was often identified and brought into organisations 
by leaders and senior managers to be further applied in various ways, including in the 
restructuring the company i.e. in targeting new businesses (e.g. YDreams’ spin outs) or 
redesigning its organisation (e.g. Moldene’s new organisational design). 
Significantly, organisational structures and cultures were found to be closely related to 
levels of engagement with external actors and ‘open innovation’ practices. High tech 
companies exhibited relatively open forms of governance, based on decentralized 
partnerships and spin outs, whilst the traditional companies tended to be rather ‘closed’ 
and with relatively top down hierarchical structures, with firms’ learning processes 
appearing to be concentrated within top management teams. The study shows, therefore, 
how higher levels of environmental turbulence, complexity and knowledge intensity – 
notably in high tech sectors - necessitated greater organisational responsiveness and 
fluidity in terms of organisational boundaries, which contributed, through different 
firm’s responses, to maintaining firms’ entrepreneurial capabilities and preventing their 
decline.   
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Finally, the study shows how innovation processes and related learning lead to distinct 
entrepreneurial capabilities across the examined cases and sectors. In high tech 
companies, entrepreneurial capabilities revolved around the combination of distinct 
internal and external capabilities (e.g. internal technologies and externally acquired 
knowledge and shareholding) which resulted in unique products. Conversely, in 
traditional companies, entrepreneurial capabilities centred on the strong business 
competencies of owner-managers and firms’ flexible production and design capabilities.  
To further explore the nature of learning processes in Portuguese GOFs, we developed 
sub-questions from our understanding of the shortcomings in the literature on growth, 
and entrepreneurial and organizational learning. We take each research question in turn 
to show how they have been addressed. 
7.2.2 The influence of context upon the learning processes 
The Portuguese economic context and innovation system   
This study shows how growth and learning processes are strongly influenced by 
external contextual variables relating to the economy, institutional environment and 
factors relating to innovation support, regional cooperation and education - i.e. the 
domestic innovation system. First, and in terms of positive influence, high tech firms in 
particular have benefited from Portugal’s relative strength in aspects of higher level 
science education.  More negatively, the study provides evidence of a Portuguese 
context of a small domestic market worsened by the ongoing global economic crisis, a 
shortage in terms of investment sources (e.g. venture capital) appropriate to high tech 
firms’ long term needs, and a lack of collaborative networking amongst public and 
private actors.  Also apparent were experiences of inefficient and restrictive regulation, 
perceptions of excessive taxation, and the limited availability of credit, further 
compelling firms to internationalize and to rely on their own internal capabilities.  
Biotech firms, for instance, were compelled to continuously improve their own internal 
capabilities (e.g. management skills), apply for alternative funding (e.g. European 
funding programmes), and to sell consultancy services to help secure much needed 
working capital.  
Second, there was little evidence of successful collaborative partnerships between 
Portuguese enterprises in related sectors. Evidence of industrial clustering was scarce 
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and only a few favoured industries (e.g. cork and wine) have been targeted for public 
support. Likewise, there were few examples of purposive relationships and knowledge 
sharing with other local innovation actors, such as universities. The local/regional 
contextual environment did not therefore appear to encourage ‘open innovation’ and 
there was a lack of a regional cooperative culture (see section 3.4).  
Such findings would seem to confirm that the domestic context of the case study firms 
is a long way from the idealised notion of a coherent business innovation system that is 
regionally embedded and based on close relationships between highly networked local 
actors (e.g. Boekema and Rutten, 2007; Etienne et al., 2008). In order to overcome the 
constraints posed by their domestic context, all the firm cases examined chose therefore 
to focus on developing relationships with partners and clients located abroad. The 
constraining influence of this regional insularity was particularly evident in the case of 
the traditional manufacturers, further reinforcing their relatively inward-looking cultures 
and limitations with respect to international business knowledge and innovation based 
on minor product and process adjustments.  
The examined companies overall engaged in innovation mostly with distant 
international actors.  However, the geographical distance between most firms and their 
clients, suppliers and technology transfer centres  gave rise to varied responses in terms 
of how firms sought to balance openness and engagement with other actors with 
‘closeness’ and IP protection. Some high tech companies  had relocated their 
headquarters or spun out subsidiaries in order to be nearer to principal clients, markets 
and sources of R&D support  (e.g. in the US) or acquired international business 
expertise (e.g. Altitude) and contracted consultancy advice (e.g. YDreams). On the other 
hand, traditional manufacturers adopted more informal approaches to searching for and 
acquiring simpler marketing-related knowledge, building on their existing local industry 
knowledge, and with more limited financial resources tending to limit their focus to 
nearby European markets.  
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The learning processes  
The firms examined responded to the domestic economy and related innovation system 
constraints by combining internal and external knowledge through different learning 
processes and with different levels of openness towards external actors and sources of 
knowledge. The examined companies, overall, showed high levels of absorptive 
capacity in relation to business knowledge, principally gained at an international level, 
reflecting needs that were difficult to fulfil at the domestic level. Relative levels of 
learning intensity were also found to be closely associated with sector-related 
knowledge demands and the extent to which firms engaged with international networks 
and sources of academic knowledge. In particular, innovation practice in high tech 
companies involved combining internal R&D knowledge with new external knowledge, 
gathered through complex and formal learning arrangements and partnerships with 
clients.  Other contributory aspects were acquisitions of firms and external expertise, 
and their development and provision of specialised consultancy services. Conversely, in 
traditional companies, innovation practices were particularly focused around in-house 
design capabilities, combined with simpler external business knowledge largely gained 
from distributors, wholesalers and clients. In high tech companies, growth was 
underpinned by radical innovation and complex interactive learning processes that often 
involved the creation of new organisational forms and related arrangements, such as 
spin outs (YDreams), licensing (Altitude), or franchising (NFive).  In traditional 
companies, on the other hand, growth involved the creation of new stores and 
distribution points for their existing products.  
The examined companies combined exploitative learning, involving incremental 
improvements to existing products and processes, with more explorative learning.  The 
latter took many forms, with innovative outcomes resulting principally from planning 
collectively (or at management team level), international networking and partnership 
building, acquiring external expertise/other firms and researching new client needs. 
Other learning processes involved investments in vocational training to support R&D 
level experimentation with relatively radical new products; imitation of competitors’ 
products and processes, and rapidly improvising new products by newly combining 
existing concepts, designs and resources. Additionally, all companies, the high tech 
cases in particular, had been compelled, at least once in their lifetimes, to learn new 
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methods of learning through rapid restructuring. The interview evidence reveals how 
exploitative and more experiential learning ‘by doing’ routine procedures were often 
combined with more explorative learning processes at the organisational level. 
The study has been focused on the key role of lead entrepreneurs and senior managers 
and largely reliant on their accounts.  In this respect, there was some evidence of the 
processes and mechanisms by which their learning was disseminated and applied within 
organisations. New external business knowledge brought into the firm by leaders/CEOs 
was often crucial in raising collective awareness (within high tech firms in particular) of 
strategic challenges, opportunities and the collective effort and planning that might be 
needed.  Responses to external challenges and strategy relating to innovation included 
spinning out new businesses, acquisition of new  expertise and the cultivation of 
partnerships (e.g. YDreams, Biotecnol, Bioalvo), accessing appropriate investment 
sources and income from selling services (e.g. Biotecnol, Bioalvo), or integrating 
complementary technologies (e.g. Altitude, NFive, Moldene). Conversely, in traditional 
companies the application of external knowledge tended to result in incremental 
modifications to a standard product (e.g. a new shoe, with a new sole to a new client) 
and by trial and error experimentation with new products specifically targeted at a new 
market (e.g. a new accessory made of cork for a new client sector).  
Planning processes in high tech companies tended to be relatively ‘collective’ in nature 
and supported by professional knowledge management systems. Higher levels of inter-
organisational learning were particularly apparent in the biotech companies. This 
seemed to be attributable to a combination of factors, including the long R&D lead 
times of their products and heavily reliance on long term investment which also 
reinforced the need for a systematized approach (i.e. in terms of planning a formal 
partnership) and transparency towards external investors, and with inter-organisational 
learning also being furthered through their networking efforts with other key actors, 
joint long term planning and acquiring external expertise (‘grafting’). Significantly, ICT 
companies were heavily engaged in R&D partnerships, reflecting their need for 
complex knowledge and formal cooperation arrangements, while also relying heavily on 
external networking and knowledge acquisition by recruiting external expertise.  
In contrast, traditional companies tended to rely on their in-house resources and 
demonstrated less openness to new external knowledge or partnering to support 
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innovation. Their learning processes were principally reliant on internal design 
capabilities and centred on their senior management teams. In this way, traditional 
companies exhibited relatively less intense learning and a lower diversity in terms of 
their learning processes. They rather showed a tendency to learn in a less systematic and 
professionalised way, for instance by sporadic approaches to investigating the needs of 
clients and related networking with local distributors. In addition, their business 
planning tended to be relatively informal and confined to the senior management teams.  
Unlike the high tech cases, the traditional cases exhibited few instances of learning new 
ways of learning in the face of structural changes or investment in formal vocational 
training. Moreover, there was only limited evidence of high tech (e.g. YDreams) or 
traditional companies (e.g. SOMarques) occasionally learning by imitating competitors. 
Additionally, the studied companies overall, partly due to their financial limitations, 
rarely acquired other firms but rather engaged in international partnerships to develop 
(high tech) and commercialize (traditional manufacturers) innovations. Furthermore, 
high tech companies showed a greater propensity to learn new ways of learning in the 
face of strategic downturns compared to their traditional counterparts.  
This research has highlighted the importance of the different forms of R&D and 
business knowledge used by firms and the varying extents to which they rely on 
external sources of support to meet their innovation needs and growth aspirations. In 
general, the high tech companies had a higher propensity to seek and apply external 
knowledge, i.e. through networking and collaborative partnerships, both in terms of 
business and R&D knowledge.  In contrast, searching and networking in the traditional 
companies tended to be limited to the acquisition of business knowledge, while relying 
heavily on their internal production and product design/development capabilities.  
Learning outcomes in terms of capabilities and competitive advantages 
The study shows how firm level capabilities evolve out of learning from a combination 
of entrepreneurial and organisation wide learning (Table 6.8). Owner-managers 
contributed mainly by providing complementary business knowledge and strategic 
direction, but with important variations in terms of enabling absorptive capacities and 
firm propensities to engage in ‘open innovation’ practices.  Interactive cooperative 
arrangements were central in the high tech cases, whereas production/marketing 
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capabilities and relatively informal approaches to searching were to the fore in the 
traditional companies (see Table 6.8). 
The research found that high tech companies have evolved toward specialization in 
knowledge intensive business niches to flexibly combine capabilities through global 
partnerships, spin outs, and some acquisitions of other firms and external expertise that 
led to the capability of building integrative custom-made products. In contrast, 
manufacturers had developed strengths in production and design and developed 
capabilities in terms of flexible international design and marketing campaigns.  
The research found that new capabilities developed by high tech companies often led to 
new products for new markets, whereas in traditional manufacturers’ capability 
development contributed to continuous improvement in international business 
knowledge, design and certification. Explorative learning through cooperative 
arrangements and partnership governance (e.g. co-development of products through 
licensing) led to competitive advantages in terms of international R&D and business, 
whereas exploitative learning (e.g. ‘by doing’ the same products to the same clients) and 
informal searching at the business level, confined to the organisational boundaries and 
firms’ hierarchical governance, tended to lead to more operational based competitive 
advantages (e.g. customised products). In this way, traditional firms, being more 
‘closed’ and traditionally managed, with their entrepreneurial capability being confined 
to the top management team, were less open to external knowledge than their high tech 
counterparts that demonstrated a broader entrepreneurial capability.  
The study also revealed that once companies had internationalized successfully, their 
newly attained capabilities and competitive advantages in dealing with international 
business led to improved growth in their domestic markets i.e. the reputation attained at 
distance, through prestigious partnerships became a ticket to admission to other more 
demanding clients. The increased internal knowledge appeared to augment the capacity 
to search for more external knowledge. 
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7.2.3 The influence of entrepreneurial learning in Portuguese growth-
oriented SMEs 
The study has shown how owner-managers and their contribution to the entrepreneurial 
learning of organisations was central in identifying gaps in knowledge and 
competencies, identifying and combining external business knowledge with internal 
R&D/design knowledge, thus building firm entrepreneurial capabilities. 
Owner-managers are revealed to be the main knowledge gatekeepers, identifying and 
selecting opportunities and moderating organizational receptivity to new innovation 
practices. In the high tech companies, they were generally more internationally oriented 
and more involved in inter-organisational learning at an international level, and within 
the firm by shaping responses to opportunities and coordinating resources / capabilities.  
By contrast, owner-managers of traditional companies tended to be more oriented 
towards their domestic industries, targeting opportunities in near and culturally familiar 
markets. During the period of this study, owner-managers were found to have been 
central influences on the observed relative changes to the absorptive capacities of the 
case study organizations.  
The study found that owner-managers from high tech companies (and also Pelcor, one 
of the traditional cases) were more highly educated and proactive in building purposive 
external links,  thus promoting inter-organisational learning (e.g. by acquiring external 
expertise), which also contributed to new spin outs or internet-related businesses. 
Conversely, traditional owner-managers tended to be more reactive and focused on 
firms’ design capabilities, and responding to nearby European markets. Accordingly, 
high tech owner-managers, from knowledge intensive sectors, performed a more 
collective and inter-organisational role in partnership (ICT firms), controlling the 
property to be patented and licensed (biotech firms). Manufacturers’, on the other hand, 
in labour intensive sectors, and being more risk adverse, exhibited simpler and less open 
learning processes based on managers’ experiential knowledge of client needs. The 
study shows therefore how individual entrepreneurial learning contributed to broader 
organisational and inter-organisational learning and innovation processes but with 
significant differences between the high tech and traditional cases.  
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7.2.4 How do we best conceptualize the learning processes in growth-
oriented SMEs?  
The discussion now turns to the final overarching research question: how to 
conceptualize the learning processes in growth-oriented SMEs, given what has been 
revealed about the interplay between contextual factors and processes of entrepreneurial 
and organizational learning.   The research shows how contextual issues relating to the 
domestic economy and innovation system have compelled Portuguese GOFs to rely to 
varying extents upon their internal core capabilities, while also seeking new knowledge 
and from relatively distant innovation actors and resources. Overall, different learning 
processes underpin distinct responses to context, with diverse learning outcomes in 
terms of absorptive capacities, openness and entrepreneurial capability realisation (see 
Figure 6.1).   
The study provides insight into what constitutes the substance of situated 
entrepreneurial learning in growth-oriented SMEs. Entrepreneurial learning in these 
companies is understood through the organising concepts of absorptive capacity, ‘open 
innovation’ and entrepreneurial capability. Learning processes were found to be more 
varied and the level of exploration in firms operating within more complex contexts was 
greater, with experiential learning being combined with more varied and higher level 
learning modes (e.g. complex networking arrangements), in building the firm’s 
entrepreneurial capability over time. Also, external knowledge and entrepreneurial 
capability tended to be further integrated with varying intensity and learning modes, 
through distinct collaborative structures and profiles of strategic leadership.  
7.3 Key Contributions 
Theoretical contribution  
The theoretical foundation of this thesis is organizational learning in SMEs and its 
influence on the main concepts drawn on – entrepreneurial capability, entrepreneurial 
learning and ‘open innovation’. The research contributes to  ‘open innovation’ theory 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Oakey, 2013) by adding understanding of how GOFs in less 
developed contexts seek to overcome domestic constraints by searching for distant 
support whilst relying heavily on their in-house and capabilities. The study also shows 
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how a reluctance to engage in ‘open innovation’ processes is reinforced by the IP 
protection concerns of conservatively managed manufacturing firms.     
The study contributes to capabilities theory by responding to the call of Zahra et al. 
(2006) to clarify the link between learning modes and organisational development. The 
study therefore identifies combinations of learning processes and variations which can 
be related to different sectors and contextual constraints and with varying outcomes. 
This study underscores the interactive effect of different exploitative / explorative 
modes of learning in the building of substantive capabilities and how these contribute to 
the dynamic entrepreneurial capabilities needed for growth.  
Furthermore, due to this analytic distinction of learning modes and capabilities, the 
entrepreneurial learning of GOFs was examined as an interactional process, revealing 
the underlying dynamics involved in the owner-managers’ ongoing learning processes. 
Indeed, little is known so far regarding the role of the entrepreneur in the process of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The study identified the crucial role of 
owner-managers as knowledge gatekeepers able to access various sources of external 
knowledge and thus increasing firms’ absorptive capacities, albeit to varying degrees 
amongst the cases studied.   
Regarding the concept of entrepreneurial capability, previous literature has identified a 
need to reveal the configurations of different entrepreneurial capabilities in its multiple 
elements across firms and sectors and longitudinally (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). This 
study has found that the owner-managers are key to building and maintaining a firm’s 
entrepreneurial capability through absorbing and disseminating knowledge through 
various combinations of learning modes. 
Finally, the process by which firms apply new knowledge to achieve their goals (Sadler-
Smith et al., 2001) remains unclear. This research identified the knowledge bases, 
learning processes and types of knowledge underpinning the firms’ growth process, 
which differ according to the context. The success of high-tech firms was particularly 
dependent on their R&D capabilities, whereas traditional companies had a stronger 
domestic industry orientation based heavily on its design knowledge. Hence, in high 
tech companies, growth was underpinned by more complex interactive learning 
processes leading to more radical change and novelty.  
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Empirical contribution  
First, this thesis extends the study of learning and growth to the empirical setting of the 
less favoured context of Portugal and by demonstrating that not all growth-oriented 
SMEs from certain sectors display a positive relationship with growth and learning, as 
previously suggested (e.g. Katz and Green, 2008). For example, the research showed 
that although growing in terms of sales, Portuguese GOFs exhibited little job growth 
and, in some cases, little propensity to engage in ‘open innovation’. Furthermore, high 
growth is often episodic and unlikely to be consistently maintained over the long term. 
Second, the research has revealed the idiosyncratic and sector-specific nature of the 
learning processes of GOFs within a less developed economic context, bringing to the 
fore the differences between sectors and how the entrepreneurial learning of owner-
managers is central to how sector related opportunities and constraints are addressed 
over time.  
Third, although the spatial dimension has been addressed in interactive learning (e.g. 
Oakey, 2013), the significance of proximity in clustering has generally been overplayed 
in intermediate contexts. This research has shown how proximity does not necessarily 
enhance close collaboration and clustering. In fact, in the Portuguese context clearly 
does not encourage ‘open innovation’ at all, as all the case study GOFs internationalised 
sooner or later to achieve markets, funding and partners.  
A further empirically relevant contribution is the role of different types of knowledge 
and how they are absorbed.  This study has demonstrated how firms with greater 
learning intensity – mainly the high tech cases - are able to combine their internal R&D 
knowledge with externally gathered business knowledge. Conversely, low knowledge 
intensity manufacturers tend to rely on their internal design knowledge combined with 
external absorbed business knowledge.  
Finally, the literature on capabilities posits that the nature and quality of both 
capabilities and organizational knowledge stem from the resources and learning 
processes the firm carries out, with it being opportune to link the learning processes to 
its outcomes (Zahra et al., 2006).  This research shows that new capabilities developed 
through explorative learning by high tech companies often lead to global products for 
global markets, whereas in traditional manufacturers, capability development through 
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exploitative ‘by doing’, contributed to continuous improvement in international 
business knowledge and design competences.  
7.4 Overall conclusions 
To summarize, this research highlights the interplay between firms’ capabilities and 
how the contextual challenges and opportunities are addressed through different 
learning processes.  Owner-managers/leaders were shown to play a central role, leading 
to distinct learning outcomes in terms of firms’ absorptive capacity, capabilities and 
competitive advantages.  In the relatively peripheral (or intermediate) context of 
Portugal, GOFs face particular challenges relating to  limited domestic markets, 
insufficient investment sources, weaknesses in the system of education and training, 
knowledge and institutional constraints, and a general lack of a co-operative culture 
relating to business innovation.  These contextual characteristics have contributed to the 
lack of regional cooperation and openness in terms of innovation, with Portugal being 
quite different to the relatively well endowed regions with their supportive institutional 
contexts that have featured in many previous studies on business growth and learning.  
Spatial proximity and clustering of business and other institutional actors (e.g. 
universities) did not necessarily lead to the development of purposive relationships, 
with the case study companies more often engaging in distant trust-based networking 
and partnership building with key international actors or, in the case of traditional 
manufacturing companies, relying on their entrepreneurial experience and targeting 
nearby and familiar (culturally close) international markets. Either way, the ‘innovation 
system’ in which these companies were engaged was highly internationalised, while 
building on in-house strengths in terms of R&D, design and production skills developed 
at the domestic level. However, traditional companies showed narrower innovation 
behaviours as their networking tended to be restricted to the commercial level (i.e. 
knowledge relating to markets and client preferences) and innovation was strongly 
based on the feedback and needs of established clients.  
The research found that owner-managers have carried out a central role by embedding 
their entrepreneurial learning into the wider process of organisational learning, and 
firms’ entrepreneurial capability and absorptive capacity. External business knowledge, 
obtained by owner-managers through diverse activities (or modes of learning), was 
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identified as crucial in building firms’ absorptive capacities in all the studied cases. The 
owner-managers, tended to moderate their firms’ ‘openness’ in terms of innovation by 
identifying and selecting potential opportunities and setting cooperation arrangements at 
inter-organisational level whilst protecting their firms’ core capabilities.  
The research shows that all companies were driven to internationalise sooner or later to 
overcome domestic constraints and explore new opportunities. As suggested by the 
literature (Autio et al., 2005), new internationalizing ventures demonstrated greatest 
absorptive capacity in their ability to explore new international businesses. 
Nevertheless, a distinction between high tech companies and traditional companies, 
with the former adopting more explorative learning behaviours and the latter more 
exploitative learning behaviour (e.g. as suggested by Zhang et al., 2006) was not 
evident. Instead, all of the examined companies exhibited both explorative and 
exploitative learning behaviours, with the former being led by owner-managers (or 
senior management team), the principal knowledge gatekeepers, and exploitative 
learning behaviour also occurring at the organisational level, mostly based on stable 
local resources, such as skilled labour. Additionally, high tech companies more often 
demonstrated collective learning behaviour at the organisational and inter-organisational 
levels, improving their entrepreneurial capabilities, for instance through improvising 
‘brainstorming’ sessions or learning new ways through restructuring, whereas in 
manufacturing companies, instances of two-way organisational learning during their 
relatively stable life spans were rare.  
The research shows that in the most proactive cases, responses were driven by the speed 
of developments in new technology sectors, thus necessitating intensive learning in 
order to remain abreast of such developments, whereas the more reactive responses of 
the traditional cases were associated with more stable environments (e.g. lengthy 
technology cycles) and with incremental learning and innovation being more prevalent. 
Hence, the learning outcomes, entrepreneurial capability and modes of growth were of a 
more strategic nature in high tech companies (e.g. combinative products, spin outs) and 
of a more operational/ marketing nature in traditional companies (e.g. operational 
flexibility, organic growth).  
In general, high tech firms exhibited higher levels of absorptive capacity during the 
study, as reflected in their greater variety and frequency of adaptive changes and 
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innovative developments, such as establishing specialized spin outs near key markets, or 
developing integrative solutions by combining different technologies. These companies 
had augmented their capabilities of strategic restructuring through international spin 
outs, long term partnerships, headquarters relocation and grafting expertise. Traditional 
companies, on the other hand, were found to have increased their absorptive capacities 
in terms of design and international business knowledge, developing capabilities in 
international business.  
The findings indicate that such increases in absorptive capacity were particularly related 
to behaviours associated with the concept of ‘open innovation’  (e.g. forms of 
networking governance), and involved particular combinations of learning modes and 
scopes, in which entrepreneurial learning played a central role in moderating the firms’ 
openness towards innovation collaboration. The speed and turbulence of ICT develop 
means that success and growth is highly dependent on high levels of exploratory search, 
networking and inter-organisational learning, involving both R&D and business 
knowledge. Biotech companies dealt with very specialized/unique products, heavily 
demanding in terms of investment, and thus their learning behaviours and modes tended 
to be narrower in scope, focused on searching and planning for long term 
projects/investments while prioritising the protection of intellectual property and core 
R&D capabilities. 
Conversely, traditional manufacturing companies, within less knowledge intensive 
industries and faced with  a relatively stable environment therefore tended to exploit 
existing knowledge, engaging less often in ‘open innovation’ and external learning 
modes, short term planning, and with learning principally focused around the owner-
manager and senior management teams. These companies preferred external learning 
processes such as imitating competitors’ products and processes and searching 
informally for client needs, at the business knowledge level and were less likely to 
undertake radical new ways of learning through a firm’s restructuring, such as could 
lead to a new product to a new market. 
The study shows that owner-managers were of special importance to all firms, playing a 
key role as knowledge gatekeepers, collectively embedding external acquired 
knowledge into organisational learning and mediating the firms’ openness in terms of 
innovation. The process allowed complementary external R&D/business knowledge to 
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be linked with internal R&D/design/productive knowledge in order to seize 
opportunities and coordinate the firm’s resources / capabilities, and was very 
systematized and participative in high tech companies (particularly biotech).  
The research found that local R&D internal capabilities were core in high tech 
companies, whereas local design and production capacity were of particular importance 
in the case of the traditional manufacturers. Despite their different industry contexts, 
responses, learning behaviours and outcomes, both high tech and traditional 
manufacturing companies were able to achieve high growth rates, although in all cases 
periods of high growth tended to be episodic rather than sustained over time. Hence, the 
research has found it more appropriate to categorise these companies as Growth-
Oriented Firms (GOFs) rather than High Growth Firms. However, some had limited 
learning intensity and limited openness in terms of innovation, which can be attributed 
to their stable context, conservative owner-managers and reduced absorptive capacity.  
7.5 Implications for management practices 
During the fieldwork period of this study Portugal was experiencing the consequences 
of a global economic recession, which has worsened its long standing structural 
problems and limitations in terms of policy support for business and innovation (see 
section 3.4). This study has also highlighted businesses’ experiences and negative 
perceptions with respect to regulation. Significantly, according to the OECD (2012), 
although Portugal has made progress in the development of policies for better regulation 
(e.g. the Simplex programme), there remains a need for the  Portuguese public sector to 
become more cost-efficient and better able to contribute to a supportive environment for 
business and innovation. The country continues to present important regulatory 
limitations, such as significant delays in the court system and EU regulations that are 
still below the EU average in terms of the efficiency of their implementation (OECD, 
2012).  
In addition to providing useful insights into the entrepreneurial learning literature, this 
research suggests that there is a need for support for GOF owner-managers in improving 
firms’ absorptive capacities and ability to access and benefit from external support. In 
this respect there is a need to address the inward-looking and self-reliant culture and 
practice of ‘traditional’ companies in particular, and their preference to avoid becoming 
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reliant on external resources and to rely instead on limited self-finance. Also, evident 
was a lack of collaboration, even in those firms within relatively concentrated industrial 
clusters (e.g. Moldene and SOMarques). There was little evidence of positive benefits 
from economic spatial concentration as firms only collaborated occasionally, notably in 
response to a need to enhance their project delivery and production capacities through 
subcontracting arrangements (e.g. SOMarques and ACSMV). There are important 
barriers to collaboration at the domestic level and subsequently a need to create more 
effective institutional mechanisms to broker and coordinate local innovation 
partnerships.   
These findings suggest that interventions to help develop and support learning processes 
within GOFs in intermediate/peripheral regions are needed. GOFs that are particularly 
limited by an over-reliance on owner-managers’ entrepreneurial knowledge and internal 
core capabilities, should be selectively targeted with appropriate support to expand their 
opportunity horizons, for instance in terms of international business knowledge. By 
becoming more familiar with the more complex aspects of their business and operating 
environment, these owner-managers also became more understanding of the type of 
assistance needed to address their specific needs. 
Supplementary assistance is therefore paramount to these companies seeking to grow 
through internationalisation. Previous entrepreneurial experience gained through 
experiential learning might be adjusted to the context of a specific GOF through 
managerial training (e.g. formal courses and export seminars), in order to provide the 
appropriate knowledge to help these owner-managers develop a stronger client focus 
and to become more responsive to the potential of new international markets. 
7.6 Methodological discussion – reflections on what I have learnt and 
some limitations of the study  
This PhD has been a learning experience for the researcher and it is appropriate to 
reflect on the approach adopted and some inevitable limitations of such a small-scale 
study. In the course of undertaking the empirical aspect of this study a number of 
challenges were encountered which necessitated some adjustments to the original 
research design and a flexible attitude towards what was feasible, particularly given the 
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limited resources available to the researcher and given the self-funded nature of the 
study.    
The research involved nine qualitative case studies of enterprises selected to represent 
two broad sectors and six industry sub-sectors, and so contributes towards theoretical 
insight rather than statistical representativeness. Given that the study was also 
conducted within the specific context of Portugal, caution needs to be exercised when 
seeking to generalize the findings to other industries and regions.  A further main 
limitation relates to the difficulties experienced in accessing firms’ staff and other 
related external actors, meaning that the study was heavily reliant on the accounts of the 
owner-managers and CEOs. Potential participants from the lower ranks withdrew their 
support, expressing concerns that their comments might conflict with the owner-
managers’ or that they would reveal confidential data. Also, owner-manager 
interviewees withdrew their support in relation to the provision of internal 
documentation, which may be a reflection on their inward-looking nature and/or their 
lack of trust towards a university-based researcher to maintain strict confidentiality. 
Likewise, most were unwilling to facilitate access to relevant external actors (e.g. 
suppliers) for fear they would reveal sensitive data. Hence the interview evidence is 
largely dependent on the accounts of top strategic leaders in the nine case studies.  
Nevertheless, seven interviews were conducted with relevant partners, clients, or 
suppliers, with the permission of the owner-managers in these cases, to some extent 
helping to reduce bias and enhancing the robustness of the analysis.  
The initial intention of the researcher to observe important in-house organisational 
events, and to encourage owner-managers to complete a diary log – i.e. to write down 
relevant learning issues – had to be abandoned due to lack of co-operation, also 
constituting a methodological limiting factor. Participants were generally unwilling to 
adopt a diary log or allow the researcher to observe meetings of strategic importance.  
The development of the proposed model (Figure 6.1) required much insight. Combining 
theories relating to entrepreneurial (e.g. entrepreneurial capabilities), regional (e.g. 
‘open innovation’ theory), and organizational (e.g. absorptive capacity) levels was 
undertaken with apprehension, particularly given the study’s heavy reliance on the 
accounts of owner-managers. Although they have been used separately, these theories 
have rarely been combined within other studies or, to the writer's knowledge, been 
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applied together to the intermediate and less supportive Portuguese context and across 
different sectors. To render visible the learning processes of those growth-oriented 
SMEs, data was analysed in a ‘creative’ manner, combining their analytical / theoretical 
roots and contributing to the researcher’s methodological learning and insight.  
The study promotes theoretical development by linking methodological considerations 
and empirical enquiry with constant reference to the specific sectoral contexts involved. 
This was strengthened through inclusion of the views of other relevant actors, such as 
the industrial associations or firms’ suppliers and partners, thus providing a degree of 
triangulation with the accounts of owner-managers. The study also benefitted from the 
constant guidance of the researcher’s supervisors, which led to the proposed model 
being refined further. The later inclusion of perspectives from the literatures on ‘open 
innovation’ and entrepreneurial capability was also an important exercise in terms of 
updating and strengthening the literature review with new theoretical developments.  
At the beginning of the study, the researcher was not aware of the key sources of 
knowledge and learning processes that underlie the growth of SMEs in intermediate 
contexts. Hence, the ‘open innovation’ literature revealed the potential tension between 
firms’ willingness to share their capabilities in co-operative partnerships and their 
motivation to conceal core competences and related IP. Entrepreneurial capability 
theory unveiled the varying role of the owner-manager in identifying, selecting and 
shaping opportunities across sectors, as well as in coordinating the firm’s resources 
accordingly. This added significant value to the wide range of literature covering 
individual entrepreneurial learning (e.g. learning issues) and collective organizational 
learning (e.g. absorptive capacity). Furthermore, with the wisdom of hindsight, the 
semi-structured interview schedule applied in the subsequent interviews was improved 
following a first pilot interview (in the case YDreams), particularly by including probes 
to elicit  greater insight on key issues while omitting some questions found to be 
unnecessary.  
To summarise, a real limitation of this work has been the cautious attitude of the owner-
managers of the case study firms which limited the researcher’s ability to include the 
perspectives of other actors, both internal and external to the enterprise.  Answers were 
evasive and further interviews with other staff members were either postponed or never 
allowed.  This limited consideration of multiple perspectives which was a downside 
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with respect to the aim of furthering understanding of organisational and collective 
learning dynamics. The lack of contribution from other views on organisational learning 
was a limitation of this research, which leads us to the discussion of future research. 
7.7 Future directions for research 
This study has explored a complex topic and has been informed by findings and 
ongoing theoretical debate in the extant literature. Further areas for additional research 
are proposed below.  
First, since there is relatively little research on the learning processes of growth-oriented 
SMEs, further research utilising other methodologies is essential. This would aid in 
developing the organisational learning aspect of this study by including the perspectives 
of a wider range of actors. It would also be of value to conduct research to cross-
evidence the conclusions with other methodological tools, such as a diary log, 
observation, and interviews with other organisational actors and external stakeholders, 
and thus address a limitation of this research. To allow generalisation of the 
conclusions, it would also be of value to conduct quantitative research with a larger 
sample of GOFs and include a larger number of interviewees per company. For 
example, it would be wise to strengthen future analysis through a survey, periodically 
applied to firms’ learning indicators over a period of time.  
Second, further studies that explore how entrepreneurial capability is built in 
intermediate contexts are needed to further clarify the links between entrepreneurial 
learning and contextual issues.  In general, a worthy goal would be to combine the 
understanding gained here with entrepreneurial capability theory (Abdelgawad et al., 
2013) and particularly to better theorise how firms in peripheral contexts learn about 
and connect with key global markets and innovation actors. 
Third, questions around ‘open innovation’ and entrepreneurial capability should be 
explored widely throughout the organisation, particularly as this allows for more 
understanding of entrepreneurial learning and the team’s role in this. Abdelgawad et al. 
(2013) suggest that obtaining different views and integrating entrepreneurial capability 
throughout the organization is positively related to the creation of new opportunity 
realization paths.  Zhang et al. (2006) also point out the importance of disseminating 
individual entrepreneurial learning throughout the firm.   
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Fourth, this study has only touched on structure and strategy in discussions around 
collaboration. Abdelgawad et al. (2013) note that structure has a part to play in the 
embeddedness of entrepreneurial capability that should flow in a decentralised way 
across organisational units. Nicholls-Nixon (2005) note that GOF owner-managers are 
able to develop a structure that enables ‘self-organizing’ learning, for instance by 
emphasizing relationship building. With internationalisation, more sensitivity toward 
structural / strategic analysis would be valuable. Future studies could analyse how 
entrepreneurial learning and capabilities interplay with different strategies / structures. 
Fifth, there could also be a focus on more specific themes concerning the role of owner-
managers corresponding, in part, to the key elements of the conceptual framework set 
out in Figure 6.1. While past research on entrepreneurial learning demonstrated the 
impact of contextual events, there is scope for detailed mapping beyond what has been 
shown in this study. Additional research should be conducted to further examine the 
role of different learning configurations in legitimising distinct ‘open innovation’ 
regimes and to elaborate typologies of entrepreneurial capability. In addition, another 
goal for research concerns the need to study the implication of firms’ contextual 
networks in building their learning capabilities.  
Finally, there is a need to further explore the situated and idiosyncratic nature of 
entrepreneurial learning and how this links to ‘open innovation’, entrepreneurial 
capabilities in other different contexts. By applying different national and sector 
contexts through a longitudinal approach, entrepreneurial learning scholars may gain 
new insights into what, how and why questions, such as: what are the situated processes 
that owner-managers engage in over time?; what is the role and potential of local 
contexts and related support in promoting ‘open innovation’ and the building of 
entrepreneurial capabilities?; how are the other staff members’ views and organisational 
learning taken into account in the process?  
Overall, there is considerable scope for future investigations to advance the research 
started here, and to provide further understanding of both growth and entrepreneurial 
learning within peripheral contexts and the intersection between the two.   
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Appendix i 
1
st
 interview 
 
Learning Processes in Growth-oriented SMEs 
 
Topic Guide for Face to Face Interviews with  
Owners Managers 
 
I am developing a PhD thesis at Middlesex University London about learning 
mechanisms in SMEs. The study intends to understand the longitudinal process of 
learning within the development of growth-oriented SMEs.As part of this study I am 
conducting interviews of owner-managers to bring additional insight into their firms’ 
learning processes. The interview should take about an hour. 
 
This interview aims at focus on the main issues in your business activity over the last 
three years. I am interested in events that were of importance to you in this period and 
how you (and your firm) handled them.  
 
The main topic areas that I would like to discuss with you are: 
 Some background details about yourself and the business; 
 Relevant changes  and environmental critical events;  
 The learning processes by which you (and the firm) has dealt with change; 
 The influence of such processes in firm’s ability to learn. 
Interview record - to be completed in advance: 
Company:  
Address:  
Contact details:  
Year of foundation:  
Interviewee:  
Position of interviewee:  
Business founder (s):  
Type of business/Industry  
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Interviewer:  
Date:  
 
 
1. Background Details 
 
(This section aims at capture the previous experience of the entrepreneur, the 
firm’s knowledge heterogeneity and stock, the firm’s learning / innovation 
intensity and its growth rate) 
 
1.1 Background and current role of owner-manager/founder (s) 
 
 
1.2 Background and current role of other key managers (e.g. middle managers)  
 
 
1.3 Year of establishment and main historical events 
 
 
1.4 Main activities 
 
 
1.5 Product/markets where the firm operates 
 
 
1.6 Number and level of training of employees 
 
 
1.7 Rate of introduction of new products 
 
 
1.8 Sales growth (last 3 years)  
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1.9 Estimated sales  
 
2. Environment  
 
2.1 I would like you to tell me what significant changes have you implemented in 
the last 3 years? 
 
(This question aims at understand the relevant contextual critical events endured 
by firm / entrepreneur and decisions taken to deal with them) 
 
Prompts: 
 
Products? 
 
Processes? 
 
Staff? 
 
Market? 
 
Technology? 
 
 
2.2 What forces have driven these changes? 
 
(This question aims at bringing additional insights over the mentioned critical events, 
namely, namely their interrelatedness with macro, micro and firm dimensions) 
 
Prompts: 
 
Internal (e.g. performance)?  
 
External (e.g. industry, spatial (local, regional, national, international)?  
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3. Firm’s Learning Mechanisms  
 
3.1 How has the business managed these changes? 
 
(this question aims at explore different modes of acquiring knowledge and 
different levels of learning, either more low level incremental, or more high 
level transformational)  
Prompts: 
 
Improving processes?  
 
Changing procedures? 
 
Planning? 
 
Imitating others?  
 
Improvising?  
 
Networking? 
 
3.2 What have been the facilitating factors in these changes (e.g. firm’s previous 
knowledge, partnerships, sources / channels of knowledge, location)? 
 
(This question aims at understanding the relevant actors and sources of 
knowledge that intervene in the previously pointed learning modes and levels) 
 
3.3 And the limiting factors? 
 
Prompts: 
 
Can you explain? 
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3.4 What has been your personal role in managing these changes (e.g. identify 
opportunities)? 
 
(This question aims at explore the role of entrepreneurial learning in the organisational 
learning equation) 
 
4. Absorptive Capacity 
 
4.1 What has been learnt during these changes? 
 
(This question aims at understanding the influence of those learning events upon the 
firm’s absorptive capacity) 
 
Processes? 
 
Products? 
 
Markets? 
 
4.2 How did such learning occur? 
 
(This question aims at understanding which agents other than entrepreneur, internal 
or external to the firm, contribute to firm’s absorptive capacity) 
Prompts: 
 
Externally? 
 
Internally? 
 
By whom (external, internal actors)? 
 
Can you give an example? 
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4.3 Has this learning influenced what the firm is capable of doing now? 
 
(This question intends to understand if new learnt knowledge contributed to firm’s 
absorptive capacity improvement and how) 
Prompts: 
 
Investment? 
 
Products? 
 
Processes? 
 
4.4 How? 
 
 
4.5 To what extent is these changes successfully learnt / implemented? 
 
(This question intends to explore if new learnt knowledge was successfully distributed 
and applied within the firm) 
 
Prompts: 
 
Innovation in products? 
 
In  processes)? 
 
4.6 Can you give an example? 
 
 
5. Concluding reflections and potential further involvement in the study  
 
5.1 Are there any remaining important issues not yet covered that you would like to 
comment on? 
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5.2 Do you know of any other key actor(s) involved in these changes who would be 
of interest to interview? 
 
5.3 Are there any reports or supplementary paperwork relating to these changes that 
would be useful for me to see? 
 
5.4 As part of this longitudinal study over two years the aim is to triangulate 
different sources of information at different times. This would involve further 
interviews and observation of relevant events.  Would you be willing to help me 
in this? 
 
Prompts: 
 
In a future interview (let us say next year)? 
 
In observing in site an important change in the future? 
 
Thank you very much for your help. 
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2
nd
 Interview 
Learning Processes in Growth-oriented SMEs 
Topic Guide for Face to Face Interviews with  
Owners Managers 
I am developing a PhD thesis at Middlesex University London about learning 
mechanisms in SMEs. I interviewed this firm last year attempting to understand the 
longitudinal process of learning within the development of growth-oriented SMEs. As 
part of this study I am now conducting follow up interviews of owner-managers to bring 
additional insight into their firms’ learning processes.  
 
This interview aims at focus on the main issues in your business activity over the last 
year, and I would like to focus on those that are the most important to you. I am 
interested in the things that were your main attention last year regarding your business 
activity and how you (and your firm) handled them.  
 
The main topic areas that I would like to discuss with you are: 
 Explore some details about yourself and the business in the last year; 
 Explore relevant changes  and environmental critical events occurred in the last 
year;  
 Explore the role of organisational learning on dealing with those changes; 
 Explore the impact of such organisational learning processes on firm’s new 
capabilities. 
Interview record: 
Company:  
Address:  
Contact details:  
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Year of foundation:  
Interviewee:  
Position of interviewee:  
Business founder (s):  
Type of business/Sector  
Interviewer:  
Date:  
 
2. Background Details 
 
2.1 Have there been any changes on the background and current role of 
CEO/founder (s) and of other key managers? 
 
Why? 
 
2.2 Have you achieve your business objectives for the current year? 
 
Can you explain? 
 
2.3 Can you estimate its effect on firm’s growth in sales and number of 
employees in the current year? 
6. Environment  
 
From our interview last year it seems like the most important issues were: 
 
6.1 Were these the main ones or do you have in mind other issues that came up in 
the meanwhile (e.g. products / markets / technology/institutional)? 
 
Can you explain? 
 
6.2 What were the triggers for these changes? 
 
Internal triggers? 
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External triggers? 
 
 
6.3 How has this impacted your business activity now (e.g. new products services 
/investment, staff, strategy, market)? 
 
7. Firm’s Learning Mechanisms  
 
I would like to explore how you learn to deal with the above mentioned issues. I would 
like to talk about:  
 
3.1 How did you respond to those critical events?  
 
Improving processes?  
 
Changing procedures? 
 
Planning? 
 
Imitating others?  
 
 
3.2 What have been the main barriers and facilitating factors in the business 
development of your firm over the last year (e.g. product expertise, 
management expertise, networking, partnerships, external aid, new 
opportunities, new financing sources)? 
 
Can you explain? 
 
4 Absorptive Capacity  
 
4.1 Where did you learn the needed knowledge? 
 
Externally? 
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Internally? 
 
 
4.2 How such learning occurred? 
 
Can you give an example? 
 
4.3 Have been in the last year any changes regarding the role of CEO and of other 
key managers? 
 
Why? 
 
4.4 Who in the enterprise has the skills for the product / business development now? 
 
4.5 What are the main difficulties in mastering such new capabilities? 
 
Can you give an example? 
 
4.6 How such new learning has influenced what the firm was able to do before (e.g. 
new products / markets)? 
 
4.7 To what extent is these changes successfully learnt / implemented? 
 
Can you give an example? 
 
5 Concluding reflection and potential further involvement in the study  
 
5.1 Are there any remaining important issues not yet covered that you would like to 
cover on? 
 
5.2 Are there any reports or supplementary paperwork relating to these changes that 
would be useful for me to see? 
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Thank you very much for your help. 
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Appendix ii 
 
A - Ydreams B - Biotecnol C - Bioalvo D - Altitude E - Nfive F - Pelcor G - Moldene H - SOMarques I - ACSMV 
a -The 
context 
1 - 
Knowledge 
base 
 All the 
managers were 
researchers. 
(aA1i); 
I am a chemical 
engineer (CEO). 
I started 20 years 
ago as a PhD in 
research on 
animal biology 
(aB1i);  
The board is today fully 
Portuguese and the firm 
is managed by 
technologists’ experts in 
R&D  (aC1i) 
The team is little 
but we have here 
the core 
competences, the 
R&D (aD1i) 
The team...they are 
graduated 
people...with a strong 
component on R&D 
(aE1i) 
The owner-manager 
comes from the area 
of marketing; she is 
graduated and bet on 
this business (aF1ii) 
Those owner-managers I 
work with worked for long 
time on this industry and 
started as employees in other 
firms (aG1ii) 
One owner-manager 
was initially an 
employee of the firm 
(aH1ii) 
I was already the 
president of 
FENADEGAS (and 
I was its paymaster 
during another 6 
years  (aI1ii) 
2 - Learning 
triggers 
There are 
excellent 
people to fulfil 
functional 
areas  but not 
to 
management 
(aA2iii); 
The 
consultants...hav
en’t recognized 
for years our 
investment on 
intangible assets 
(aB2iii) 
In Portugal... there are 
not strategic and 
management 
competences. (aC2iii) 
We had created 
expectation through 
a structure of 
shareholders 
(aD2v) 
The need to change 
comes always outside 
in (aE2ix) 
An intense 
competition which 
demands us to 
innovate above our 
own innovations 
(aF2vi) 
The automotive client is 
much awaiting for someone 
to take the first step (aG2ix) 
I could even 
internationalize to 
distant regions but I 
do not have the 
productive capacity 
(aH2vii) 
At this point we 
have reached our 
limit regarding 
productive capacity 
(aI2vii) 
3 - 
Responses  
To hire a 
professional 
manager 
(aA3xxvi); 
we’ve start in 
this room 
meetings to 
optimize 
strategies in 2012  
(aB3xxviii) 
We have been hiring 
new people in the recent 
years...with knowledge 
in business development 
(aC3xxvi) 
We used to 
travel...The nets are 
informal and formal 
and we used both 
(aD3xxv) 
The firm born 
globally because it 
started up with a 
French partner 
(aE3xxv) 
Now we have three 
additional managers, 
although I am still 
leading (aF3xxvi) 
At organisational level, it was 
designed an additional 
commercial department for 
plastic moulds (aG3xxvii) 
There is now a fashion 
tendency that we must 
keep up with and 
therefore we make 
hundreds of samples 
(aH3l) 
Regarding the filling 
line we feel the need 
of changing it (aI3l) 
b - Learning 
processes  
4 - Learning 
modes-level 
our main 
source of 
knowledge 
starts to be 
internally... 
mould by the 
experience 
(bA4lx) 
Our experience is 
fundamentally 
‘learning by 
doing’  (bB4lx) 
It is always a process of 
‘learning by doing’ 
(bC4lx) 
This business phase 
is more incremental 
than inventive and 
we must adapt 
continuously 
(bD4lx) 
Our experience is 
paramount to manage 
such continuous 
change (bE4lx) 
The previous 
knowledge has been 
very useful ... it has 
been a continuous 
learning. (bF4lxi) 
Here, the new processes are 
mainly production and 
efficiency related. (bG4lxi) 
The procedures are 
always the same 
(bH4lx) 
There aren’t any 
ruptures with the 
past. We simply are 
improving 
continuously (bI4lx) 
5 - Learning 
scope 
I only 
orchestrate and 
the others play 
their 
instruments 
(bA5lxxx) 
CEO has a 
paramount role 
on 
this...networking 
is highly centred 
on him 
(bB5lxxx) 
I know what to do and I 
must look for allocate 
resources to do it,. 
(bC5lxxx) 
My role is to assure 
the best technology 
used in the product 
and to set priorities 
(bD5lxxx) 
I do the planning, I do 
the strategy and I am a 
technician... I do the 
business development 
(bE5lxxx) 
the owner CEO is the 
first to approach the 
client (bF5lxxx) 
 There are other two 
commercial directors who 
meet and discuss strategies 
but in the end report it to me 
(bG5Lxxx) 
We are autonomous 
but we communicate 
in a daily basis,. 
(bH5lxxx) 
It is the direction 
board who deal with 
those issues (client 
demands) (bI5lxxx) 
c - Learning 
outcomes 
6 - 
Capabilities  
we intend to 
keep an 
integrated 
perspective at 
product level 
(cA6lxxxiii) 
 The future of the 
enterprise 
depends on us 
top / middle 
managers 
(cB6lxxxv) 
now we already 
developed some 
products, get some 
partners and clients 
(cC6lxxxvi) 
We have one single 
world product line 
along 800, 900 
client production 
units (cD6lxxxiii) 
We synthesize on it all 
the technologies we 
have ...into  a single 
one  (cE6lxxxiii) 
this issue triggers us 
to look for another 
suppliers or partners 
(cF6lxxxvi) 
 We have managed to 
improve the process which is 
a partnership after all,  
(cG6lxxxvi) 
Partnerships are 
important as we have 
now two or three 
fabrics working with 
us (cH6lxxxvi) 
We were not the 
first to go to Angola 
but I knew 
somebody in Angola 
(cI6lxxxvi) 
7 - 
Competitive 
advantages 
We intend to 
keep an 
integrated 
perspective at 
product level 
(cA7xci) 
...a market niche 
where we turned 
out specialists: 
(cB7xcv) 
as we can be the 
innovation unit of 
Procter and 
Gamble...because we 
have all things 
integrated: (cC7xcv) 
Our business is to 
sell distinct 
software that can be 
customized 
(cD7xcii) 
We hold a monolithic 
software product 
which presents all the 
functionalities 
(cE7xcii) 
We are focused 
primarily on the 
fashion business 
before we diversify 
(cF7xciv) 
it is very effective as we hold 
a state of the art machinery 
park, an integrated 
organisational system 
(cG7xcii) 
We still being 
positioned on the 
business of shoes to 
ladies, (cH7xcv) 
We have a good 
financial condition 
to obtain financing 
(cI7xcvii) 
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